“A Most Interesting and Complex Involvement”: Cold War Alignments between the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and the Central Intelligence Agency

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Abstract

When temperatures on the cultural Cold War front reached boiling point in the early 1950s, both the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) solicited the cooperation of the private sector for funding activities aimed at refuting Communist claims about the United States and its allies—activities that would have suffered from inefficiency had they been openly funded by Washington. This report traces this symbiotic state-private relationship in the case of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), a worldwide CIA-funded forum for intellectuals of centrist persuasion, established at a time when the US Congress was reluctant to appropriate funding for counterpropaganda. From the very onset, the CIA tried to transfer “Operation Congress” to the philanthropic sector, the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, in particular. Records of these foundations reveal an internal balancing of risks against responsibilities, which tipped in favor of the CCF by the presence of staunch advocates such as John McCloy and Shepard Stone. By the time the Ford Foundation finally decided to commit itself substantially to the CCF, fate struck and exposed its link with its secret patron. A sense of obligation, if not guilt, on the part of Ford Foundation administrators, often combined with a sincere conviction of its continued utility in the concerted endeavor of tearing down the Iron Curtain, ensured the existence of the CCF—renamed into the International Association for Cultural Freedom (IACF)—for another decade. The incapacity of the IACF to adapt itself to the political climate of the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, ultimately led to its demise.
Introduction

On April 3, 1951, Ford Foundation President Paul Hoffman and his associates—then three months into their assignment to expand Henry Ford’s philanthropic foundation into a force for global and lasting peace—travelled down to Washington, DC. Their intent was to ask Secretary of State Dean Acheson whether a collaborative arrangement could be set up whereby the Ford Foundation (FF) and the State Department would exchange information about programs of mutual interest. Acheson more than welcomed the proposal and assured that his department would “promptly put its liaison machinery into high gear.” Later that day, the philanthropoids met with CIA Director Walter Bedell Smith and Allen Dulles, soon to be promoted as Smith’s deputy director of plans. After instructing their collocutors “never to refer to [this meeting] as long as we lived,” Smith and Dulles warmly reciprocated the request for cooperation. They hoped to interest the FF in the Agency’s plans. These included, among others, the rehabilitation of defectors and settlement of exiles from the Soviet bloc countries, the supply of medical and laboratory equipment to the University of Tehran (for Iran’s being “a strategic and sensitive area of great importance”), and the creation of various “area centers” to accumulate knowledge of the social, political, and economic problems in regions susceptible to Soviet overtures.

Ten days later (April 13, 1951), both Acheson and Smith sent a staff delegation to New York for a follow-up meeting, during which the Ford Foundation was informed that it might receive from time-to-time project proposals which had the support of both the Department and the Agency. To start with, “unqualified and urgent” Foundation support was sought towards the consolidation of the Free University of Berlin (founded two years earlier in response to the sovietization of the University of Berlin), the establishment of a university for Soviet bloc exiles near Strasbourg, the activities of the International Federation of War Veterans’ Organizations, and—under the auspices of the CIA-created National Committee for a Free Asia (later the Asia Foundation)—a study of Soviet tactics in the Far East. As John Howard, a former high-ranking State Department official now in charge of the Foundation’s overseas activities, reported to his superior, Bernard Gladieux, this meeting had been “very cordial,” and had closed on Dulles’ expression of belief...
that the relationship which had been established between the Ford Foundation and the CIA could prove “highly beneficial” to both. From numerous studies of the so-called “state-private network” in US society, exchanges such as these appear typical of the early Cold War years, when the concerns and interests of private philanthropic foundations, corporate entities, and (c) overt state agencies coalesced. Their mission was to immunize the United States, its allies, and nonaligned nations against the Kremlin’s propaganda and advances, and to remedy the biases so many elites in the world held vis-à-vis the American way of life. Many (but not all) of those who staffed, or came to staff, the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations in the immediate postwar years had worked in military, intelligence or governmental positions concerned with the reconstruction and economic recovery of Europe. These individuals had personally witnessed the success of Soviet tactics of persuasion and infiltration among leftist target groups. Notwithstanding differences about tactics and focal points, those equipped with this experience generally agreed that considerably more investments in “a well-planned psychological warfare program designed to gain us allies among wavering countries” were needed than Washington’s overt agencies could muster. This was especially the case in the McCarthyite years, when overseas assistance programs, including those of philanthropic foundations, fell under Congressional scrutiny for alleged susceptibility to Communism. They also recognized that the success of contributions to—as one of the Ford Foundation’s consultants from the RAND Corporation put it—“peacefare” in Europe hinged on the anonymity of sponsors, and that private organizations could step into the breach to “play the role which overt government effort can no longer assume.” Consequently, they declared themselves willing to recommend support for projects that would “strengthen and supplement governmental efforts in areas within which governmental activity is inappropriate, partisan, or ineffective” (see Tables 1 and 2). Initially, however, opposition by those apprehensive about close ties to the intelligence community and disapproving of their organizations acting as extensions of governmental policies stymied the realization of the proposed state-private partnership.
Tentative Beginnings, 1951-1956

This initial hesitancy befell, for instance, to one of the CIA’s most ambitious projects on the cultural front about which the Ford Foundation’s representatives were briefed at the aforementioned top-level meetings: the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), an international association of writers, artists, academics, and opinion makers, founded in West Berlin in June 1950. It was created for the cause of defending freedom of thought and expression against totalitarian control, mainly of Communist hue. The idea of the CCF was conceived by private intellectuals on both sides of the Atlantic. However, it was Washington’s intelligence and foreign policy community that enabled its realization. The inaugural conference was funded by the CIA through the use of Marshall Plan counterpart funds. In 1951, the Agency, through its International Organizations Division overseen by Dulles’ special assistant, Thomas W. Braden, earmarked $200,000 for the consolidation of the CCF, with headquarters in Paris and affiliate committees in London, Oslo, Berlin, Frankfurt, Vienna, Rome, New Delhi, Tokyo and New York City.12 Yet, as much as the State Department and the CIA believed in “Operation Congress” (as the CCF was codenamed in CIA parlance), they realized that direct governmental support amounted to a “kiss of death,” and therefore hoped to find the Ford Foundation to be willing to act as an intermediary.13

No time was wasted. Not long after its April 13 meeting with the CIA top brass, the Ford Foundation received an application from Sidney Hook, a New York University professor of philosophy and one of the driving spirits behind the CCF. Hook asked for a grant of no less than $1,000,000 to support the CCF over a period of three years in its mission to further establish itself as a rallying point for “forces, particularly in Europe and Asia, in defense of a way of life which is the least common denominator of free society everywhere.” 14 Gladieux informed his counterpart at the FF Pasadena headquarters, Joseph McDaniel, of the application. He added that George Kennan saw the value of supporting the CCF “inasmuch as it includes a large number of left-wing non-Communists”—a grant, however, should not be so large as to amount to “outright sponsorship.” 15 McDaniel questioned the wisdom of the Foundation’s participation because of the
CCF’s potential as an instrument in the Cold War, and advised that the CIA better take on full sponsorship.16 His superior, Robert Hutchins, was also not sympathetic to the proposal, but for another reason: he considered Hook as “contentious and erratic,” and the purpose of the CCF as being mere propaganda.17 Thus, two months after filing the application, Hook was notified that the Ford Foundation could not comply with his request.18

This unfortunate outcome for the CIA did not come as a surprise. Already at the April 13 meeting with the CIA delegation, Howard had pointed out that if it ever were to come out that the Ford Foundation was acting as a channel for CIA funds, “many of the Foundation’s activities might become suspect and the particular usefulness of the Foundation as a thoroughly private instrumentality might be jeopardized.” In fact, Dulles himself indicated that he raised his request “with caution,” since he had just come from the private foundation sector and wanted “to safeguard the interest of the Ford Foundation.” Howard advised his superiors against a decision in principle as to whether or not the Foundation would be willing to act as a channel for CIA funds. He suggested to “wait until a specific case arises in which all other channels have been exhausted and it is in the national interest that the foundation act as a channel.”19 His colleagues at the Pasadena office, however, went further and closed the door altogether, voting against the tentative CIA proposal “as a matter of policy.”20 As it turned out, this rejection not only concerned the idea of the Foundation as a conduit for governmental money, but also extended to the idea of the FF as a provider of supplementary support for organizations that were recipients of (co)vert governmental subsidies.21 Several officers and trustees had grown disenchanted. They did not like the blatant way in which Kennan’s projects, such as the creation of the Free Russia Fund (soon East European Fund) to accommodate defectors, exiles, and refugees from behind the Iron Curtain for the two-fold purpose of furthering their appreciation of the “free world” and acquiring intelligence about Soviet conduct, complemented governmental activities in the Cold War.22 However, others were not dismissive of a collaboration with the government in principle. Among them was Hoffman, whose approach towards international tensions was aimed at de-escalation through international dialogue and exchange rather than potential escalation through psychological and political warfare. Officers and trustees who opposed
FF support deemed the lapse into secrecy and subversive action a bridge too far. For those in favor of the RAND Corporation’s advice (including Gaither), however, the global tensions of the time obviated such objections, and justified coordinated (but independent) cooperation with the government.\textsuperscript{23}

Suspicion would be justified by the uncomfortable unraveling of events with one of the Ford Foundation’s recent grantees: the Fighting Group against Inhumanity (\textit{Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit}). This grantee was a West Berlin-based anti-Communist resistance group engaged in a wide variety of what it purported to be solely “peaceful” activities to debilitate the East German regime. The group was represented in the United States by the International Rescue Committee (IRC), which by this time was operating in Europe—in close coordination with Washington’s intelligence community—on a range of projects that went beyond mere relief.\textsuperscript{24} Convinced of the Fighting Group’s added value to what she saw as the Truman administration’s excessive reliance on military measures in waging the Cold War, none other than Eleanor Roosevelt pressed Hoffman—with the approval of the State Department and the CIA—to take interest in the organization.\textsuperscript{25} Hoffman did, but realized he had to go about it cautiously. He insisted the grant of $150,000 he obtained in April 1951 from the Board of Trustees be strictly used for the Group’s “humanitarian activities,” i.e., locating arrested and missing individuals in the Soviet Zone/German Democratic Republic and extending aid to victims of Soviet/GDR injustice. Additionally, as “we cannot contribute to subversive activities,” he stipulated that the grant be channeled through another organization, which came to be the National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE). The NCFE was a CIA proprietary set up to facilitate covert refugee assistance and counterpropaganda activities (notably Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) aimed at destabilizing Communist regimes.\textsuperscript{26} In subsequent months, FF officers became alarmed by various signals of the Fighting Group’s “more aggressive action in fields and by means not entirely consistent with the purposes of the Foundation” (i.e., sabotage, espionage, psychological warfare, arson, bombing, and poison attack). These actions induced the Ford Foundation to suspend the release of the final grant allotment until Gladieux, who—at the time still acting in a consultant and liaison capacity with the CIA—managed to convince his colleagues that a cancellation of the grant would “completely disrupt the present relations between
the NCFE and the Fighting Group.”

The experience with the Fighting Group made painfully clear the risks of aligning private philanthropy with clandestine intelligence operations. It prompted Hoffman to assure the trustees that the Ford Foundation was not to support activities “which would destroy its effectiveness in working for peace” by appearing as a tool for combating Soviet power. As a consequence, support (either as a sponsor or as a conduit) for the projects that the CIA had brought to the Foundation’s attention, including the CCF and the NCFE-established University in Exile, fell through. Nevertheless, several officers kept in close contact with the Truman administration which sought to capitalize on the increasing flow of political refugees from the Soviet bloc countries. When asked, an unnamed FF representative (presumably Gladieux) advised an application for a concerted refugee program might be successful, as long as it could be demonstrated that a Ford grant would contribute to an emergency program that could not be fully handled by the government and that did not risk being openly associated with covert operations involving destabilization and sabotage. Assured by his interlocutors that it indeed concerned an emergency, the FF representative confirmed the Foundation’s continued interest in assisting voluntary agencies aiding escapees, and advised that such agencies apply—advisably within one single unified scheme—with the Foundation in time before the upcoming trustees’ meeting.

Over the years, this public-private *pas de deux* continued. In this dynamic, State Department or CIA officials tried to nudge the Ford Foundation into neutralist areas of the world, if not in areas behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, while FF officials, still believing that—in the words of then-Vice President Don Price—“our objectives and the US national objectives ought to be in harmony,” tried to keep in control “as to what that harmony ought to consist of.” Unfortunately for the Congress for Cultural Freedom, such behind-the-scenes maneuvering did not work out to its advantage. By early 1954, the FF leadership adopted the position that—again in Price’s words — “we’re just not going to mix in with these action agencies” like the CCF. As a consequence, a renewed request for support ($500,000) of the CCF’s publication activities, submitted by both the CCF and the CIA in
March 1954, faced rejection, leaving the CCF dependent on its secret sponsor.\textsuperscript{32}

The CCF was more successful in soliciting subsidies from the Rockefeller Foundation (RF), albeit not on a structural basis. Nelson and David Rockefeller were indeed closely tied to the intelligence community and anything but shy in providing assistance to the CIA’s covert operations.\textsuperscript{33} In addition, some resumés of RF personnel included stints with the CIA and/or its wartime predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Nevertheless, the records show no indications that the CIA approached the Rockefeller Foundation or its affiliated funds with a similar agenda, as it had approached the Ford Foundation in April 1951.\textsuperscript{34} To be sure, diaries of RF officers with OSS pasts reveal frequent consultations with senior US officials.\textsuperscript{35} Yet, in contrast to what occurred at the Ford Foundation, RF consultants generally did not push for the Rockefeller Foundation’s commitment to governmental programs. For instance, when Kennan’s Policy Planning Staff tried to sell the idea of an intelligence unit staffed mainly with Soviet and East European emigrés (an “Eurasia Institute”) to the RF, Philip E. Mosely, one of the leading Soviet experts of his time, strongly advised against buying it.\textsuperscript{36} Indeed, although sympathetic to consider its overtures, officers of the Rockefeller Foundation and its affiliates seemed to have kept the government at bay and the initiative to themselves.

The CCF’s first appeals arrived at the Rockefeller Foundation in early 1953, in connection with two conferences that were to take place later that year. The first application concerned a conference of composers, performers, and critics in Rome (eventually postponed to April 1954) and, as such, reflected the interest of CCF Secretary General Nicolas Nabokov, a Russian émigré composer endowed with exceptional networking and fundraising skills.\textsuperscript{37} By that time, he had already learned his lesson with the Masterpieces of the Twentieth Century festival he had organized for Paris in the previous spring (which had been attacked from both sides of the political spectrum for its ideological motives). Nabokov made sure that the Rome convention’s application and promotion material were devoid of antitotalitarian rhetoric: the prospectus reads like an innocuous effort to stimulate international exchange, and thereby breaking “old parochial boundaries,” in European music life.\textsuperscript{38} The opposite was the case for the second
conference for which Nabokov requested funds: an international assembly of
scientists that was to convene in Hamburg, West Germany. Its agenda was to
“discuss and exchange information about the situation of science in both the free
and the totalitarian worlds and to warn world opinion of the dangers menacing
free research and free teaching.”

39 Asked by his colleague from the Humanities
Division, John Marshall, for his opinion, Warren Weaver, director of the RF’s
Natural Sciences and Agriculture Division, showed himself unimpressed, deeming
“the whole thing [as] pretty confusing.” He could understand the presence of the
Hungarian-British polymath Michael Polanyi (“not only a first-rate scholar, but
also an outstanding enemy of Communism”) or the American geneticist and
educator Hermann Joseph Muller (also “a clear enemy of Communism”) on the
roster of participants. However, Weaver had a very different view of the British
biologist and geneticist Cyril Darlington (“a well-known Pinko”) or the American
physicist Arthur Compton (a “first-rate scientist,” but also “one of the most naïve
persons in the world who is completely capable of being sucked into almost
anything”).

40 Acting on Weaver’s doubts, Vice-President Lindsley F. Kimball
debuffed the application.

The CCF did not give up. The inclusion of scientists not wholeheartedly subscribing
to the tenets of anticommunist liberalism was more than intentional. As it appears
from the memorandum accompanying the application, a discussion of “the best
methods of furthering the spirit of free and responsible inquiry” was secondary to
the conference’s main purpose. Its goal was to “bring home” to scientists that, at a
time when “totalitarian tendencies” from behind the Iron Curtain creep up in the
“free world,” one cannot choose to remain passive or neutral.

41 When Polanyi, who chaired the conference’s organizing committee, stressed to him this edifying
rationale, Weaver changed his mind, informing President Dean Rusk that “I am
now convinced that the sponsorship is good.”

42 The State Department, whose
approval Rusk sought in the light of ongoing Congressional investigations into the
political leanings of philanthropic foundations, also endorsed the conference as “a
constructive move” in which it would like to see participate America’s “sound
and sensible defenders of
democratic liberties.”

43 Reassured by this official endorsement, Rusk granted the
request for covering $10,000 of the expenses. The balance, approximately
$35,000, was provided by a certain Farfield Foundation, which was later exposed as a covert conduit specifically created for channeling CIA money to the CCF.44

Following this success, Nabokov was quick to sound out his newly established contacts at the Rockefeller Foundation about the fundability of a follow-up conference on the future of freedom (which would take place in Milan, 1955), a permanent Committee for Science and Freedom, and an international competition and exhibition for young artists. Although open to listening, in recognition of the Hamburg Congress’ success, Weaver and Marshall pointed out that support for continuing initiatives outside established institutions and organizations was an exception rather than the rule. Nabokov and Polanyi, in return, emphasized the benefits of flexibility, efficiency, and innovation of working outside the box. In the end, Rusk decided that RF officers would “certainly have to give sober consideration to any proposals that the Congress laid before the RF,” while advising the CCF to appeal to other foundations for support, as well.45 After having once again secured confirmation from the State Department, which continued to believe that the CCF was “deserving of whatever financial support private philanthropy is able to extend to it,” the Rockefeller Foundation would come to support various small-scale CCF projects, such as the startup of the Science and Freedom Committee and the production of a brochure presenting an analytical critique (rather than a propagandistic denouncement) of dialectical materialism.46 A follow-up grant application of $30,000, however, was denied, due to doubts about the efficiency of the Committee’s work and an increasing concern to steer away from projects in which political objectives were prioritized over scientific results.47

**Turn of Tides, 1956-1966**

From the mid-1950s, two course changes significantly stimulated the flow of FF and RF subsidies to the CCF’s Swiss account. First, at the insistence of the African, Asian, and South American delegates to its 1955 “Future of Freedom” conference in Milan, the CCF substantially expanded its scope of action from Europe to those areas of the world that were in the process of developing themselves into
autonomous nation-states after having shed the shackles of military dictatorships or colonial repression. These areas until hereto had been more in the purview of RF and FF programs than the transatlantic region, and which after the stabilization of Europe increasingly shifted to the center of the Cold War competition.⁴⁸ Second, at the insistence of John McCloy—the former US High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG) who had been brought in as a consultant by Henry Ford II—the Ford Foundation came to supplement its Third World development programs with a full-fledged European program, of which McCloy’s former public affairs director at HICOG, Shepard Stone, became the director.⁴⁹ During two European tours, he undertook for the Ford Foundation, Stone, whose wartime and postwar experience in Germany had boosted a network encompassing intelligence and policy-making communities in both Washington and Bonn/West Berlin, had become convinced that post-Stalinist Russia was beginning to make more favorable impression on Western Europeans. Consequently, private institutions should continue the government’s goodwill operations that were facing the threat of discontinuation under Congressional suspicion and parsimony. Aware from his HICOG days of its ties to Washington, Stone took a particularly strong interest in the CCF, which he considered to be “the most effective organization in Europe working among political, intellectual, and cultural leaders.” This interest that would prove to be vital for the organization in surmounting the crisis that was to come.⁵⁰

As a result of these developments, the CCF received its first FF grants for two seminars that set the model for its future program on the academic front. One of the seminars was to assess the challenges and potentials of economic growth in “underdeveloped countries,” with the underlying purpose of preventing “authoritarian methods” from gaining acceptance over the “democratic approach.” The agenda of the other seminar was to appraise the changes in post-Stalin Soviet society, with the underlying purpose of capitalizing on the then current “confusion” that seemed to reign under the Khrushchev leadership.⁵¹ This “confusion” referred to the contradiction between the Kremlin’s actions that—in the wake of Khrushchev’s ‘de-Stalinization’ speech of February 1956 — seemed to portend the relaxation of control on the domestic front and rapprochement towards the West on the one hand, and the brutal repression of forces of change in Poland and Hungary later that year, on the other. The Budapest Uprising, in
particular, created a momentum that showed the transatlantic public-private partnership at its best. Within less than four months after the event, Nabokov, encouraged by the State Department, had solicited from both the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations a total of $165,000 toward the support of Hungarian intellectuals, students, and artists who had fled to Austria. A major part of this support (followed up by an additional injection of $40,000 by the Rockefeller Foundation in the year of its launch and a $133,500 joint FF/RF continuation grant for the 1958-1959 season) was invested in the creation of the Philharmonia Hungarica, an orchestra of Hungarian refugee musicians which by its very constitution presented “a potent political symbol favorable to the free world.”

The success of these projects, in combination with the State Department and CIA’s persisting appeals on the Ford Foundation to continue and proliferate its investments in opening up the Communist world to the West, finally crystallized into what the CCF leadership had long wished for: permanent support. In Fall 1957, the Ford Foundation approved a two-year term grant of $500,000 toward the expansion of the CCF’s international activities, which included international, regional, and local conferences, seminars, and study groups on “problems of progress” in various parts of the world. It also included an outreach program for intellectuals and artists from Poland and Hungary. Qualified by Stone’s FF office, the International Affairs Division (IAD), as “one of our best investments to date,” the annual support of $250,000 was extended up to the end of 1962, which enabled the CCF to upscale its networking activities in Eastern Europe (Yugoslavia in particular), Africa, and the Arab world.

To be sure, Stone had to fight for each of his proposals. Gaither and Price had established strict conditions for collaborating with (c)over branches of the Eisenhower administration. However, the political sensitivity of engaging with Europe, an area no longer in need of assistance in socio-economic development, as well as the way FF officials rubbed shoulders with state officials, kept bothering not only some trustees and officers, but also Gaither’s successor, Henry Heald. Heald was more inclined to prioritize domestic academic over foreign assistance projects. Through his skills of persuasion and adept employment of his rich network of transatlantic contacts, Stone did manage to obtain Heald’s and the trustees’ approval of initiatives at cementing East-West contacts. These projects
included an exchange program directed at Poland (1957-1962), in later years to be followed by Yugoslavia (1958-1969) and Hungary (1964-1969). Replicating this success for the CCF, however, proved more strenuous. In February 1961, the trustees raised an obstacle to future Foundation assistance. They disallowed the allocation of funds to tax-exempt organizations that could not fully account for their other sources of income, a stipulation to which a year later was added that “institutions which also receive funds from undisclosed United States Government sources” likewise did not qualify for Foundation support. For Stone, however, the stakes were too high to abandon the CCF. So, he set out to convince the trustees to help an organization “considered to be of unusual significance” gain independence from the CIA’s treasury by assuming all expenses. However, given that more than three quarter of the CCF’s annual budget was covered by governmental sources (see Table 3), this came down to a guarantee of “some $2,000,000 per year for the next five years,” after which Stone believed an arrangement with other American and European foundations would have been found that could take over (a part of) the CCF’s financial burden. Unsurprisingly, despite Stone’s staunchest ally, John McCloy, in the meantime having assumed the chairmanship of the board of trustees, this proposal foundered. Stone’s subsequent attempt at obtaining the participation of the Rockefeller Foundation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and other philanthropic organizations in a consortium that would muster “a fund of approximately $15-20 million over the next ten years” in support of the CCF’s activities, was no more fortunate: both Rockefeller entities did not see the possibility of raising the amounts needed without a substantial Ford contribution. The impasse seemed to have been broken by early 1966, when Heald’s strained relationship with the trustees led to his replacement by McGeorge Bundy. Bundy was a former national security advisor in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, was internationally minded, and was unconcerned about the CIA’s involvement in the CCF. No sooner had Bundy started his presidency, however, than the scenario that all in the know had wished to prevent unfolded: late April 1966, the New York Times fleetingly mentioned the CCF, and its flagship magazine Encounter, as recipients of covert funds in a series of articles disclosing the CIA’s overall modus operandi.
Uphill Challenges, 1966-1977

All statements from CCF administrators and associates vouching for the CCF’s autonomy notwithstanding, the 1966 New York Times revelations could easily have precluded any consideration of funding on the part of the Ford Foundation. The contrary was true: a self-declared friend of the CCF, Bundy ensured Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (who was privy to the secret and, on the first day of the NYT disclosure, wrote Bundy to check whether he could do anything to “illuminate or reinforce” the CCF’s grant application) that he would make sure that the Ford Foundation give careful consideration to the CCF’s needs. All that was needed was for a “strong group of outstanding character and intelligence” to stand up among its constituency and make “a firm decision to carry on without being deflected by the fact that the New York Times has said out loud what so many have known for so long about its relationship with [the] CIA.” Bundy indeed requested from the Overseas Development Division (ODD)—focused on the “Third World” in contrast to Stone’s International Affairs Division (IAD)—a review of the CCF’s performance and its prospective usefulness in developing areas to which its leadership planned to give increased attention. The responses varied, ranging from moderately sympathetic to emphatically disapproving. In his final recommendation, however, ODD’s vice president, Champion Ward, judged in favor of the CCF. Initially he held reservations about supporting an organization whose purpose it is to mobilize intellectuals as “the ideological wing of NATO” and whose activities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America could impair or embarrass the Foundation’s ODD program. However, over the years, Ward had come to the view that these anxieties were unwarranted. Rather than having compromised complete individuality of thought and expression, the CCF had “brought men from all parts of the world into forms of association which have nerved some of them in freer expression than would otherwise had been possible in their situations”—something Ward thought the Foundation should have accomplished. He recognized the “inevitable tension” between the CCF’s necessary orientation to voices of dissent and the ODD’s necessary orientation to existing regimes and their development programs. However, Ward concluded that, until the Ford Foundation would come to broaden its own overseas program to include more cultural activities, it was to accept the risks which increased CCF activity in ODD areas would entail. James Perkins, a
former colleague at the Johnson administration whom Bundy had asked to shed his light over the matter as an outside observer, likewise saw a future role for the CCF (“a gamble, but an important one”), provided that the Foundation would dare to take measures to adjust the CCF’s leadership, program, and finance successfully to the political climate of the 1960s.66

And thus, the CCF was saved. Convinced that its dubious funding history had not damaged it beyond repair, Bundy, while confirming that the Congress had “completely cut all ties of every description with its principal previous financial sponsors,” secured the trustees’ approval to assist the CCF in its transformation into a self-sustaining organization. The grant consisted of $7,000,000, to be disbursed over six years in ever decreasing portions, after which it was expected that a transatlantic consortium of sponsors would take over. “It may raise a few eyebrows among those who know or think they know the previous financial history of the Congress,” Bundy admitted, “but it is the right thing to do at the right time.”67 With this commitment on the part of the Ford Foundation, the CCF’s situation seemed to have stabilized and the damage limited. Yet, a few months later, the issue flared up again, when the San Francisco-based monthly Ramparts broke the news that the CIA had for over a decade been funding the National Student Association (NSA).68 In the slipstream of this disclosure, which at a time of dwindling support for the Vietnam War triggered a much greater public outcry than in May 1966, The New York Review of Books published an overview of the CIA’s deployment of intellectuals in the Cold War which more than once singled out the Ford Foundation as being implicated in the plot.69 The final blow came with a controversial publication by Thomas Braden, in which the indignant former chief of the CIA’s International Organizations Division defended the Agency’s counteroffensive against Communist front operations.70 He waxed nostalgic about the successes of his operations, which apart from academic and artistic circles, implicated labor unions, women’s committees, civil rights groups, religious societies, and charity organizations. Braden’s article also divulged— without disclosing names—the placement of agents in the CCF and on the editorial board of Encounter. This time, Josselson was overflooded by requests for the truth from all corners of the world in which the CCF operated. Realizing he no longer could hold the dam, he decided to convogue the CCF General Assembly into a special session.
At this assembly, Josselson came out into the open and disclosed the financial history of the CCF. He relayed that back in 1950, when his term at the US Military Government in Germany had ended, it was suggested to him to take on the task of creating a permanent organization that would become the Congress for Cultural Freedom. When other channels of funding fell through, the CIA, alarmed by the inroads that the Communist World Peace Council was making among the intellectuals at that time, offered to the CCF its financial commitment with the assurance that it would not interfere with its activities—a promise that had been kept. At that moment, Josselson explained, he did not see an alternative: the Ford Foundation had not yet embarked upon the international stage, and the only other major foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, “did not wish to get involved in anything that had political undertones,” although it did provide a few small ad hoc grants. To most other potential benefactors, Josselson added, “intellectual’ was a dirty word.” As the Congress grew, and as its budgetary requirements grew correspondingly, reaching in 1965/66 a total of $1,800,000, Josselson’s concerns about his failed efforts to attract substantial funding from the private sector, thereby cutting off the CCF from its secret benefactor, kept him awake at night. It was only when Shepard Stone, whom he had first met in Germany when the latter was in the Office of the High Commissioner, arrived at the Ford Foundation that prospects improved. It was Stone who, “realiz[ing] the predicament facing the Congress, for whose achievements he had the greatest respect,” finally managed to push through a first grant to the Congress towards the support of its seminar program, which in the next nine years would accumulate to $2,900,000. In 1963, an attempt was made to have the Ford Foundation adopt full sponsorship for the CCF. This failed because—in Josselson’s words—“then president [Henry Heald] had little use for culture and equally little use for the earlier CIA involvement.” Subsequently, Josselson explored the possibility of setting up a consortium of several foundations, which he pitched to David Rockefeller, who “was sympathetic, but saw no possibility of raising the amount needed by the Congress without heavy Ford participation.” The Ford Foundation, however, which had just given a $1,000,000 terminal grant, was unfavorably disposed towards the idea. The break came when Heald was replaced by McGeorge Bundy. Contrary to Heald, Bundy “was for culture and did not mind the CIA background.” It was a tragic twist
of fate that the $7,000,000 grant that materialized under Bundy’s presidency coincided with the CIA disclosures.

Although recognizing his efforts at “maintain[ing] the complete independence and intellectual integrity of the organization,” the CCF General Assembly received Josselson’s revelations with “profound distress,” and expressed regret that “the Executive Director should have felt it necessary to accept financial support for the Congress from the CIA without the knowledge of any of his colleagues in the Congress.” The main question now was how to continue. Raymond Aron, who on Stone’s request had accepted the post of chair of the new board of directors, thought the organization should be fundamentally changed or even discontinued. However, others considered such a move as—in the words of Josselson—“a catastrophic concession to leftwing extremists” bent on seizing advantage of the CIA disclosures to “finish off the Congress and its cause.” FF’s International Affairs Division Vice President Francis Sutton, sent out in the field to collect the views of CCF participants and observers, concurred with Josselson. He considered it better for the organization to continue with appropriate changes rather than to build a new organization from scratch. In addition, while duly recognizing the existence of tensions between direct and indirect support in some parts of the world in which the Foundation operated, Sutton recommended the continuance of FF support for a period of five years. In this way, it could facilitate the defense of liberal values in areas where such a defense would be undermined by direct funding, with the proviso that the sources of finances would be increasingly supplemented by non-American sources and the need of certain expenditures would be thoroughly reviewed.

Despite Aron resigning the moment he saw things going into the ‘wrong’ direction, Bundy felt sufficiently assured by Sutton’s report that the CCF still could count on international support. Perhaps also prompted by the fact that he had been knowledgeable about the CCF/CIA relation since his time as national security adviser, Bundy consequently decided not to reverse the five-year grant, although the last three installments were pruned with slices totaling nearly $1,000,000.

Its immediate future saved, the CCF—rechristened as the International Association for Cultural Freedom (IACF)—ventured into the two-fold challenge of
restoring its image and broaching new financial sources before the FF grant would expire. The men to guide the challenge: the French poet Pierre Emmanuel as director, and as president someone close to the FF center: Shepard Stone, who had been implored by Josselson to take the lead. As time would tell, success eluded on both fronts. Financial prospects grew dimmer each day, as Stone’s fundraising efforts in Europe and Japan failed to garner a solid and enduring alternative to FF sponsorship, forcing him to cut still more on IACF’s publication and seminar programs. The project of rejuvenating IACF’s base was also not successful. Although it managed to maintain most of the adherents it had won during the 1950s, the IACF failed to attract a new generation, in whose eyes it was forever tarnished by its previous connection to the US government. The fact that the internal IACF ranks were deeply divided did not help. Staff disagreed on how to respond to the New Left’s rejection of their governments’ technocratic and managerial approach towards society and economy—a positivist, rationalist, end-of-ideology approach that had been promoted by the CCF from the mid-1950s onwards. Generally, the Anglo-Saxon wing wished to analyze the causes for the New Left’s passionate and ideology-driven rebellion which they framed in terms of a “crisis of rationality.” The Romance-language wing, led by Emmanuel, argued for a radical shift of orientation away from politico-economic analysis to a cultural-philosophical introspection on the ethical implications posed by the protests against authority, interventionism, and consumerism. This divergence of interpretation, underpinned by the longstanding Continental suspicion towards American culture and intentions, was never overcome, and prevented the IACF from acclimatizing itself to the political climate of the late 1960s and early 1970s.

With these stagnating factors at play in the internal affairs of the IACF, prospects for an extension of the Ford grant beyond 1972 seemed bleak. It may be called a miracle that, despite internal reservations about the IACF’s capability of reinventing itself in a drastically changing world, the FF management and trustees nonetheless awarded a five-year renewal grant. They were acting on a positive review by its International Division’s program officer, David Heaps, who started his assignment with “a reserve bordering on skepticism” towards the IACF but returned as a convert of its continued value. This time, however, the grant was limited to $400,000 per annum, which as of the third year would also be
progressively tapered off due to financial constraints on the Foundation’s budget. With this progressively declining income combined with the inflation of the mid-1970s, it was a Herculean task to keep the IACF’s operations solvent, even after another round of expenditure cuts. Stone’s successor, Adam Watson, a retired British diplomat, was not more successful in attracting either additional funding or a younger generation of sympathizers. By 1975, the IACF was a mere shadow of what it had once been. Its activities were mainly limited to a financial assistance program for intellectuals in Central and Eastern Europe (Foundation for European Intellectual Cooperation/Fondation pour une Entraide Intellectuelle Européenne), support for trends of democratization on the Iberian Peninsula, and publishing and networking activities in South and Southeast Asia (India, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines). As Heaps reported, “[t]he IACF in recent times has really been cut almost to the bone—but the bone is the relic of a much bigger and now somewhat obsolete creature no longer fully responsive to the current needs.” Another report expressed disbelief at the inefficient operation of the Paris-based secretariat, and observed that the previous CIA connection continued to complicate the IACF’s success in convincing wary intellectuals in both East and West “that its raison d’être is the promotion of intellectual freedom, and not simply the combating of Communism and Communist influence.” The conclusion was inevitable: the FF leadership would no longer foot the bill for nearly all of the IACF’s administration and projects beyond the final grant term in 1977, although it was willing to fund several of its programs, such as the Foundation for European Intellectual Cooperation and the publication of two of its most prestigious scholarly reviews, Survey and Minerva. As a consequence, the IACF board saw no other option than to dissolve the Association and turn its operations into autonomous entities. On March 31, 1978, the IACF silently ceased to exist.

**Reflections and Retrospections**

Charged with closing its voluminous grant files with the obligatory evaluation statement, the program officer in charge of FF’s European and international affairs felt time was not yet ripe to conclude much more than that the $8,400,000 awarded to the CCF/IACF over two decades’ time represent “one of the most
interesting and complex involvements of the Ford Foundation over the course of its relatively brief history.” ⁸² Indeed, defying any sweeping characterization of being passive and obedient extensions of the US government, the records of both the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations show that decisions to cooperate with governmental entities were not taken without internal discussion and controversy. FF’s collaboration with (c)overt state agencies in “waging peace” faced internal opposition from its very inception. Hutchins, for instance, was critical of any proposal cast in Cold War rhetoric, such as Howard’s suggestion that the Foundation “presumably should allow for psychological warfare activities and current American foreign policy of building situations of military and political strength in the free world.” ⁸³ As he saw it, the assumption that “Russia and her allies are unqualifiedly dangerous to peace and the United States and her allies unqualifiedly helpful and dedicated to it” would subject the Foundation’s policies too much to the whims of political reality. Hutchins had further noted, “the Foundation should ideally have a program that would still be good if the men in the Kremlin suddenly joined the Republican Party.” ⁸⁴ Instead of responding to a particular geopolitical competition, he argued that the Ford Foundation should address the underlying causes of war, such as “economic and cultural frustration,” and contribute towards the strengthening of a sense of world community. To achieve this, Hutchins saw a particular role for private foundations in dispelling misconceptions about America’s intentions and interests among intellectual elites abroad. After all, “anything which comes to a foreigner under an official government label suffers from the taint of propaganda and ‘cultural imperialism’.” ⁸⁵ Ironically, it was precisely this advantage of their apolitical appearance that prompted (c)state agencies to solicit the participation of philanthropic foundations in the mission of countering Soviet propaganda. This effort, much to the dismay of those like Hutchins, who sensed the self-defeating logic behind this strategy, and for whom the risk of dragging the Ford Foundation into a political quagmire and thereby marring its credibility as an autonomous actor, did not weigh up against the short-term effect any precipitated action would have.

At this stage in the early 1950s, both the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations did grant some of the State Department or the CIA’s requests for funding its foreign ventures. However, such support was usually given on an exceptional and one-off
basis only, and often after such protracted negotiations that the Ford Foundation (as well as the Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations) held a reputation within the CIA of being troublesome, in the sense that they were “reluctant to cooperate on joint ventures.” As a consequence, long-time operations, such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom, depended on supplementary clandestine sources. Realizing that from the day of its conception, the CCF’s financial backing hung as a sword of Damocles over its future, CIA director Allen Dulles and CCF executive secretary Michael Josselson had continuously tried to secure sustained private support that would free their operation on the intellectual front from its umbilical cord of gold. With the arrival of McCloy and Stone (and after two previous rejected applications for ‘big money’ in 1951 and 1954), Ford finally increased substantially its financial commitment. However, by this time, the CCF had already expanded to such dimensions that it still needed injections of CIA dollars to keep its operations running. The CCF’s tragedy is that precisely at the time when it finally achieved self-sufficiency through Ford’s 1957-1962 grant, the cover of the Agency’s international network of front organizations was blown, turning into reality what so many privy to the setup had feared. Although not the only reason for its ultimate demise, the CCF’s successor kept being haunted by its past association with an agency that at the time of the disclosures was subjected to severe public criticism, particularly from the New Left, for its unchecked and misguided interventions on the global arena. That the IACF could continue for another decade was solely to the credit of those within the FF management who—against internal criticism—kept believing in the organization’s value, until its incapacity to find common purpose and renew itself could no longer be ignored.

The symbiotic but secret liaison between the government, private organizations, and philanthropic foundations raised, and raises, ethical questions. To be sure, efforts to coordinate private philanthropy and volunteerism with US foreign policy date back to at least the First World War, and gained in importance in the interwar period, when Nazism and Bolshevism posed a double-faced threat to the interests of both the state and philanthropic foundations that owed their capital to private enterprise. These efforts, however, had been prompted more by the Depression-caused inability rather than unwillingness of the US Congress to intervene in Europe. It was only with the creation of the Office of Strategic
Services—the wartime precursor of the CIA—that a state-private mechanism came into being for conducting propaganda by stealth. As the close of the Second World War drew near, debate arose within the ranks of both the Washington bureaucracy and philanthropic organizations over whether the state-private collaboration should be terminated or continued. The argument that it was to be continued to ensure the restoration of democracy and competitive industry in formerly fascist countries, and with that the protection of American interests, won. This time, however, secrecy was used to circumvent a US Congress that was not unable but unwilling to engage in another war and spend millions on propaganda activities. The legislation that led to the creation of the CIA in 1947 did provide leeway for conducting activities in the name of national security. In this case, the question could be raised whether the ends justified the means, and whether “in a free society, it is right, wise—or necessary—for supposedly independent organizations to receive secret subsidies.”87 For is the very defense of free and open exchange of ideas not undermined by the very fact that that defense is mobilized and steered by state actors whose aim it is to promote a specific idea at the expense of others?

For those privy to, if not responsible for, CIA’s front strategy, the answer to the first question was firmly affirmative, to the second firmly negative. According to Thomas Braden, his division at the CIA was simply fulfilling its patriotic duty of defending the United States against “a new and extraordinary successful weapon” that it considered the “international Communist front” to be, and that Congress had been too slow to see.88 As George Kennan saw it at the time, in lack of a ministry of culture, “the CIA was obliged to do what it could to try to fill the gap.”89 Howard, too, recognized that the CIA was trying to do things that the British Council did, and that given the fact that “you couldn’t get this sort of thing through Congress at any time,” the CIA was actually “filling a vacuum.”90 One may sympathize with the urgency advocates for the state-private collaboration felt at the time. At the onset of the Cold War, when efforts at cultural promotion by the State Department and philanthropic foundations alike met with fierce Congressional suspicion, subterfuge was arguably inevitable to muster and harness the financial resources of those actors within the public-private nexus that were adamant on countering the copiously financed Soviet front apparatus on an equal level. And although the pressure on cooperation with a government that was
finding them “useful and convenient” seemed to have been relentless, there is also little reason to doubt the numerous testimonies about the CIA’s non-interference in the internal affairs of the associations it sponsored. Indeed, irony has it that the IACF enjoyed less freedom in its programming under Ford Foundation patronage than its predecessor under (mainly) CIA patronage. Yet, one certainly can criticize the lack of urgency to end the partnership once the immediate danger was averted, or—as Heaps conceded—the insufficient consideration of “the temporal dangers” posed to recipients of CIA-injected grants.

Indeed, despite all counterarguments, the painful question that kept lingering in the air for seventeen years was whether any covert strategy justified the repercussions a possible exposure would have on the lives and careers of those who had unwittingly benefited from it. In the wake of the 1966–7 disclosures, the editor of the Uganda-based CCF magazine Transition was arrested and imprisoned for months on charge of sedition. In Japan, one CCF activist’s house was vandalized with a Molotov-cocktail. In Lebanon, the editor of the Arabic CCF magazine Ḥiwrā saw himself forced to cease publication and leave the country in disgrace. In India, the revelations basically undid the entire work of the Indian CCF affiliate, which became the focus of governmental inspection. This are merely the direst consequences—the risk of damaging reputations of recipients in the most liberal and affluent circumstances, however, was arguably not more justifiable. Against such consequences, a defense that CIA sources had come with no strings attached and merely enabled recipients to do what they would have done on their own account, or that the program of covert subsidies had not been conducted without approval by the executive branch or authorization by Congress throughout three successive administrations, stands rather weak. On balance, the United States, by virtue of being a democracy, could not afford secrecy as its ideological enemy. In contrast, the Soviet Union, could, not only because it defied its purposes (dispelling anti-American sentiments) but also because it played into the hands of foreign state actors suspicious of US intervention, who in the event of a disclosure could (and did) use it as a stick to beat their opponents.
In the wake of the 1967 *Ramparts* disclosure, President Johnson established a committee to review relationships between the CIA and private American voluntary organizations, and followed its recommendation (but not in the form of an executive order) to end all covert funding of private American groups by the end of the year. The recommendations were ultimately implemented with a few exceptions, among which were Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. The committee’s mandate was also to explore the possibilities for a “public-private mechanism” for approving public funds openly for “overseas activities of organizations which are adjudged deserving, in the national interest, of public support.”94 The latter did not materialize under the Johnson administration. A follow-up committee (chaired by Dean Rusk, now in his role as Secretary of State) failed to reach consensus as to how such a coordinating entity would have to wed private initiative to public policy, while a survey foreshadowed a firm rejection if the proposal were to be submitted to Congress. An added difficulty was the same problem that in the early 1950s had led to the now cursed state-private alliance. In the late 1960s, it had not become easier for most overseas organizations to accept funds directly from foreign government agencies without hampering their effectiveness as independent bodies—or worse in countries run by a dictatorship, without endangering their existence. Indeed, the amount of suspicion US philanthropic foundations faced throughout the world bode ill for open funding, and gave the lie to Dulles’ 1951 impression that the Ford Foundation’s collaboration with the CIA could be mutually beneficent. “It seems to me far better to let the CIA matter wither away and let a new administration take a fresh look at the possibilities,” Rusk advised the president. 95 The Nixon administration, however, never picked up the matter, with the result that in 1976, under President Ford’s administration, a major review of intelligence operations took place. It concluded that the restrictions developed by the CIA in response to the events of 1967 had been more motivated by a determination to prevent further public disclosures of sensitive CIA operations rather than by a felt need to reconsider the question of “where boundaries ought to be drawn in a free society.”96 An aged George Kennan, who was at the onset of the Cold War the chief architect of the counter-fronting stratagem, admitted that “[o]perations of this nature are not in character” for a country that defines itself by democratic transparency, and, consequently, should never have been initiated.97
**Table 1**

**Rockefeller Foundation (and Other Rockefeller-Related Philanthropic) Grants Awarded to the CCF/IACF**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fund</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Grant ($)</th>
<th>Box</th>
<th>Folder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>Conference “Science and Freedom,” Hamburg, July 24-26, 1953</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>25.179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>Conference of composers, performers and music critics, Rome, April 4-15, 1954</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.45-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>Starting grant for the CCF’s International Committee for Science and Freedom and the publication of a critique of dialectical materialism</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>25.179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>Travel of three members of the Committee for Science and Freedom to a study group meeting on academic freedom in Royaumont near Paris, August 1956</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td></td>
<td>25.180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CECA</td>
<td>Pilot meeting towards the organization of the 1961 Tokyo East-West Music Encounter, New York City, April 24-28, 1958</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CECA</td>
<td>Nabokov’s travel to Japan in connection with the further development of the EWME plans, 1958</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CECA</td>
<td>East-West Music Encounter, Tokyo, April 17-May 8, 1961</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.57</td>
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<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>Five individual study trip grants in connection with the EWME</td>
<td>18,000</td>
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<td>52.398</td>
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<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>Philharmonia Hungarica 1957/02/14-1957/08/31 1957/10-01-1958/09/30 1959/01-1959/12/31</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.37-38</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDR3F</td>
<td>Two travel grants for US ethnomusicologists to attend the East-West Conference and Festival of Music, New Delhi, February 7-13, 1964</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td></td>
<td>722.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBF</td>
<td>General support for three years, 1971/07/01-1974/06/30 Additional support for the period 1974/07/01-1974/12/31 Renewed support for 1975</td>
<td>30,000 5,000 5,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>442.2703 442.2701 442.2702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBF</td>
<td><em>Contact: The Journal of Middle East and World Affairs</em> 1974 1976</td>
<td>25,000 3,250</td>
<td></td>
<td>442.2704-5</td>
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</table>

**Total:** 328,900
Table 2

Ford Foundation Grants Awarded to the CCF/IACF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grant no.</th>
<th>Subject (FA732D)</th>
<th>Grant ($)</th>
<th>Reel</th>
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<tr>
<td>05600340</td>
<td>International seminar “Problems of Economic Growth” (originally titled “Economic Growth in Underdeveloped Countries”), Tokyo, International House, April 1-6, 1957</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>509</td>
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<tr>
<td>05700097</td>
<td>Pilot of a program for on-demand distribution of books and translated articles to scholars, writers and universities in Eastern Europe</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05700111</td>
<td>Aid to Hungarian refugee intellectuals and artists, primarily in Europe, in the wake of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising Establishment of the Philharmonia Hungarica</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0570395</td>
<td>General support</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>2135</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1957/10/01-1959/09/30</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td>2136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960/01-1962/12/31</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>2174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1963/01-1966/12/31</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1966-11/01-1967/10/31</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1967/11/01-1968/10/31</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1968/11/01-1969/10/31</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1969/11/01-1970/10/31</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970/11/01-1971/10/31</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971/11/01-1972/10/31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05800369</td>
<td>One-year continuing support for the Philharmonia Hungarica</td>
<td>66,750</td>
<td>514</td>
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<tr>
<td>06800335</td>
<td>Three-year support for Mundo Nuevo (CCF’s literary journal directed to Latin American audiences)</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06900066</td>
<td>Placement abroad of scholars, writers and artists whose freedom as professionals is curbed, prompted by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (Fund for Intellectuals), 1968/11/01 Specifically for Bengali refugees, 1971/05/01</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>1607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>3385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07000328</td>
<td>Two-year grant to support IACF-sponsored publications in Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>115,000</td>
<td>1667</td>
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<tr>
<td>07200090</td>
<td>Fifteen-month support for Encounter, 1972/01-1973/03/31</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>1750</td>
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<tr>
<td>07300043</td>
<td>General support</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>3385</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1972/11/01-1973/10/31</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1973/11/01-1974/10/31</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1974/11/01-1975/10/31</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1975/11/01-1976/10/31</td>
<td>313,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1976/11/01-1977/10/31</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>2434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1978/01/01-1978/03/31 (terminal grant)</td>
<td>10,934,750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3

Grants to the CCF, 1958-1959 / 1963-1964


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>1958</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1964</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farfield Foundation, New York</td>
<td>843,668</td>
<td>825,796</td>
<td>1,513,000</td>
<td>1,046,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia Foundation, San Francisco</td>
<td>1,623</td>
<td>1,218</td>
<td></td>
<td>98,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bright Foundation, Beverly Hills</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Whitney Fund, New York</td>
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The Farfield Foundation was a front, set up to channel funds to the CIA’s target organizations, mainly the CCF. The italicized foundations are the foundations that have been identified as witting or unwitting conduits for CIA funding. The International Rescue Committee was also part of the CIA network.
1 Report of the Trustees of the Ford Foundation, September 27, 1950, pp. 10-18. Following the deaths of Edsel Ford in 1943 and Henry Ford in 1947, the Foundation received Ford Motor Company stock valued at $417 million, an endowment by which its assets dwarfed those of what until then had been the two largest philanthropic foundations, the Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations. Owing to a rocketing growth of the automobile industry and a prosperous stock market, the endowment rose to $492 million by New Year’s Eve of 1950. For an account of the development of Ford’s policies and its internal affairs, see Francis X. Sutton, “The Ford Foundation: The Early Years,” Daedalus 16, No. 1 (1987), pp. 41-91.

2 Dean G. Acheson, memorandum of conversation with Henry Ford II, chairman of the Ford Foundation’s Board of Trustees, Paul G. Hoffman and his assistant director, Bernard L. Gladeux, and the Foundation’s associate directors, Robert M. Hutchins, H. Rowan Gaither, and Chester C. Davis; Willard Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State; and W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence, April 3, 1951, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Dean Acheson Papers, Box 68, Folder 6.

3 Transcript of interview with Robert M. Hutchins, May 23, 1972, p. 20, Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC), Ford Foundation Records (FFR), Oral History Project (FA618), Box 36, Folder 187.

4 This initiative had been proposed by George F. Kennan, who as head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff had masterminded the Truman administration’s strategy of harnessing the private sector for US political warfare against the Soviet Union and now, at Hoffman’s request, acted as a consultant to the Ford Foundation’s international program planning. See Kennan’s memorandum “The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare,” May 4, 1948, in Foreign Relations of the United States: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment 1945-1950 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 668-672.

5 Gaither, “Notes on conference with Walter Bedell Smith, Allen [W.] Dulles and others,” April 3, 1951, RAC, FFR, Office Files of H. Rowan Gaither (FA621), Box 1, Folder 1. See also the preparatory memorandum by Smith’s assistant director Max F. Millikan, April 2, 1951, CIA Library, FOIA request CIA-RDP79-01157A000100060036-2.

6 Howard to Gladieux, memorandum of conversation with State Department and CIA officials, April 16, 1951, RAC, FFR, Office Files of Robert M. Hutchins (FA703), Box 4, Folder 4. Before joining the Foundation, Howard had been a special assistant to Acheson, with a particular interest in “the field of ideological conflict and psychological warfare.” Howard to Gladieux, memorandum, April 26, 1951, RAC, FFR, General Correspondence (FA735), Reel C-1141.

8 Hoffman, for one, had been in charge of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), the US government agency set up in 1948 for the execution of the Marshall Plan, including the underwriting of so-called counterpart funds to European organizations prepared to face the Soviet challenge on the European theatre. Suggestions for potential targets of counterpart funds were made by the CIA, and reached Hoffman’s desk through Gladieux, who, before being recruited as Hoffman’s assistant at the Ford Foundation, had been the executive assistant to the Secretary of Commerce, and as such the chief liaison between the Commerce Department and the CIA. Gladieux to Gaither, May 12, 1953, RAC, FFR, Office Files of H. Rowan Gaither (FA621), Box 11, Folder 133. Three of Hoffman’s ECA deputies transferred with him to the Ford Foundation: Milton Katz as associate director (who on his turn recruited John Howard, who, apart from having served as special assistant to the secretary of state, had been the deputy chief of the first ECA mission to Greece), Joseph M. McDaniel, Jr. as assistant director, and Richard M. Bissell, Jr. as a consultant, who in 1954 left to become Dulles’ special assistant, in which capacity he helped Franklin A. Lindsay—a CIA operative who was taken in by the Ford Foundation upon his return from Europe where he had been instrumental in setting up the network of counter front groups (including the CCF)—on an “internal, no-holds-barred study of techniques that could be used to roll back the Communists in Europe.” Bissell cited by Burton Hersh, The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1992), p. 319.


10 Hans Speier, director of the RAND Corporation’s Social Science Department, to Gaither, memorandum “Administrative Arrangements of the Foundation to Support Foundation Activities in Europe,” May 5, 1951, RAC, FFR, Office Files of H. Rowan Gaither (FA621), Box 1, Folder 3. The connection with the RAND Corporation was imported by Gaither, who, before being hired by Henry Ford II to help set the priorities of the Foundation in 1947, had contributed to transforming the RAND Corporation from a branch of the Air Force into an independent think tank, for which he served as a trustee until 1959. In this memo, Speier advised the Foundation “to plan for the administrative arrangements which would permit the most effective pursuit” of its overseas projects. By way of illustration, he presented the example of a number of organizations in Western Germany and Berlin engaged in “work that appears most valuable in supporting US government policy in the cold war with the Soviet Union,” but that the State Department and the Office of the US High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG) “find it embarrassing to support in view of the constraints which the occupation statute places upon the US authorities to lend open, overt support to these organizations.” To circumvent this problem, Speier explained, the State Department and HICOG “cooperate with [the] CIA to channelize covert funds in such a way as to support worthy institutions and organizations” with concealed governmental support. “Whenever the Foundation decides to come to the help of the US Government in cases of this kind,” Speier advised, it would first have to be ascertained that its action be “unobjectionable in the light of Foundation objectives and reputation, both in the United States and in the European country concerned.”

11 Hoffman, memorandum to the Board of Trustees, January 29, 1951, RAC, FFR, Catalogued Report 016865. John Marshall, associate director of the Rockefeller Foundation’s Humanities Division, likewise explained that “[o]bligations to American government and to American national interest are axiomatic for the Foundation and its officers,” whereas at the same time he stressed that “it is within the limits [these obligations] impose that the Foundation’s reputation for disinterestedness in its international work has been established.” Marshall, Program and Policy Report for 1951, “Relations of the Foundation with Governmental and Intergovernmental Agencies,” November 3, 1950, RAC,
Rockefeller Foundation Records (RFR), Record Group 3.2 (FA112), Series 900, Box 29, Folder 159.


13 “Notes on conference with Walter Bedell Smith, Allen Dulles and others,” April 3, 1951, RAC, FFR, Office Files of H. Rowan Gaither (FA621), Box 1, Folder 1. The cited phrase was used by Frank G. Wisner, director of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), a covert-action unit originally answerable to the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, but with the appointment of Smith fully subsumed within the CIA’s International Organizations Division.

14 Hook to Howard, April 30, 1951, Hoover Institution Archives, Sidney Hook Papers, Box 124, Folder 3.

15 Gladieux to McDaniel, memorandum, May 7, 1951. The original memorandum has been destroyed, but a brief outline has been conserved through the Projects Master Cards, NY-166.

16 McDaniel to Hutchins, memorandum, May 23, 1951, Projects Master Cards, NY-166.

17 Hutchins to McDaniel, undated note, Projects Master Cards, NY-166.

18 Gladieux to Hook, June 27, 1951, Sidney Hook Papers, Box 124, Folder 3. The negative outcome was communicated to the CIA by James Burnham, who acted as a liaison between the CCF and the Agency. See his memorandum 02.446, “The Ford Foundation and the Congress for Cultural Freedom,” July 5, 1950, Hoover Institution Archives, James Burnham Papers, Box 11, Folder 5.

19 Howard to Gaither, April 25, 1951, RAC, FFR, Office Files of H. Rowan Gaither (FA621), Box 1, Folder 1.

20 Gaither to Gladieux, April 27, 1951, RAC, FFR, Office Files of H. Rowan Gaither (FA621), Box 1, Folder 1.

21 In an interview from the early 2000s, the CIA officer in charge of public/private relations, Thomas Braden, recalled with respect to the ‘conduits’ or ‘screen foundations’ that “[w]e never used the large and genuine American foundations like the Rockefeller, Ford or Carnegie, except once in the case of the Ford Foundation.” It is not clear if this statement is true, and if so, for which project. Braden quoted by Joël Kotek, “Youth Organizations as a Battlefield in the Cold War,” in *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945-1960*, edited by Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam (London/Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 152.

22 Transcript of interview with W.H. Ferry, July 25, 1972, p. 33, RAC, FFR, Oral History Project (FA618), Box 33, Folder 167; Transcript of interview with Edwin H. Land, August 20, 1973, p. 2, RAC, FFR, Oral History Project (FA618), Box 27, Folder 119. Kennan admitted that the Soviet exile projects he proposed to the Foundation had been projects that the State Department had failed to realize. Transcript of interview with George F. Kennan, March 29, 1972, pp. 24-25, RAC, FFR, Oral History Project (FA618), Box 36, Folder 189. See also Kennan to Hoffman, January 8, 1951, RAC, FFR, General Correspondence (FA735), Reel C-1142. In February 1953, tensions between Hoffmann’s dovish and Gaither’s hawkish approach reached a breaking point, at which Henry Ford II—a staunch supporter of Gaither—forced Hoffman to resign. At the trustees’ meeting during which Hoffman was ousted, Gaither was elected to the position of president, director, and trustee member.

23 Unknown author, memorandum “Political Warfare,” March 30, 1951; Hans Speier and Donald G. Marquis (RAND Corporation), memorandum “Program Area One,” May 3, 1951, RAC, FFR, Office

25 Roosevelt to Hoffman, telegram, February 5, 1951, RAC, FFR, Grant File 05100034 (FA732E), Section 4, Reel 488.

26 “Notes on conference with Bedell Smith, Allen Dulles and others,” April 3, 1951, RAC, FFR, Office Files of H. Rowan Gaither (FA621), Box 1, Folder 1. See also the grant notification letter from Hoffman to C.D. Jackson, NCCE President, April 16, 1951, RAC, FFR, Grant File 05100034 (FA732E), Section 1, Reel 488.


28 Hoffman, “Director’s Statement to Trustees on Foundation’s Peace Objectives,” 1952, RAC, FFR, Office Files of Robert M. Hutchins (FA703), Box 4, Folder 7.

29 From a conversation between NCCE President DeWitt C. Poole and a Rockefeller Foundation staff member, it appears that the application for the Free University in Exile project was sidetracked by Hutchins and others on the grounds that the NCCE was “a cold war propaganda organization rather than an educational institution”—a theory which Poole regarded as “rather tenuous” considering the generous grant of $1,309,500 that the Ford Foundation had bestowed upon the Free University in West Berlin, established in 1948 in response to the Stalinization of the University of Berlin. Although both universities were deeply implicated in the Cold War struggle, the Berlin University was advantaged not only by having a past which the University in Exile had not, but also by having Henry Ford II’s personal investment. Yorke Allen, Jr., memorandum “National Committee for Free Europe,” March 20, 1952, RAC, Office of the Messrs. Rockefeller Records, World Affairs, Series Q (FA326), Box 32, Folder 278. For full accounts of the University in Exile project, see Giles Scott-Smith, “The Free University in Strasbourg: US State-Private Networks and Academic ‘Rollback’,” Journal of Cold War Studies 16, No. 2 (2014), pp. 77-107; and Veronika Durin-Hornyik, “The Free Europe University in Exile Inc. and the Collège de L’Europe libre (1951-1958),” in Katalin Kádár Lynn, ed., The Inauguration of “Organized Political Warfare”: The Cold War Organizations Sponsored by the National Committee for a Free Europe/Free Europe Committee (St. Helena, CA: Helena History Press, 2013), pp. 439-514.

30 Arthur M. Cox, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), to President Truman, memorandum, January 11, 1952; Cox to Gordon Gray, PSB director, memorandum, February 28, 1952, Harry S. Truman Library, Staff Memoranda and Office Files, PSB Files, Box 4, 080 Ford Foundation. In the end, a joint refugee program failed to materialize as hardly any relief agency wished to be associated with the
International Rescue Committee, which was rumored to politically indoctrinate the refugees it aided. See Chester, Covert Network, p. 109.

31 Transcript of interview with Don K. Price, Jr., June 22, 1972, p. 59, RAC, FFR, Oral History Project (FA618), Box 38, Folder 213. The citation in the next sentence is from the same source.

32 The Projects Master Cards (NY-166) show that the CIA and Josselson sent a memorandum to the Foundation in March 1954, and after a deferral to the trustee meeting of October that year, Josselson received on November 16 a rejection letter from Gaither.

33 In his position as Special Assistant to the President for Foreign Affairs (1954-1956), Nelson Rockefeller came to oversee the Eisenhower administration’s psychological warfare activities, whereas Allen Dulles kept David Rockefeller, who during World War II had served in the Army’s intelligence branch in North Africa, informed on the activities of the CIA. Thomas Braden, chief of the CIA’s International Organizations Division, recalled that David was Dulles’ “friend and confidant,” who in some instances “furnished a front.” Braden cited in Cary Reich, The Life of Nelson A. Rockefeller: Worlds to Conquer, 1908-1958 (New York: Doubleday, 1996), p. 559. See also Braden’s interview with Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, p. 121.

34 The CCF first appears in the Rockefeller archives in a briefing on the organization requested by John D. Rockefeller 3rd. Edgar B. Young, memorandum “Berlin Congress for Cultural Freedom,” March 6, 1951, RAC, Office of the Messrs. Rockefeller Records, Civic Interests, Series D (FA313), Box 10, Folder 56. A year later, David Rockefeller, upon having taken notice of a brochure concerning the Free University in Exile, wondered whether the University was “an offshoot of the Freedom Foundation,” by which he might have meant either the CCF or the NCFE. Rockefeller to Dana S. Creel, Director of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, February 11, 1952, RAC, Office of the Messrs. Rockefeller Records, World Affairs, Series Q (FA326), Box 32, Folder 278A. These inquiries suggest that, if known at all, the exact details of the CIA’s fronting activities were at this time unknown at Rockefeller Plaza.

35 See, for instance, the diaries of Charles B. Fahs and Chadbourne Gilpatrick, RAC, RFR, Record Group 12 (FA392).

36 Mosely, memorandum “Eurasian Research Institute,” October 19, 1948, RAC, RFR, Record Group 2, Series 200 (FA308), Box 407, Folder 2744. Unsuccessful in interesting a foundation for the idea, the CIA would continue and establish the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich with no academic cover. Mosely, for his part, set up a similar—but CIA free—program as part of his growing Russian program that he managed at Columbia University, for which he secured support through the Ford Foundation’s subsidiary East European Fund. David C. Engerman, Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America’s Soviet Experts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 39-40. See also Chester, Covert Network, pp. 74-83.

37 The conference was organized in collaboration with the Swiss-based European Center of Culture (led by Denis Rougemont), under whose auspices the grant application was formally submitted. See RAC, RFR, Record Group 1.2, Series 803.5 (FA387), Box 4, Folder 45.

Draft of the invitation letter for the Hamburg conference, January 8, 1953, RAC, RFR, Record Group 1.2, Series 100D (FA387), Box 25, Folder 179.

Weaver to Marshall, February 10, 1953, RAC, RFR, Record Group 1.2, Series 100D (FA387), Box 25, Folder 179.

Nabokov to Marshall, memorandum, February 3, 1953, RAC, RFR, Record Group 1.2, Series 100D (FA387), Box 25, Folder 179.

Weaver to Rusk, March 10, 1953, RAC, RFR, Record Group 1.2, Series 100D (FA387), Box 25, Folder 179.

Weaver, diary excerpt March 11, 1953, RAC, RFR, Record Group 1.2, Series 100D (FA387), Box 25, Folder 179. Weaver’s contact at the State Department was Caltech chemist Joseph B. Koepfli, who acted at the time as a governmental consultant on scientific affairs.

Having worked for the State Department’s Office for United Nations Affairs prior to his arrival at the Rockefeller Foundation in July 1952, Rusk was in favor of a well-coordinated public-private partnership. As he told Howard, his five years’ experience in the State Department had instructed him on “the way in which important policy decisions are reached by government officials without any help from private agencies and persons.” In order to correct this state of affairs, he planned to have “the problem thoroughly explored with a view to bringing private resources more fully to bear in the anticipation of problems which will inevitably require Government decisions as well as in the solution of problems which have already arisen” and to make governmental information more currently available to private groups so that “their contributions can be useful in relation to daily government operations.” Howard, memorandum “Conversation with Dean Rusk,” April 9, 1952, RAC, FFR, General Correspondence (FA735), Reel C-1151.

Marshall, diary excerpt March 2, 1954, RAC, RFR, Record Group 1.2, Series 100D (FA387), Box 25, Folder 179.

Rusk to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, January 21, 1955; Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy to Rusk, February 5, 1955, RAC, RFR, Record Group 1.2, Series 100D (FA387), Box 25, Folder 179.

Weaver, diary excerpt January 2, 1957, RAC, RFR, Record Group 1.2, Series 100D (FA387), Box 25, Folder 180.


When he was about to leave Germany, McCloy—echoing Speier’s aforementioned memorandum—wrote to Hoffman to encourage the Ford Foundation to “help to carry on certain operations which the future [US] Embassy may find difficult to continue, but which are of great significance to United States objectives in Germany.” McCloy to Hoffman, December 31, 1951, cited in Kai Bird, The Chairman: John J. McCloy and the Making of the American Establishment (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 358. For a detailed account of the internal struggle concerning the expansion of FP activities in Europe, see Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe, pp. 153-168.

Stone, notes on European trip, June 15-July 28, 1954, and memorandum “European Program,” September 17, 1954, RAC, FFR, Catalogued Reports 010643 and 010640. In a letter in which he briefed his mentor McCloy about the CCF and a meeting he had with Nabokov and Rougemont, Stone hinted at a shared secret, writing “you know the sources of funds that have hitherto been supplied to the
Congress, but in our conversation with these gentlemen [Nabokov and Rougemont] we should not reveal what we know.” Stone to McCloy, February 25, 1954, cited by Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Culture Wars in Europe, p. 223. About his connection to the intelligence community, Stone later pointed out that he never had any clearance, but that he would from time-to-time approach Dulles for information about Eastern Europe. Transcript of interview with Shepard Stone, December 12, 1972, pp. 25-27, RAC, FFR, Oral History Project (FA618), Box 39, Folder 218.

51 Docket excerpt for the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees, September 27, 1956, RAC, FFR, Grant File 05600340 (FA732D), Section 1, Reel 509; Josselson, application letter for a seminar on “Changes in Soviet Society,” November 30, 1956, RAC, FFR, Grant File 05700099 (FA732D), Section 1, Reel 526. Energized by Khrushchev’s speech, Josselson proposed, in the summer of 1956, a number of activities towards the “exploitation of the new situation,” such as the publication and dissemination of a translation of the speech, the calling of a convention of European writers and the sending of specialists to the Soviet Union to take temperature. Josselson to Stone, August 3 and September 26, 1956, RAC, FFR, Log Files (FA734), L56-765, Reel L-17.

52 Docket excerpt for the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees, September 25, 1958, RAC, FFR, Grant File 05700111 (FA732D), Section 1, Reel 514. Initially, Ford officials advised against the 1958-9 continuation grant since such support would not be consistent with Foundation policy. Thereupon, Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter wrote to then-FF president Henry Heald to express the State Department’s “strong desire that [the orchestra] continue as a going concern,” and to ask the Foundation to reconsider its decision. Herter to Heald, August 5, 1958, RAC, FFR, Grant File 05700111 (FA732D), Reel 514.


54 Seminars funded by this grant included “Patronage of the Arts,” Venice, September 16-23, 1958; “Workers’ Participation in Management,” Vienna, September 19-25, 1958; “Representative Government and Public Liberties in the New States,” Isle of Rhodes, Greece, October 6-13, 1958; “Industrial Society and Western Political Dialogue,” Basel, September 20-26, 1959. Each of these international seminars was followed up with smaller, more diversified regional study group meetings that focused on the issues in terms of local interests and concerns.


56 In a hand-written note attached to the transcript of Price’s Oral History interview, Gaither stipulated that “the Foundation will not sponsor projects which also receive government support,” although it may support “projects which had prior support from the government” or “domestic projects of an organization which receives governmental support for its overseas projects.” In a memorandum dated May 21, 1954, Price formulated a policy for the Ford Foundation’s handling of government-sponsored programs, which permitted such projects—in an infrequent manner—to be recommended for funding provided that they 1) are “worth support on their merits, regardless of any official interest,” and 2) have the prior approval of three members of the Board of Trustees: the Chairman, the President, and “Mr. McCloy.” Both the latter and Price later defended this arrangement as a means to limit the CIA’s access to FF officers and grantees. Surmising that they could not keep—in McCloy’s words—the Ford Foundation’s “shirts clean” had they closed the door completely on the Agency, they provided this little window on the understanding that any other contacts would jeopardize the Foundation’s willingness to cooperate. “The first time you meddle with our boys,” Price had warned Dulles and Wisner sternly, “we’ll quit this whole program.” Transcript of interview with
57 These apprehensions turn out to be justified. His 1954 agreement with the Ford Foundation notwithstanding, Dulles kept expressing over the years his wish to recruit the Foundation’s fellows. In 1958, he invited several FF officers to come down to Washington, DC, for a briefing about its operations. As remembered by John Howard, “the Agency’s covert operations were as assumed: cloak and dagger stuff and all the rest of it.” Its overt operations, on the other hand, “scared the hell out of us because they had more money than they knew what to do with. They were asking our advice on how to spend the money, and the ideas they had for spending the money would have duplicated practically everything we were doing, meaning that if any of the covers blew, the whole foundation world was in jeopardy.” Transcript of interview with John B. Howard, February 15, 1973, pp. 108-10, RAC, FFR, Oral History Project (FA618), Box 26, Folder 115. Eventually, in 1959, Price reached an understanding with the Agency, allowing it to approach fellows after the expiration of their grants. Ibid, p. 58-59. See also the 1958 and 1959 CIA correspondence files in RAC, FFR, General Correspondence (FA735), Reel C-1258 and C-1316. The CIA persisted, however, and in the early 1960s, Heald felt obliged to repeat Ford’s position to then-CIA director John A. McCone, which fell on deaf ears. Transcript of interview with Henry T. Heald, February 25, 1972, pp. 26-7, RAC, FFR, Oral History Project (FA618), Box 35, Folder 180.

58 Excerpt from the minutes of the Executive Committee meeting of February 10, 1961, in the Shepard Stone Papers, Rauner Special Collections Library at Dartmouth College, cited by Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe, p. 227.


60 Stone to Josselson, June 10, 1964, Harry Ransom Center, University of Texas at Austin, Josselson Papers, Box 21, Folder 1; Josselson’s report, Shepard Stone Papers, cited by Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe, p. 236-7; Transcript of interview with Don K. Price, Jr., June 22, 1972, p. 69, RAC, FFR, Oral History Project (FA618), Box 38, Folder 213.

61 The New York Times disclosures ran in a series from April 25-29, and the CCF was mentioned in the article of April 27. Long before the publication, Bundy, in his capacity as national security advisor, had counseled the CIA, which had been approached by one of the NYT journalists (Tom Wicker), to stay aloof and instruct its people that they were not to contribute information about its operations to the NYT. Richard Helms, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, to Bundy, September 30, 1965, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Box 192, Oversize Attachment Packet #1. Incidentally, the CCF had already come up in news reports about a 1964 congressional investigation into the tax-exempt status of certain private foundations, which exposed eight of them as umbrella organizations for the CIA. See the editorial of The Nation, September 14, 1964. At that time, however, the story was barely picked up in the media. For an analysis of the differences in reception of CIA revelations between 1964 and 1967, see Tity de Vries, “The 1967 Central Intelligence Agency Scandal: Catalyst in a Transforming Relationship between State and People,” The Journal of American History 98, No. 4 (2012), pp. 1075-1092.

62 See the letters to the NYT editor by J. Kenneth Galbraith, George Kennan, Robert Oppenheimer, and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., May 9, 1966; by Stephen Spender, Melvin Lasky and Irving Kristol, May 10, 1966; and by Nabokov and Rougemont, May 19, 1966.

64 The officer in charge of African affairs limited his reply to a brief report on the CCF’s pan-African conference on “Freedom and the Rule of Law” he had attended in Lagos, January 1961, which had generally been regarded as highly successful. His counterpart at the Latin American branch, however, emphatically expressed his hope that the Foundation would sever its relations with the CCF, in order not to further damage the Foundation’s endeavors in areas that historically were already unfavorably disposed towards European and American presence. The ODD representative in Indonesia concurred, 
rhetorically wondering whether “the Foundation should be in a position to be identified with a militant movement of this kind so long as the foundation claims to be apolitical.” By contrast, his colleague in India commended the CCF’s work on the Subcontinent, noting that it had encouraged Indian leaders to speak upon major issues, and as such had delivered a “major contribution in the development of a democracy.” And Francis Sutton, reporting from Kenya, thought that the CCF, albeit against general inclinations towards indifference, parochialism, and distrust of European-American paternalism, could be of considerable importance in facilitating African nations in their search for an independent identity and safeguarding them from “brain drains” and “massive infiltration by middle- and lowbrow cultural influences from the West.” J. Donald Kingsley, head of the Middle East and Africa branch, to Ward, June 24, 1966; Harry E. Wilhelm, head of the Latin America branch, to Ward, July 11, 1966; Frank J. Miller, representative for Indonesia, to Ward, July 12, 1966; Douglas Ensmonger, representative for India, to Ward, July 11, 1966; Francis X. Sutton, representative for East Africa, to Ward, July 22, 1966, RAC, FFR, Office Files of F. Champion Ward (FA565), Box 4, Folder 3.

65 Ward to Bundy, memorandum “Support to the Congress for Cultural Freedom as it may affect the Foundation’s Overseas Development program,” July 15, 1966, RAC, FFR, Office Files of McGeorge Bundy (FA617), Box 11, Folder 136. Ward was a strong proponent of the thesis that economic and technical support should be supplemented with support towards “cultural growth,” something that many of his colleagues considered not to be the proper business of a foreign foundation. Ward, memorandum “By Bread Alone?”, January 27, 1964, ibid.


67 Bundy to Julius A. Stratton, chair of the Board of Trustees, September 23, 1966, RAC, FFR, Francis X. Sutton Papers (FA1141), Box 50, Folder 465.

68 Sol Stern, “A Short Account of International Student Politics and the Cold War with Particular Reference to the NSA, CIA, Etc.” Ramparts 5, No. 9 (March 1967), pp. 29-38.


71 Josselson, “Report on the Financial History of the Congress for Cultural Freedom,” read before the General Assembly meeting of May 13, 1967, pp. 2-3, Josselson Papers, Box 27, Folder 2. Subsequent citations in this and the following paragraph are from this document. For more on Josselson’s role in, and perspective on, the CCF, see Sarah Miller Harris, The CIA and the Congress for Cultural Freedom in the Early Cold War: The Limits of Making Common Cause (New York: Routledge, 2016).

72 Minutes of the Extraordinary Meeting of the General Assembly held in Paris, May 13, 1967, RAC, FFR, Grant File 05700395 (FA732D), Reports, Reel 2135.
Josselson to Sutton, September 20, 1967, RAC, Francis X. Sutton Papers (FA1141), Box 50, Folder 465.

Sutton to Bundy and Bell, memorandum “Congress for Cultural Freedom,” September 21, 1967, RAC, FFR, Office Files of Francis X. Sutton (FA568), Box 71, Folder 5.

Sutton to Bell, memorandum “Congress Finance Proposal,” September 20, 1967, RAC, FFR, Office Files of David Bell (FA624), Box 12, Folder 179. Aron, incidentally, would soon return to work actively within the CCF/IACF framework.

Stone to Bundy, August 12, 1968; Stone to Sutton, September 18, 1968, RAC, FFR, Grant File 05700395 (FA732D), General Correspondence (FA732D), Reel 2135. Stone managed to solicit some additional support from Ford for necessitous journals like Mundo Nuevo, the only Latin American literary journal with region-wide circulation. This grant turned out to be in vain: despite attempts to broaden its appeal, the journal still suffered from the taint of CIA support and ran afoul of the Brazilian authorities. When a follow-up grant was denied, it ceased publication. See Grant File 06800335 (FA732D), Reel 1900.

For more on this division, see Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe, pp. 265-76.

Heaps to Bell and Sutton, report on IACF, December 3, 1970, RAC, FFR, Catalogued Report 008975; Sutton to Stone, September 23, 1971, RAC, FFR, Office Files of David Bell (FA624), Box 12, Folder 179; Bell to Bundy, November 13, 1972, RAC, FFR, Grant File 07300043 (FA732D), Reel 3385. In 1970, Heaps raised the question whether the Foundation should not “admit flatly that there are certain institutions which are useful, laudable and merit survival for a decade or so anyway—and will never make it on their own?” By 1974, however, after having observed the incapacity of the IACF board to overcome the differences in views of its members as to the future and orientation of the Association, Heaps had become “steadfastly depressed,” even sighing that “we would be much better off if we were disengaged from this annual albatross.” Heaps to Bell, Sutton, and Goodwin, memoranda, February 4, 1970, February 11, 1974, and July 22, 1974, Grant File 07300043 (FA732D), General Correspondence, Reel 2618.

Heaps to Bell and Sutton, report on IACF, September 16, 1975, RAC, FFR, Office Files of David Bell (FA624), Box 12, Folder 179.

David R. Smock to Craufurd Goodwin, report on IACF, 15 September 1975, RAC, FFR, Catalogued Report 0009578.


Howard to Hoffman and other directors, memorandum “Peace Program for July Board Meeting,” May 10, 1951, RAC, FFR, Office Files of Robert M. Hutchins (FA703), Box 4, Folder 8. On top of the typescript Hutchins scribbled: “This is a war memorandum, not a peace memorandum. It conceives of the Foundation as an arm of US foreign policy, which policy it assumes is correct.” Later, when asked about the impact of the “Cold War mentality” on the deliberations of the Foundation, Hutchins would recall that, although “they were very mild compared with other people who had this kind of view,” Hoffman and Kennan “were slightly Cold Warrish,” whereas “I was never a Cold Warrior.” Transcript

84 Hutchins to Rowan Gaither and Dyke Brown, confidential letter about the memorandum “Draft for a Presentation to the Trustees on Area I,” April 13, 1953, RAC, FFR, Office Files of Robert M. Hutchins (FA703), Box 4, Folder 3. Subsequent citations in this paragraph are from this document.


87 “How to Care for the CIA Orphans,” Time, May 19, 1967.


89 Kennan to Stone, November 9, 1967, University of Chicago, Special Collections Research Center, CCF/IACF Records, Box 318, Box 3.

90 Transcript of interview with John B. Howard, February 15, 1973, p. 111, RAC, FFR, Oral History Project (FA618), Box 36, Folder 186. Stone’s successor as director of the International Affairs Division, Joseph Slater, pointed out that scholars who received grants in IAD’s exchange program often knew that CIA money was involved, and merely considered it as a “less mature system” than the British Council and kindred constructions. When asked whether they experienced any interference on the part of the CIA, recipients everywhere around the world would have answered in the negative. Transcript of interview with Joseph E. Slater, February 2, 1973, pp. 67-8, RAC, FFR, Oral History Project (FA618), Box 39, Folder 216.


93 Of a less incisive nature, the secret funding of foreign committees, publications, or activities also raised questions of disparity. In the case of the CCF magazine Encounter, for instance, both benefactors—the CIA and the Ford Foundation successively—where confronted with the uncomfortable question why to demonstrate such largesse to a foreign publication whereas so many domestic journals were struggling for survival. Ford’s grant of $50,000 towards the promotion of Encounter in the United States was protested by seventy-three American and English writers and editors. The petition was organized by Partisan Review, which, ironically, had been rescued more than once by CIA money channeled through the CCF and its US affiliate, the American Committee for Cultural Freedom. Press release, November 16, 1972, RAC, FFR, Grant File 07200090 (FA732D), Reel 1750.

94 Report to the President by the Under Secretary of State (Nicholas Katzenbach), the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (John W. Gardner), and the Director of the CIA (Richard Helms), March 29, 1967, in American Foreign Policy: Current Document 1967 (Washington, DC: US

95 Rusk to President Johnson, June 4, 1968, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Box 192, Oversize Attachment Packet #1.

96 Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities [Church Committee], Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 188.