

American Philanthropy and Post-1956 Hungarian Refugee Aid

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My research at the Rockefeller Archive Center focused on the records of the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Social Science Research Council. Some materials from the Nelson A. Rockefeller papers and the Rockefeller University archives were also consulted. The primary goal of my research was to identify the role of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations in supporting collaboration across the Iron Curtain in the humanities.

Upon arriving at the Archive Center and gaining an initial insight and a better overview of the potentially relevant materials, I complemented my original research agenda with an additional aspect. I realized that among the records of both the Rockefeller and the Ford Foundations, a large number of collections deal with humanitarian actions that benefited Hungarian refugees leaving their country in 1956 and 1957, after Soviet military forces defeated the Hungarian revolution and before the borders were closed and strictly controlled. While it was known that American philanthropic foundations were involved in humanitarian aid, existing scholarship in the field has not reported on the extent of their involvement. The Rockefeller and Ford Foundations gained passing mentions at best, or not at all.¹ Considering the potential benefits for the international research community, I decided to cover these numerous records during my stay. The number of documents on Hungarian refugee aid far exceeded the amount of materials on soft cultural diplomacy in Hungary. Considering that previous researchers have already reported on Ford Foundation's Eastern European Fund, probably, the most important cultural diplomatic effort targeting the region during the early Cold War (that I covered myself to gain firsthand knowledge on the program), I will rather focus in this report on what other researchers did not.

The influx of refugees to Austria and Yugoslavia, after Soviet military forces had put an end to the 1956 Hungarian uprising, mobilized a great number of NGOs. Most of them provided general humanitarian aid, but the social composition of Hungarian refugees was such that many of them needed special assistance.

Among the refugees, the number of students and intellectuals was relatively high and finding their place in their host countries required expertise that humanitarian NGOs did not have. This is where the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, which had been actively involved in supporting cutting edge research and intellectual collaborations and exchanges in academia for decades, could step in and offer their competence and networks. There was a threat that students would not be able to continue their studies and intellectuals would be forced to leave their fields and volunteer for unskilled work, unless organizations found a way to allow them to remain in their profession or go on with their studies. This was recognized early by both foundations, which continuously coordinated their efforts in providing aid for Hungarian refugees.

The most significant contribution of the Ford Foundation within the scope of this humanitarian action was the co-financing of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the aid provided to students and intellectuals was only a little fraction of that sum. In contrast, the Rockefeller Foundation focused precisely on the latter groups in accordance with its founding principles that intended to support an effective use of talent in the service of humanity. Both foundations provided coordinated support to students, typically through intermediaries, but the Rockefeller Foundation made a particular effort to match high-profile academics and physicians with research institutes, universities, and hospitals where their expertise would be put to good use.

The Rockefeller Foundation's Hungarian refugee aid programs ran until as late as 1964 and benefited thousands. Even though the Hungarian revolution raised worldwide interest for some time, it was far from evident that the Rockefeller Foundation should intervene. Indeed, the Board of Trustees was divided on the issue, and the interest and commitment of five officers proved to be decisive. The president of the Rockefeller Foundation at the time of the 1956 uprising was Dean Rusk, who had filled that position since 1952. A key architect of US diplomacy during the Cold War, who would soon become secretary of state, Rusk was quick to recognize the propaganda value of excellent treatment of the refugees, unanimously hailed in the Western press as freedom fighters. Rusk instructed John Maier, who was leading the Paris office of the Rockefeller Foundation, to

gain first-hand information in Vienna in November 1956. Central Europe was not unknown territory for the Rockefeller Foundation, since it provided generous support for public health institutions and research in the natural sciences in the interwar period both in Hungary and throughout the entire region.² As a physicist himself, Maier received information from their colleagues in the field, who were sometimes former Rockefeller fellowship holders. Maier was central in collecting and synthesizing information in the field. He was the author of the March 1957 report that summarized the events of the most critical first few months during the refugee crisis,³ a document of outstanding significance that I published in English with the permission of the Rockefeller Archive Center with a Hungarian language introduction.⁴ On December 8, Edward D'Arms arrived from the New York office, who was one of the deputy directors responsible for the humanities and the arts. His arrival meant a great relief to Maier who was overwhelmed by the difficult task of locating people in need (which was a very time-consuming activity in a chaotic situation), responding to their needs, and mediating between the many Austrian offices (governmental and non-governmental), other NGO representatives, and the Rockefeller Foundation's New York office. D'Arms complemented Maier's field of expertise and brought in new networks. While Maier and D'Arms stayed in Vienna for a longer period, Rusk visited the city on two occasions during December and January. At the same time that Rusk was travelling across the globe to oversee ongoing programs, Robert P. Burden and Gerard R. Pomerat supervised the aid from New York. A sanitary engineer, Burden was an associate director for agricultural programs, while Pomerat, similarly to Maier, held the office of associate director for biological and medical research. Agriculture and medicine were the two most important fields of the Rockefeller Foundations activity in Hungary before the communist takeover. Therefore, they were both well-positioned to deal with cases that required some acquaintance with the country. Burden and Pomerat were reporting to the Board of Trustees, which was a crucial task with great responsibility, since any allocations needed the Board's consent. Pomerat's enthusiastic insistence in favor of aid for Hungarian refugees played a key role in establishing the case and persuading the body.

The first greater aid package was approved on December 5, 1956, the second on December 28, and both were for 600,000 USD.⁵ To give an indication of the level of importance the Board assigned to the Hungarian refugee crisis, we might refer to Pomerat's own prediction, who in a letter to Maier before the Board meeting, expressed his expectation that the allocation would only be around 200,000 USD.⁶ (It should be noted, though, that the crisis grew day-by-day in that period as the number of refugees fleeing Hungary quickly increased.) The total aid provided by the Rockefeller Foundation to help Hungarian refugees until the closure of the program amounted to around 3 million USD over the years.⁷ Almost half of this sum (1.45 million USD) was allocated in late 1956 and during 1957. This latter amount is comparable to the sum that the Foundation spent on its worldwide fellowship program in a year.⁸

The Rockefeller Foundation distinguished among three types of aid within the action: besides the scholarships provided for students and postdoctoral researchers (Program of Emergency Aid in the Arts and Sciences for Hungarian Refugees – Project 1 & 2), it also covered overhead costs for institutions that administered the refugee programs (Aid to Cooperating Educational Institutions – Project 3).⁹ The Foundation, given its prehistory, had the most experience in supporting already established scholars, but this category was rare among the awardees: most of the scholars belonging to this category moved on from Austria relatively quickly without relying on foundational aid, for they were the ones who found their way easily to the US or elsewhere. Especially for physicists, it was not particularly difficult to secure an invitation or even a job offer from a high-profile institution and obtain a visa. A much larger cohort of scholarship holders were students (ca. 600 persons), who received no direct support from the Foundation as it let higher education institutions run the program. The major part of the first two large allocations was transferred to thirteen Austrian universities, and no representatives of the Rockefeller Foundation were involved in selecting candidates.

For the Rockefeller Foundation, excellence had been the most significant aspect when providing fellowships. However, in such critical times, the Foundation needed to make concessions. In the first six months following the revolution, it

did not urge Austrian universities to strictly apply the principle of excellence, for it was difficult to measure the qualities of students in the given circumstances. From mid-1957, however, the Rockefeller Foundation expressed its concern with students who performed poorly and, in some cases, did not even attend classes. In these particular situations, the Foundation asked the universities to deprive them of the stipends.¹⁰ However, in those cases where student performance was convincing, the Foundation did not oppose rather long-term support. For instance, if high school students wished to go on with their studies, they were eligible for extending their scholarship over the entire course of their studies.¹¹ The pragmatics behind such decisions were twofold: on the one hand, the Rockefeller Foundation wanted to secure the best long-term results possible in cases when it already invested in a student so that the money was not wasted. On the other hand, there was a fear that not getting into higher education might motivate some students to return to Hungary and the communists would exploit this for propaganda reasons.¹² Thanks to such long-term stipends, when the program was closed in 1964, only a few dozen students remained without degrees.¹³ This was the first occasion in the history of Rockefeller Foundation to provide non-project-based scholarships benefitting the same individuals over such an extended time.

In response to the crisis, the main site of activity for the Rockefeller Foundation, just as for the Ford Foundation, was in Europe. Both organizations agreed to the principle that students should remain in Western Europe¹⁴ for three reasons: One, transporting them overseas would be much more expensive; two, graduates should be kept close to their home country, so that in case of a political turn, they could return and be the backbone of the new elite; and three, the number of refugee visas was limited. Since the Ford Foundation helped refugees to find their way from Austria to Western Europe and financed students' education, the Rockefeller Foundation decided to focus on Austria. In the end of November 1956, when the two foundations agreed on dividing responsibilities, the US quota for refugees was relatively small. On December 1, however, Eisenhower raised the quota from 6200 to 21,500 persons, a decision that motivated the Rockefeller Foundation to launch a program for Hungarian refugees wishing to immigrate to the US, and in the final account more than 44,000 Hungarians entered the country.¹⁵

Like in the case of Austria, the Rockefeller Foundation relied on intermediaries in the US, as well. Domestic governmental institutions, most importantly the Institute of International Education, and international organizations such as the World University Service were among the most important partners.¹⁶ American universities opened several fellowship programs for Hungarian students, but the language skills of these students did not allow them to start their studies. The most urgent problem, therefore, was to set up English language courses and launch orientation programs that would help the newcomers to adapt to American culture and get them acquainted with the system of US higher education, which was very different from the Sovietized Hungarian one. The largest programs were launched by Bard College and St. Michael's College, and another fifteen small-scale programs were co-financed by the Rockefeller Foundation.¹⁷ In order to accommodate those high-qualified experts, artists, and scientists who chose to immigrate to the US, two organizations received larger support from the Foundation: the National Academy of Sciences and the President's Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief set up by Eisenhower, although, the latter caused controversies within the leadership of the Foundation because of the very direct political affiliation of the Committee.¹⁸

The Ford Foundation reacted somewhat slower to the Hungarian refugee crisis, but its efforts were geographically more broadscale than those of the Rockefeller Foundation. Information was, of course, key to the success of the programs, but it was very difficult to gather. Therefore, communication between such aid organizations were crucial. John Maier and others from the Rockefeller Foundation tried to map out the situation in Austria and motivate local organizations and groups to set aside rivalries and take coordinated action, which required consultations with a long list of individuals on multiple levels. In contrast, the Ford Foundation had a few trusted informants and partners who were close enough to the respective governments to represent a sort of official viewpoint and mediate between the various parties.

The first representative of the Ford Foundation who headed to Vienna was Waldemar A. Nielsen. He had previously served as an assistant to the president of

the Foundation, and was in a transitional phase within the organization, since he assisted Shepard Stone to prepare the International Affairs Program that was an upgrade of the recently established European Program. Both of their efforts were key to the success of the Hungarian refugee students aid that was a further impetus to the new program that highlighted Europe as an important operational field for the Foundation in a new stage of the Cold War. Even though Stone had shown some concern that the Hungarian crisis would affect the establishment of the new program in unpredictable ways, he nevertheless was committed to prioritizing refugee aid in 1957.¹⁹ Ever since December 7, 1956, when the Board of Trustees approved the first emergency aid of 500,000 USD for such purposes,²⁰ Don K. Price, vice president of the Foundation who was responsible for reviewing the matter for the next trustees' meeting, wanted to make sure that the budget was effectively spent and precedents for general welfare aid would be avoided.²¹ Nielsen's memorandum from Vienna on December 18, 1956, greatly informed Price in grounding the principles of the Ford Foundation's operations with regard to the Hungarian refugees. These included a preference to settle the issue mainly within Europe, even if that would require a longer-term support, since finding appropriate jobs in the future for the highly qualified graduated seemed to be somewhat easier in overseas countries than in Europe. Accordingly, Price presented a plan of appropriating another 500,000 USD for student relief in Europe and 150,000 USD in the United States that was approved by the trustees on January 15, 1957.

This initial sum of 1,150,000 USD was supplemented with smaller allocations over the years. The most significant of these was the one approved on March 19, 1959, when 333,000 USD was granted for refugee student aid.²² The total amount spent on Hungarian refugee students, scholars, and artists by the Ford Foundation was around 1,700,000 USD. This figure included the budget for a research program of Columbia University on Hungarian refugees (209,000 USD), and the grant for the Philharmonia Hungarica (91,850 USD), but did not contain the approximately 70,000 USD worth of grant money that the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and the National Office of French Universities and Schools (ONUFE) were unable to spend in the final account, and which was cancelled in fiscal year 1964/65.²³ The last payment for Hungarian refugee

students was made in 1962/63, and the program was terminated two years later, when it was approved that no further financial assistance would be required.

These figures were considerably high, if one takes into account that Henry T. Heald had just been appointed as the president of the Ford Foundation. According to Heald, in the first years of his presidency, he followed a relatively conservative fiscal policy.²⁴ The amount spent on Hungarian refugees was around 38% of the total budget of the European Program for the year 1956/57, and more than half of the actual payments for that year. One of the principles of Heald's presidency was his insistence on strategic planning instead of crisis management.²⁵ In the oral history interview he gave in 1972, he revealed that overseas expansion was not unanimously welcomed by the staff.²⁶ Despite the concerns that he might have had at the time of the refugee crises, there is evidence that he attributed great significance to this particular humanitarian action. The American Red Cross approached the Ford Foundation on November 26, 27 and 30, 1956 and again on December 4, 1956 to support its fundraising campaign.²⁷ Shepard Stone prepared a memorandum, supported by Price, that the Foundation should consider providing the Red Cross with aid for the sum of 5,000 USD or a maximum of 10,000 USD.²⁸ Following an officers' meeting, however, Heald instructed Comptroller Ernest J. Perry to draw a check in the amount of 25,000 USD for the American National Red Cross for emergency relief for the Hungarian people.²⁹ It is not only the increase that should be noted, but also that this grant was not publicized and it is nominally "missing" from the relevant annual report. This is because Heald decided to charge this sum against administrative expenses in order to keep this support under the radar of the public. Obviously, the Foundation wanted to maintain the image that, according to its principles, it did not support general aid, and thus avoided a flood of letters with similar cases.

As previously mentioned, the Ford Foundation's main activity was to assist refugees to find their way to Western European countries outside of Austria, following an informal agreement with the Rockefeller Foundation. Another important difference between the operations of the two foundations was that the Ford people also dealt with Hungarian refugees in Yugoslavia, a country that became a target for the refugees after Hungary's Austrian borders were closed and

strictly monitored by the new Hungarian dictatorship that consolidated itself with Soviet assistance.³⁰ While Sweden, Switzerland, and Italy completed their selection process in Austrian camps, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Denmark, and Belgium also considered recruiting in Yugoslavia. After the January 15, 1957 board meeting, Shepard Stone prepared a recommendation on how to divide the allocated financial support for student grants to countries for two years that followed and, in general, the Ford Foundation realized this plan (Figure 1). The only significant changes were the lower amounts of support for Germany and the United Kingdom, and a massive increase in support for Belgium.

<i>Country</i>	<i>Students</i>	<i>Yearly cost / student (USD)</i>	<i>Estimated amount for 2 years (USD)</i>	<i>Real number of students³¹</i>	<i>Allocated until Sept 30, 1958</i>
Germany	175	770	270,000	175	250,250
France	100	900	180,000	125	178,750
United Kingdom	75	1,200	180,000	54	139,600
Belgium	50	800	80,000	70	140,000
Italy and other countries	100	800	160,000	119	189,350
Totals	500		870,000	543	897,950

Figure 1: Shepard Stone’s recommendations on January 29, 1957 and the realized allocations

Even though the main activity of the Ford Foundation was providing student grants in Europe, it was active in the United States, as well, and for a reason. Getting to the US was the ultimate aim for the majority of the students. According to Viennese field reports from April 1957, the more than six hundred refugee students remaining in Austria at that time had shown limited interest in leaving for France and the UK. Many of them sought paths to the United States instead, or if that was to be impossible to settle, their preference shifted to Canada and Australia. Vice President Richard Nixon’s visit to Vienna on December 25, 1956,

animated expectations among refugees for a more welcoming immigration policy by the United States and it was rumored that from certain countries it was possible to travel on to America.³² Such false news were echoed by the diplomatic services of a number of countries, and representatives of the Ford Foundation were aware of that. What they apparently did not know was that recruiting officers from countries that were unable to fill their quota easily but were desperate to find labor force, deliberately spread the false information in order to derail refugees from their original plans. This is how, for instance, Denmark quickly recruited the necessary number of migrants.³³ A portion of the students, however, was not considered to be at the level of higher education according to the recruiters and could not continue their studies abroad.³⁴

Similarly to the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation also relied on intermediaries. Their primary domestic partner was the Institute of International Education (IIE) through which they contributed to the costs of the mentioned programs at Bard and St Michael's, for instance (66,000 USD in sum). These two colleges received more than half of the money Ford transferred to the IIE (ca. 120,000 USD). The World University Service provided further assistance to the IIE to orient students coming to the US (for 20,000 USD). In Western Europe, the Ford Foundation sought organizations of similar status to the IIE: besides the mentioned DAAD and ONUEF, the Belgian University Foundation in Brussels was its closest analogy. However, in most of the countries, they needed to rely on different types of main actors: in the UK and Italy, the Foundation partnered with individual universities; in Sweden, the National Union of Students; while in Denmark, the Royal Academy administered the aid. The Congress for Cultural Freedom (Paris), the involvement of which was very much promoted by Shepard Stone,³⁵ received 107,000 USD for managing artists and academics movement across borders and match their expertise and needs with opportunities.³⁶

The primary reasoning behind the Ford Foundation two-year student support was to motivate local governments to offer state-funded scholarships. In Belgium and Denmark, where full scholarships were given to students and they required no further assistance from the Foundation, the initiative succeeded in its aim. The partner agency in Switzerland also committed to do the same, but the Ford

Foundation still decided to provide additional support, just as in the Swedish case, where the government found the solution in offering long-term loans. In Germany, France, and Britain, only modest stipends were available, and no sources were allocated for student refugees in Italy. Therefore, the Ford Foundation decided to provide additional funds to partner organizations in these countries in March 1959 (the above mentioned 333,000 USD).

The humanitarian programs launched in late-1956 that went on for several years provided increased expertise for the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations' staff and extended their networks among intellectuals in and from Hungary and East Central Europe. These proved to be significant advantages when exchange programs between the two blocs were developed from the late-1950s and early-1960s.

¹ If the Ford Foundation was given somewhat greater attention, the Rockefeller Foundation is barely mentioned in relevant historical sources. Cf. Granville 2006; Lénárt 2012; Niessen 2016a; Murber 2016. As it came to my attention, an MA thesis at the Central European University was written by Laura-Ann Gousha in 2011, based upon materials of the Rockefeller Archive Center. This is probably the most detailed contribution on the aid provided by the Rockefeller Foundation, but it was not further elaborated in a publication. There are several sources dealing with Hungarian refugee students in the United States: Hidas 2010; Deák 2016; Balogh 2016; Niessen 2016b; Pastor 2016; Sheridan 2016. The contribution of the Rockefeller Foundation was mentioned only by Balogh, Deák, and Sheridan. The funding of Philharmonica Hungarica via the mediation of the Congress for Cultural Freedom was probably the most widely known RF operation after 1956 that is covered by a monograph: Szőke 2006.

² Palló, 2000; Palló, 2002; Weindling, 1993; Page, 2002.

³ Dr. John Maier, Vienna Reports, Rockefeller Archive Center, Rockefeller Foundation Records, Record Group 1.2, Series 750, FA387b, Box 3, Folder 23.

⁴ See Tamás Scheibner, A Rockefeller-jelentés: 1956-os magyar menekültek Bécsben amerikai szemszögből [The Rockefeller Report: The 1956 Hungarian Refugees in Vienna from an American Perspective], *Lymbus* 12 (2019): 771-838.

⁵ Appropriations RF 56181 and RF 56206. See Flora M. Rhind, Minutes of the Executive Committee Special Meeting of December 28, 1956, RAC, Rockefeller Foundation Records, RG 1.2, Series 750, FA387b, Box 1, Folder 13.

⁶ Gerard R. Pomerat to John Maier, 1956. November 29., RAC, Rockefeller Foundation Records, RG 1.2, Series 750, FA387b, Box 1, Folder 14.

⁷ The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report, 1963, 92.

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- ⁸ The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report, 1957, 272.
- ⁹ Note on December 4, 1956, New York, RAC, Rockefeller Foundation Records, RG 1.2, Series 750, FA387b, Box 1, Folder 14.
- ¹⁰ Emergency Aid for Hungarian Refugees, April 5, 1961, RAC, Rockefeller Foundation Records, RG 1.2, Series 750, FA387b, Box 1, Folder 13.
- ¹¹ See e.g. Emergency Aid for Hungarian Refugees, April 1, 1959, RAC, Rockefeller Foundation Records, RG 1.2, Series 750, FA387b, Box 1, Folder 13.
- ¹² Note on December 1, 1956, RAC, Rockefeller Foundation Records, RG 1.2, Series 750, FA387b, Box 1, Folder 14.
- ¹³ Hungarian Refugee Scholarship Program, May 16, 1963, RAC, Rockefeller Foundation Records, RG 1.2, Series 750, FA387b, Box 1, Folder 13.
- ¹⁴ Notes on phone conversation between Dean Rusk and Shepard Stone, November 30, 1956, RAC, Rockefeller Foundation Records, RG 1.2, Series 750, FA387b, Box 1, Folder 14.
- ¹⁵ For an overview of the diverging numbers in various sources, see Deák, 2016, 399.
- ¹⁶ The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report, 1957
- ¹⁷ Roucek, 1958.
- ¹⁸ Warren Weaver to Gerrard R. Pomerat, January 7, 1957, RAC, Rockefeller Foundation Records, RG 1.2, Series 100 International – Series 253 Washington, FA387a, Box 80, Folder 681.
- ¹⁹ Berghahn, 2001: 187-88.
- ²⁰ Minutes of Meetings of the Board of Trustees, January 15, 1957, RAC, Ford Foundation Records, International Affairs Records, Series III, FA748, Box 4, Hungarian Refugee Grants folder.
- ²¹ Berghahn, 2001: 188.
- ²² Hungarian Refugee Students in Europe, March 19, 1959, RAC, Ford Foundation Records, International Affairs Records, Series V, FA748, Box 7, Hungarian Refugee Students – appropriations folder.
- ²³ These figures are my own calculations based on the Annual Reports of the Ford Foundation.
- ²⁴ Interview with Henry T. Heald, interviewer: Charles T. Morrissey, 1972, RAC, Ford Foundation Records, Oral History Project, Series IV, FA618, Box 35, Folder 180, 61-62.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, 66-68.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, 110.
- ²⁷ Robert E. McNeill, Jr. to the Ford Foundation, November 26, 1956; Robert E. McNeill, Jr. to the Ford Foundation, telefax, November 27, 1956; H. S. M. Burns to the Ford Foundation, November 30, 1956; Robert E. McNeill, Jr. to the Ford Foundation, December 4, 1956, RAC, Ford Foundation Records, General Correspondence, FA745, Series: 1956, Reel C-1186.
- ²⁸ Shepard Stone to Donald K. Price, Inter-Office Memorandum on General Hungarian Relief, November 30, 1956; Donald K. Price to Henry T. Heald, December 3, 1956, RAC, Ford Foundation Records, General Correspondence, FA745, Series: 1956, Reel C-1186.
- ²⁹ Henry T. Heald to Ernest J. Perry, December 11, 1956, RAC, Ford Foundation Records, General Correspondence, FA745, Series: 1956, Reel C-1186.
- ³⁰ Shepard Stone, Scholarships to Hungarian Refugee Students, April 18, 1957, RAC, Ford Foundation Records, International Affairs Records, Series V, FA748, Box 7, Eastern European Programs – General folder.
- ³¹ Sources are contradictory regarding the number of students supported by Ford

scholarship. A document approved on March 19, 1959 mentioned 539 students, but if one counts the numbers in the figure provided the result is 543. See Hungarian Refugee Students in Europe, March 19, 1959, RAC, Ford Foundation Records, International Affairs Records, Series V, FA748, Box 7, Hungarian Refugee Students – appropriations folder.

³² Shepard Stone, Hungarian Students and Intellectuals: Report and Recommendations, January 29, 1957, RAC, Ford Foundation Records, International Affairs Records, Series V, FA748, Box 7, Hungarian Refugee Student Program folder.

³³ Wigerfelt, 1997: 152. Wigerfelt, A (1997) “Hungarian Refugees in the Shadow of the Cold War” in Hans-Åke Persson (ed) *Encounter with Strangers: The European Experience*. Lund: Lund University Press

³⁴ Cf. Shepard Stone, Situation of Ford Scholarships for Hungarian Refugee Students as reported by Mr Hitchcock on 26 April, 1957; Idem, Report from Prof. Werner Richter concerning status of Ford grants in Germany, April 26, 1957, RAC, Ford Foundation Records, International Affairs Records, Series V, FA748, Box 7, Eastern European Programs – General folder.

³⁵ Stone, Hungarian Students and Intellectuals, op. cit.

³⁶ Hungarian Refugee Students in Europe, March 19, 1959, RAC, Ford Foundation Records, International Affairs Records, Series V, FA748, Box 7, Hungarian Refugee Students – appropriations folder. The 1957 Annual Report provides a different figure, 95,000 USD, while the 1958 Annual Report does not contain any reference to FF funded CCF activity in relation to Hungarian refugees except the Free Hungarian Orchestra (66,750 USD). The aggregate of the two numbers was well in excess of 107,000 USD.