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Abstract

Drawing on the wealth of material from the Nelson A. Rockefeller papers held at the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC), my dissertation project examines the rise and fall of the “liberal” wing of the mid-twentieth century Republican Party. Big city Republicans from industrial states faced social movements that made mass democracy a vibrant force. Liberal Republicans emerged among the typically well-to-do men and women of older and established neighborhoods in New York, San Francisco, and Minneapolis. While no less an elite class than other Republican partisans, urban Republicans witnessed the upheavals and political transformation of the city firsthand. Unlike the rural and suburban right, big city Republicans simply could not imagine mounting a frontal assault against the vaunted New Deal coalition. In this setting, the reactionary bent of the party’s base actually looked more like an electoral liability. Liberal Republicans insisted that winning statewide (or national) office required votes from major cities home to a diverse and organized working class that otherwise voted for Democrats. But securing any significant segment of that vote required a series of accommodations that most Republicans simply could not tolerate.
The Coming of the “Rockefeller Republicans”

Shortly after Nelson Rockefeller’s death in early 1979, his longtime public relations advisor Hugh Morrow began conducting a series of interviews with his old boss’ inner circle. Many of the former New York governor’s old cadre emphasized the ways New York City shaped Rockefeller’s idea of politics. Surprisingly, they did not highlight Wall Street or Madison Avenue when describing how the city impacted the heir to the country’s most notorious robber baron fortune. Instead, they described in vivid detail the world built by New York City’s diverse class of laboring men and women. When Rockefeller first prepared to run for governor in 1958, his consultants warned him that the city’s “‘melting pot’ population and large working-class element” had been “strongly motivated by social democratic objectives.”¹ As one former aide explained, the solidarities of working-class New Yorkers “brought to bear programs that were unlike those of any other part of the country.”² By the end of World War Two, the city boasted a tuition-free university, extensive public housing, and pioneering antidiscrimination laws.³ Working-class New Yorkers won each advance through strikes, sit-ins, and, above all, the quotidian work of getting voters to the polls. In mid-century New York, no politician dared ignore the political clout of ordinary working people.

That electoral pressure forced the Grand Old Party to accommodate working-class New York’s sprawling vision of reform, not only in the Empire State but across the country. During its fifteen years in Albany, the Rockefeller administration created a state health care program, expanded the public higher education system, barred discrimination in housing, and protected women’s reproductive rights. Rockefeller, in turn, brought his experiences negotiating with working-class New York to the national stage. He insisted that Republicans could never retake the White House without first winning over the working people mobilized in Northern cities.
Rockefeller’s advisors also acknowledged that they built on a strategy of Republican accommodation begun by his predecessor Thomas Dewey in the 1940s. New York, after all, was “the original New Deal state” where Franklin Roosevelt first experimented with the reforms working-class New Yorkers brought to fruition. Dewey went from being a Manhattan prosecutor to the governor’s mansion by pushing New York Republicans to meet the demands of the growing New Deal coalition. Its most advanced blocs—including organized labor, civil rights groups, and women’s rights groups—formed the basis of a social democratic movement. During his three terms as governor, Dewey’s administration raised the state minimum wage, passed an equal pay law, and established the first state-level fair employment agency in the country. When Dewey claimed the Republican nomination for the presidency, his platforms promised government policies to promote full employment and pledged to advance Black civil rights in Congress. Rockefeller and his advisors very much saw themselves as actively building a decades-long “Dewey-Rockefeller era.” That moment represented the apogee of the so-called “liberal” wing of the Republican Party.

But by the time Rockefeller’s old cadre gathered to reminisce in the late 1970s, the political world they had once navigated was almost gone. Working-class New York endured a business-led counteroffensive that dismantled much of the Big Apple’s social democratic institutions. Nationally, that same counteroffensive eviscerated the unionized manufacturing centers stretching from the Northeast to the West Coast. Accelerated capital flight out of the urban North spurred the retrenchment of the welfare states built in New York, as well as in states such as Pennsylvania, California, and Michigan. The coming austerity disproportionately devastated working-class communities of color and placed ever greater burdens on working women. The crumbling of the urban North and West Coast further undermined the wide range of working-class social movements that had fought long and hard to make their cities more egalitarian places.

The escalating “urban crises” of the 1970s opened up space for an ascendant rightwing coalition to seize control of the Republican Party and transform American politics. In the now booming Sunbelt, the mass base of the “New Right”
came from business groups, erstwhile segregationists, suburban homeowner associations, and evangelical Christian churches. By November 1980, Ronald Reagan marshalled this coalition to win the White House and, soon after, more conservative challengers drove liberal Republicans from office and positions of authority in the party. But the collapse of the “Dewey-Rockefeller era” did not result simply from a successful counter-mobilization on the Republican right. Instead, the Republican Party’s liberal wing emerged, and declined, in direct relation to the promise, and ultimate failure, of an American social democracy across the urban North. It is this rise and fall, promise and failure, that is the subject of this dissertation.

While most recent writing on the modern Republican Party is dominated by the “rise of the right,” there is growing body of work dedicated to the political and intellectual breadth of twentieth-century Republicans. These studies focus on the cohort of liberals or moderate conservatives who blended support for popular elements of the postwar welfare state, an internationalist foreign policy, and a modest civil rights agenda, with a defense of limited government and the prerogatives of private enterprise.

Often, the terms “moderate” and “liberal” are used interchangeably to describe the men and women who challenged the GOP’s rightwing after World War Two. Some scholars define the party’s moderates as pragmatic operators who adopted the language of liberalism to keep Republicans relevant, given the popularity of the New Deal. 7 Others cast liberals or progressives as those committed to reclaiming the radical heritage of Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, or Robert LaFollette. 8 A growing body of work also examines the multiracial cadre of Republican activists who urged the overwhelmingly white GOP to reach voters of color. 9 Most of this work still emphasizes the cosmopolitan “eastern establishment” that championed reform at home and détente abroad. 10 As a result, the “modern Republicanism” of the Eisenhower years are highlighted as the zenith of liberal thought and action in a party otherwise steadily drifting to the right. 11 Above all, this narrative centers on how Republican voices for compromise waged an ultimately losing battle against the gathering forces of the New Right during the 1950s and 1960s.
This analytical and temporal framework obscures more than it reveals. It does so first by emphasizing a complex taxonomy of liberal, progressive, or moderate Republicans. Parsing out differences between political personalities understates the shared assumptions underpinning their common project. They all ought to be understood as “liberal Republicans” precisely because they believed that the institutions, discourses, and coalitions of the New Deal order formed the unshakeable foundation of American politics. As a result, the making of a liberal Republican bloc did not begin after World War Two. It began in the depths of the Depression and amid the upheavals of the mass mobilization for world war. Likewise, internecine battles for the “soul” of the GOP in Congress, the White House, or the Republican National Committee were only a part of the story. The real wellspring of liberal Republican politics came from the roiling conflicts that transformed the big cities and industrial states of the Northeast, Midwest, and Pacific Coast. After all, these were the very places where a diversity of working people had organized themselves most effectively since the New Deal. Understanding what made this cohort of Republicans liberal requires examining the social struggles in urban America that began in the 1930s and intensified during the postwar decades. Liberal Republicans became such an influential part of American politics precisely because they learned to navigate and negotiate a political terrain remade by upheavals from below.

When Nelson Rockefeller first won office in 1958, the *New York Times* heralded his election to the governorship as the rehabilitation of a “name once among the most hated and feared in America.” To many observers, the key to his political success came from his apparent ease moving through the proletarian worlds of mid-century New York City. Here was a patrician who prided himself on his ease among the plebeians. With his jolly “back-slapping, blintz-eating” demeanor, “Rocky” was just “as comfortable in a union hall as an East Side deli or SoHo art gallery,” according to one sympathetic biographer. Rockefeller came from the so-called “liberal establishment” of cosmopolitan, Ivy League-educated, white Protestants who ran Wall Street, multinational corporations, the mass media, and occupied important positions at every level of government. In their minds, reform at home and peace abroad could only be achieved through elite, technocratic rule. Rockefeller cultivated those beliefs as Coordinator of Inter-
American Affairs for the Roosevelt Administration during World War Two, then as a member of the New York City mayor’s business advisory committee after the war, and finally as an under-secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare in Eisenhower’s White House.

Rockefeller certainly blended his blintz-eating character with his establishment background to great success. But above all, Rockefeller’s idea of being Republican came conditioned by the power of working class New-York, not its affectations. Although Cold War repression ravaged New York’s radical Left, working-class politics continued to flourish. From within New York’s dense and diversified craft economy, unions negotiated a sprawling system of health care, housing, and welfare programs interwoven into the fabric of public services. Organized labor further buttressed its ambitious collective bargaining agenda through independent party politics. The Liberal Party, formed in 1944 by garment union leaders David Dubinsky and Alex Rose, challenged Democratic Tammany Hall as the political voice of New York’s workers.

By the 1950s, Liberal endorsements (for Democrats and Republicans alike) could bring thousands of proletarian Italians and Jews, as well as black and Puerto Rican migrants, to the polls as never before. The Liberals also helped the Democrats and Republicans to isolate and finally destroy the Communist-linked American Labor Party. Such an act of “political extrusion,” as political scientist Martin Shefter argues, provided the basis for working-class incorporation into the polity. At the same time, a “New Tammany” machine emerged by blending the distribution of patronage with a host of progressive policy initiatives including rent control and permanent voter registration. Together, the Liberal Party and the New Tammany Hall used the concessions struck during the Dewey’s years as a springboard for more expansive reforms. All told, working-class power made a kind of “hybrid social democracy” the heart of New York City’s postwar politics.

Working-class New York would never be far from Nelson Rockefeller’s mind as he contemplated elected office in the mid-1950s. Rockefeller saw the New York governorship as his stepping-stone to the presidency, just as it did for Franklin Roosevelt. His first step came with a call from another ambitious millionaire with eyes on the White House, Democratic Governor Averell Harriman. The
rather staid and uninspiring Harriman narrowly won office in 1954 by ingratiating himself within the proletarian milieu of New York Democratic Party politics. Harriman lured his old friend Nelson back home from his posting in Eisenhower’s Health, Education, and Welfare Department with the opportunity to chair a commission exploring a new state constitution. Harriman thought the decision quite savvy; he could claim a bipartisan commission while deflecting any heat generated by controversial issues such as reapportionment and proposed amendments barring discrimination in housing and employment. The position quickly elevated Rockefeller’s profile in state politics while giving him a crash course in proletarian New York politics. It also afforded Rockefeller the cover to assemble the nucleus of a furtive campaign for governor, and, eventually, his administration in Albany.

Rockefeller threw himself—not to mention his family’s fantastic fortune—into electoral politics. In April 1958, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund released a highly publicized report on the US economy that effectively doubled as a Rockefeller-for-governor campaign advertisement. The report itself emerged from the Special Studies Project, a personal blue-ribbon committee chaired by Rockefeller that brought together the leading lights of the liberal establishment. His advisory panel included publisher Henry Luce, Yale Law School Dean Eugene Rostow, Harvard political science professor Henry Kissinger, and Rockefeller Foundation President Dean Rusk. It also brought together a bipartisan group of policymakers including Eisenhower cabinet members Arthur Burns and Oveta Culp Hobby (Rockefeller’s old boss at HEW) and New Dealers Adolf Berle, Jr. and Chester Bowles. Labor and civil rights groups, too, received token representation with the appointments of Lester Granger of the Urban League and Jacob Potoisky of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers union.22

Prioritizing “Rapid growth, full employment, a free economy,” the report echoed the pro-business Keynesianism of the Committee for Economic Development.23 To bring the country out of the lingering “Eisenhower recession” of 1958, the report proposed massive public works projects, expanded unemployment benefits, and more sophisticated planning between the state and private enterprise to stimulate mass consumption.24 But forging the liberal Republican
compromise with working-class New York rested on a deep-seated antipathy to its social democratic institutions that might threaten business confidence. As the Rockefeller Brothers Fund report concluded, the priority of government must be to solve the “problem of capital accumulation.” The ambit of government intervention needed to be circumscribed to only those administrative functions that capitalist firms could not provide for themselves. This included monetary and fiscal policy, building infrastructure, and, at most, a modest social safety net to backstop a largely privatized welfare state.

The politics of increasingly diversified cities brought this ideology of elite accommodation into sharp focus. Rockefeller hired eminent pollster Samuel Lubell to examine how the explosive issue of race might impact his campaign. Lubell’s findings uncovered especially intense white hostility to integration, as well as some increased Black support for the GOP. Citing projections showing New York City on track on to become one-third Black by 1970, the campaign quickly recognized that it could not hope to win statewide office by retreating to racial conservatism. New York Republicans needed to “claim credit” for the civil rights legislation signed into law by Thomas Dewey in the 1940s, especially the country’s first state-level FEPC agency—the State Council Against Discrimination (SCAD).

Rockefeller’s aides explored two concrete additions to SCAD. The first looked at empowering the agency to initiate investigations across entire industries; the second, the prospect of extending SCAD’s purview to cover discrimination in private housing. Such reforms addressed the criticisms civil rights and labor groups had been leveling against SCAD for over a decade. But Rockefeller’s proposals could still only tackle discrimination at the most superficial level. In both cases, campaign strategy remained fully committed to SCAD’s founding myth of racial discrimination as a “moral and psychological problem” that could not “simply be prohibited by law.” When similar proposals did reach the state legislature, rural upstate Republicans swiftly voted down both proposals, and instead proposed vesting similar enforcement powers with the attorney general’s office. Civil rights groups, too, dismissed this compromise “either as a crass political maneuver or an attempt to block all action.” Rockefeller’s aides, however, remained confident that employer associations or real estate developers
could be convinced to accept the same modicum of antidiscrimination regulation they had already lived with for some fifteen years.\textsuperscript{32}

Maintaining business confidence proved especially important since employers appeared to be staging a mass exodus from the Empire State. On the stump, Rockefeller rattled off alarming statistics showing how “runaway shops” had sparked New York’s steep economic decline under the Democrats. Rockefeller pointed to Ford Motor Company’s decision to move its massive Buffalo assembly plant to rural Ohio; meanwhile, General Electric in Schenectady relocated its communications products division to Virginia. \textsuperscript{33} Privately, campaign aides reminded the candidate that New York employers already paid higher wages and taxes than their southern counterparts—all the while underwriting more generous benefits than employers elsewhere. With other states, especially in the South, offering tax breaks and other inducements such as “more restrictive labor-management legislation,” New York could ill afford to advocate policies that “might encourage more business concerns to emigrate.”\textsuperscript{34}

Nevertheless, Rockefeller struggled to preserve a political economy underpinned by collective bargaining and fairly generous welfare entitlements. Rockefeller, like other liberal Republicans, remained adamantly opposed to the right-to-work laws that appeared on the ballot in major industrial states across the country that year.\textsuperscript{35} Furthermore, his staff concluded that the ongoing maturation of southern industrialization would inevitably bring widespread unionization to the South and thus ultimately eliminate the regional disparities.\textsuperscript{36} Predicting an inevitable convergence of northern and southern capitalisms, the campaign identified the real problem as competition from the rest of the manufacturing core. Over the previous decade, New York’s unionized northeastern neighbors had continued to prosper by establishing industrial development corporations and offering low interest rates and cheap plant sites.\textsuperscript{37} New York State government needed to provide those same services, too. Rockefeller also proposed policies to help workers impacted by capital flight. Speaking to the Schenectady Republican Committee, Rockefeller called for creating state programs to assist workers displaced by automation and promised to subsidize workers’ pensions in the case of plant closings.\textsuperscript{38}
When accepting the nomination for governor that summer, Rockefeller proudly declared himself the steward of Thomas Dewey’s legacy. Like Dewey, he promised to expand New York’s welfare state, state university system, and build new infrastructure. 39 Rockefeller slipped easily into Dewey’s role as a good government reformer by railing against the “bossism” of New York City’s Tammany machine. By mobilizing public resources for its working-class constituents and incorporating workers into the political process, the New Tammany Hall organization typified the redistributive class politics of postwar machines. Led by the dapper Carmine DeSapio, the New Tammany organization exercised an incredible influence on state and national Democratic politics. But for Republicans it remained merely a “reformed bossism” that only threatened to upend the tepid, technocratic compromises erected during the Dewey years.

New York Republicans also pitched their anti-Tammany campaign as a pro-civil rights plank. Rockefeller upheld his family’s longstanding philanthropic connections to the NAACP, the Urban League, and the struggle against southern apartheid. Under the Democrats, he charged, confronting racial bias and discrimination would only become mired in “political” conflicts. 40 Yet Rockefeller’s aides also balked at making SCAD officials subject to civil service rules for fear of undermining their own patronage powers. 41 Therefore, Rockefeller promised to establish within SCAD an “Economic Advisory Council” made up of “prominent businessmen, labor and civic leaders, educators, and professional groups”—but conspicuously devoid of any substantive enforcement powers.42 His positions still won key endorsements. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.’s former campaign director urged Black voters to reject Democratic “bossism” and vote for Rockefeller.43

This platform helped Rockefeller secure a landslide win in an otherwise dismal midterm season for the GOP. He cut deep into New York City’s Democratic pluralities, including among Black and Puerto Rican voters. Rockefeller also posted big numbers upstate in the Black and blue-collar precincts of Buffalo, Rochester, Schenectady, and Utica. 44 Rockefeller won, as one New York Democratic operative put it, because his “daring liberalism” broke with the tired conservatism still parroted by most Republicans. 45 The Republican National Committee identified Rockefeller’s win as one of the party’s few bright spots in a
nationwide “urban revolt” against the GOP. That year Republicans faced the ire of voters still mired in the ongoing “Eisenhower recession,” and mobilized by labor and civil rights groups to vote against Republican candidates who backed right-to-work laws in California, Ohio, and elsewhere. Newly elected liberals, such as Rockefeller and Oregon Governor Mark Hatfield, won office by stressing their fealty to the organizations of working people. Though organized labor in New York lined up solidly behind Harriman and the Democratic slate, Rockefeller privately curried favor with union leaders. “I know you’re obligated,” he assured them, “but, however this turns out, we’re friends.”

2 Interview of Thomas Stephens by Hugh Morrow, September 29, 1979, pp. 58-59, RG 4, series Q.2, box 2, folder 28, NAR.
6 Harry O’Donnell interview, pp. 9-11.
10 Richard Norton Smith, Thomas E. Dewey and His Times (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982); Nicol Rae, The Decline and Fall of the Liberal Republicans: From 1952 to


14 Smith, On His Own Terms, xxxiv.


18 Shefter, “Political Incorporation and the Extrusion.”


20 Freeman, Working Class New York, 103.

21 The narrative of Rockefeller’s decision to challenge Harriman is drawn from Smith, On His Own Terms, 265-69.

22 On the creation and composition of the Special Studies Project, see Smith, On His Own Terms, 253-55.

23 Rockefeller Brothers Fund, The Challenge to America: Its Economic and Social Aspects (Garden City: Doubleday, 1958), 8. For the CED’s policy agenda in the late 1950s, see Collins, The Business Response to Keynes, 176-77.

24 Ibid., 9-15.

25 Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Challenge to America, 22.

26 Ibid., 74-75.

Memorandum on Anti-Discrimination Measures in New York State, typescript, April 23, 1958, p. 9, RG 4, series G.3, box 23, folder 283, NAR.

Ibid., p. 13.


Ibid.

Rockefeller campaign headquarters, press release, September 29, p. 3, RG 4, series G.3, box 23, folder 283, NAR.

Memorandum on Labor-Management Problems in New York State, May 6, 1958, p. 11, RG 4, series G.3, box 23, folder 292, NAR.

Rockefeller campaign headquarters, press release, October 3, 1958, p. 1, RG 15, series 33, box 1, folder 2, NAR.


Rockefeller campaign headquarters, press release, September 23, 1958, p. 1, RG 15, series 33, box 1, folder 2, NAR; Economic Trends and Business in New York State, p. 32.

Rockefeller campaign headquarters, press release, October 14, 1958, p. 2, RG 15, series 33, box 1, folder 2, NAR.


Rockefeller campaign headquarters, press release, October 19, 1958, p. 3, RG 15, series 33, box 1, folder 2, NAR.

Memorandum on Anti-Discrimination Measures, pp. 13-14.

Rockefeller campaign headquarters, press release, September 14, 1958, p. 4, RG 15, series 33, box 1, folder 2, NAR.


Quoted in Smith, On His Own Terms, 287.