Mozambique Liberation Front’s Educational Programs and the Ford Foundation: The Case of the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam (1960-1964)

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Abstract

This report is an account of my research conducted at the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC), especially in the grant records of the Ford Foundation Archives.\(^1\) The data collected in RAC’s repositories integrates the final part of a broader research schedule which has included archival work conducted in Dar es Salaam and Maputo. This material has been analyzed to deepen my current understanding of the Mozambique Liberation Front’s (FRELIMO) formative years in exile, with special focus over its deliberations on matters of language policy.\(^2\) The documents consulted at the RAC reveal in great detail how FRELIMO’s first president, Eduardo Mondlane, and his North American wife, Janet Rae Mondlane, steered the educational plans of the liberation movement towards creating a boarding school for Mozambican refugees in Dar es Salaam. The records are instrumental for comprehending how these projects were developed into creating what became known as the Mozambique Institute. Lastly, my report introduces a discussion regarding the Ford Foundation’s decision to terminate the grant money that reached the Institute, referencing the contentious political situation that arose with Portugal. This scandal raises a number of interesting questions regarding the process of the Ford Foundation’s policymaking for its grants; an analysis of this episode will be taken up beyond the scope of this report.
Introduction

The historiography of Mozambique, either written on-site by Mozambican scholars or abroad by international observers, historians, anthropologists and other specialists, has stirred several discussions on topics ranging from the nature of socialist revolutions in Africa, the role of rural mobilization during the War of Liberation,3 to modernization and nation-building, educational development, and many others.

If the liberation war waged by the Mozambique Liberation Front (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*, henceforth FRELIMO) from 1964 through 1974 against Portuguese colonialism has attracted major journalistic and academic attention since the 1960s, the formation of the Front itself in June 1962 in Dar es Salaam remains largely underexplored. One of the main problems my research assesses is precisely the integration of different nationalistic movements under the leadership of Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane. He was an American-educated Mozambican scholar and UN official who was elected as FRELIMO’s first president in September 1962 to lead and unite heterogeneous groups towards the liberation of Mozambique from Portuguese rule. More specifically, my objective is to understand how FRELIMO managed the linguistic diversity which marked the context it stood on: 1960s Tanganyika, a British trusteeship territory and later a newly-independent country, home to thousands of Mozambican migrants of distinct backgrounds. I argue that FRELIMO’s choice of the Portuguese language as the *language of national unity* must be historically situated in its exiled context. Thus, as the majority of FRELIMO’s members neither spoke nor comprehended Portuguese upon the formation of the organization,5 communicating instead through other prevalent languages shared among Mozambican refugees in Tanganyika, such as Swahili, English and Kimakonde, we must assess how the linguistic diversity was dealt with in order to allow effective political mobilization. To study this topic in the liberation movement’s early years, particularly which policies were drawn to promote unity on the linguistic level, I directed my attention to FRELIMO’s first educational programs.
The first educational projects led to the formation of the Mozambique Institute (*Instituto Moçambicano*), founded by Eduardo Mondlane’s American wife, Janet Rae Mondlane, in August 1963. It was known that Eduardo Mondlane received a Ford Foundation grant necessary to support construction of schooling and housing facilities in Dar es Salaam for Mozambican refugees, who were in turn expected to join FRELIMO’s revolutionary struggle. However, as the terms and conditions of the grant were unknown and could reveal new information related to Mondlane’s presidency over a recently founded liberation front stricken by internal strife, pulling the thread on the Ford Foundation (henceforth FF) documentation led me to the RAC collections.

The materials more directly related to Mozambique and to the context of Mozambican nationalism in Tanganyika were comprised within a single microfilm reel (no. 0765) contained in the FF archives’ “Grant Files” collection. The reel contains documents that were kept by the FF in a folder named “Grant File PA no. 63-425,” labeled as a project dedicated to support an educational program for Mozambican refugees. This file included around 300 microfilmed pages. I was positively surprised as I did not expect that the general correspondence between individuals involved would be so numerous. In fact, the correspondence comprises the bulk of the folder, with 223 pages placed chronologically under a specific section (Section 4) titled “All Other Correspondence Materials.”

My research at RAC also looked at other educational and survey projects funded by the FF on language questions in Tanzania and elsewhere in Africa during the 1960s and 1970s. I was able to access several other records in order to gather contextual information relating to language policies, nation-building and linguistic conflicts which were being studied by sociolinguists – a field recently born at the time – and their firsthand reports and insights. They may potentially lead to a broader understanding of the problems faced by FRELIMO in terms of linguistic and human resources management, in a comparative perspective with other contemporary attempts to solve linguistic heterogeneity over newly independent polities. However, to keep this text concise and coherent, I will not include in this report any description or analysis of this other contextual set of documentation; this material will be the object of forthcoming articles.
The following exposition is organized in three parts. Firstly, I expose a preliminary account of records on FF funding directly related to the Mozambique Institute and how they can be read to improve our understanding of the formation of FRELIMO’s first educational enterprise. Secondly, I proceed to historically situate the means sought by the Mozambique Institute’s personnel to implement its Portuguese-language program. Lastly, I propose some concluding remarks with the objective of outlining future research topics.

Understanding the Formation of the Mozambique Institute

The Mozambique Institute (henceforth MI) was described by scholars as early as 1971 as a “the apex institution of a projected Frelimo educational system.” As briefly stated above, being the pioneer institution in the context of Mozambican refugees in Dar es Salaam meant it necessarily had to address the language question of the newly formed nationalist movement. In order to understand how the choice of the Portuguese language as the medium of instruction was implemented, it is necessary to situate historically the agents involved and how the funds needed for its operation made it to the Mondlanes in Tanganyika.

The first document of the microfilmed folder is the program action of a $99,700 grant made by the FF to the African-American Institute (henceforth AAI), an American philanthropic organization based in New York City, to a project named “Educational project for African refugee students in Tanganyika”, dispatched on June 26, 1963, having been previously approved by FF’s president on June 10. The grant notification letter was sent to Waldemar A. Nielsen, AAI’s president, and the full payment check was sent enclosed in a letter also addressed to him on July 16, 1963.

It should come as no surprise the fact that there is no mention of Eduardo or Janet Mondlane in these first documents. If Portuguese counterinsurgency was to be
avoided, there had to be intermediary institutions to administer the FF’s grant covertly on behalf of the Mondlanes. It is now clear, however, that my initial research objective with RAC’s documentation had a theoretical flaw. To assume that there was a Ford Foundation grant to form a Mozambican Institute is an oversimplification, if not an anachronism. Instead, there was a network of negotiations and arrangements, observable through the correspondence, that ultimately led to the construction of a hostel and secondary school operated by Janet Mondlane completed only in late 1964, while the MI’s name appeared for the first time by August 1963, thus months after Grant 63-425 was approved to the AAI.

In fact, Janet Mondlane would not move definitely to Dar es Salaam before early August 1963. Among other activities in the meantime, she participated with her husband Eduardo, FRELIMO’s first president elected in September 1962, in some of his extensive travels across the world in search of support to the Mozambican nationalist cause. As Mrs. Mondlane recalls it in the first report submitted to the FF in October 1963:

> The Mozambique Institute is the fulfillment of an idea which was born in 1960–1961 when my husband and I visited Mozambique... In June 1962, we came to Dar es Salaam with the expressed purpose of looking into the possibility of developing and educational programme for Mozambican refugees... As I was working on the details of this programme, it became more and more apparent that unless something drastic was done to prepare the refugees for the university scholarships available, there would be soon no qualified students to take them.

This report indicates that the secondary school and hostel for which the MI is known came only at a later stage, while the initial objective focused on preparing Mozambican refugees to take on higher education overseas. In fact, before the hostel was completed in late 1964, the MI consisted of a two-room office rented in Dar es Salaam where Janet and her administrative secretary, Betty King, worked mainly in screening and selecting the refugees to assess their educational levels. The classes, as shown in the second part of this text, were initially conducted in a school financed and run by the AAI with the support of American volunteers.
Nonetheless, the ultimate goal of the education provided to the refugees seemed to be clear from the start. The aforementioned report was attached to a letter Mrs. Mondlane sent to the FF’s officer responsible for East African affairs, Francis X. Sutton, in which she states that “[t]he whole idea of the Institute is to build for the future of Mozambique. The students who study there should have in their minds the desire to return to that country to solve the problems that freedom will bring.”

Sutton, however, seemed not to understand or to have disagreed with this overt political objective, as this typewritten sentence in Mondlane’s letter bears a question mark drawn beside it.

Sutton was well-aware of her husband’s political activities, so he may have questioned the appropriateness or viability of MI’s role in the nationalist movement. In fact, the very first document that mentions Mozambique in the general correspondence’s documents section, dated December 3, 1962, is precisely a memorandum in which he states that Mondlane, the “most intelligent man from Mozambique” he had ever met, “is now head of a Mozambique political movement with headquarters in Dar es Salaam” and “[a]sked if we could help in any or various ways” to provide secondary education “for some of the 150,000 Mozambiquais [sic] who are now in Tanganyika.”

Before Eduardo Mondlane moved to Dar es Salaam in February 1963, he seemed to have made use of his stay in the U.S. to look for funding opportunities for the educational projects he and his wife had in mind. Upon a suggestion made by Sutton, Mondlane sent a six-page document to the FF in December 1962, named “The Mozambique Education Project,” in which Mondlane described his intention to create three educational programs. The most important would be a program to qualify Mozambican refugees to receive scholarships to African and overseas universities, followed by a high school in Dar es Salaam and, lastly, an adult education program. In a handwritten FF memo attached to this document and addressed to Sutton, dated December 17, one can read: “Why don’t we help these people?”

Mondlane’s request appears in the records again in a memo from Sutton on March 27, 1963, where he mentioned that “[r]ecent discussions in Washington and with
AAI” had brought back Mondlane’s project to his attention. From this point on, it seems to have been decided that the AAI would be the grantee because it had an office in Tanganyika and ran a “tarpaper school” for other African refugees. Finally, Mondlane submitted an adjusted version of the initial request made the previous year in a meeting on May 9, 1963, where the plans for building a hostel and a “Mozambique Education Office,” headquartered at Mondlane’s home, were made.

The final “Request for Grant Action” was submitted on May 27, 1963. As indicated above, the grantee was the AAI out of convenience, for it ran a school for African refugees in the Kurasini region of Dar es Salaam funded by U.S.AID. The grant “would make possible effective collaboration of Dr. and Mrs. Mondlane with the African-American Institute” to cater to Mozambican refugees’ educational needs. While the document does criticize Portuguese colonialist policies as “notoriously backward,” it describes Mondlane rather euphemistically as “[t]he leader of the Mozambique refugee organization,” instead of mentioning FRELIMO as a political front engaged in a nationalist struggle. Lastly, the funds would pay the education staff “provided through Project Tanganyika.”

However, both AAI’s “tarpaper school,” officially known as the “Kurasini Special Training Centre,” and Project Tanganyika’s staff conducted their classes in English. The discussion that follows assesses the linguistic aspects of MI’s schooling efforts that may be perceived through RAC’s documentation.

**Situating the Language Question in Education**

From a chronological perspective, other American philanthropic organizations were already working in the educational field in Tanganyika years before Grant no. 63-425 came into existence. Such is the case of a Harvard-Radcliffe student summer program created in 1960 that was planned to offer volunteer educational programs in Tanganyika conducted by Harvard undergraduates. The program,
named “Project Tanganyika,” was officially arranged between Tanganyikan authorities and the Phillips Brooks House Association of Harvard University in December 1960. Its main objective was to meet “the necessity for instruction in the English language” in Tanganyika, as stated by its first report.

The relation between this project and FRELIMO’s provisions on the education sector provides us an entry point to approach linguistic questions pertaining to Mozambican nationalism in its Tanganyikan context. The following quote, extracted from one request sent to the FF for funds in November 1960, outlines the motifs of Project Tanganyika:

> [T]he greatest single contribution any American group could make in Tanganyika would be to help Tanganyikans teach English in secondary schools and teachers’ training classes. It is on the base of the English language that Tanganyikans will build the civil service and administrative apparatus which will unify and govern this nation which is already relatively stable racially and politically [my emphasis].

Even though Tanganyikan/Tanzanian language policies would shift in the post-independence – especially after the Arusha Declaration of 1967 – towards the use of the Swahili language as the language of national unity, Project Tanganyika was dedicated to promote the English language in secondary education by training Tanganyikan teachers and allowed, as stated by a participant, “to meet their greatest need – education – in the most efficient way: teaching English.” The director of Project Tanganyika contacted the FF several times requesting financial aid until the opportunity of providing teachers to the Mondlanes’ own project for Mozambican refugees was presented. Sutton sent word to the director that the grant to the AAI “for training [Mozambican] refugees in Tanganyika” included “provision for six members of your group.”

Despite the availability of English teachers, the determination to have Portuguese language instituted in the role of nation-building by FRELIMO’s leaders required Portuguese-media education to be promoted through MI’s activities. RAC’s records reveal that the Ford Foundation neither pressured its grantees to foster English language as the medium of education, nor encouraged them to do so. In
fact, Janet Mondlane seized the opportunity of describing to the FF the notorious difficulties of arranging Portuguese-language textbooks faced by the MI’s staff in order to pull out the education to the Portuguese-speaking students under her advisory.\textsuperscript{28} In a report sent to the FF in February 1964, Mrs. Mondlane described the issue in the following way:

Our most desperate need, and one that it is most difficult to fill, is for books and texts in Portuguese. At this time, most of the students under the supervision of the Institute have Portuguese as their only fluent European language. They are not sufficiently advanced in their English language studies to be able to work and study in English.\textsuperscript{29}

In another report, the lack of Portuguese-speaking personnel was similarly stated as a major problem since most of the Mozambican refugees selected by the MI – 35 out of 51 in 1963 – were unable to attend the English classes conducted either by Project Tanganyika’s volunteers or the courses at AAI’s school for refugees in Dar es Salaam. On this matter, Mrs. Mondlane argued that:

It is unreasonable to expect that very many will quickly acquire a sufficient grasp of English to enable them to pursue the remainder of their education in that language. Also, it seems inevitable that Portuguese will remain the primary foreign language of Mozambique for many years following independence.\textsuperscript{30}

To overcome these difficulties, the Mondlanes sought to recruit Brazilian teachers who would be willing to participate in the MI, and the idea of resorting to Brazil’s “limitless” potential was brought up in the earliest contacts between Eduardo Mondlane and Francis Sutton.\textsuperscript{31} In fact, in the first evidence of their contact on the aforementioned memo from December 3, 1962, there is a handwritten message on the upper left corner suggesting that Reynold E. Carlson, FF’s representative in Rio de Janeiro, could be helpful on the matter. Carlson corresponded further with Sutton and other FF associates in New York, sending them a bibliography and copies of available Brazilian textbooks that were forwarded to the MI in Dar es Salaam in April 1964,\textsuperscript{32} but it seems that the recruitment of teachers was impeded due to insufficient funds on the part of the MI.\textsuperscript{33}
The reading of these documents points to the following situation: since very few of the Mozambican refugees in Tanganyika spoke any European language and Portuguese prevailed among those who did, FRELIMO’s choice to promote Portuguese language required the MI to expand significantly its facilities and operations, for it could not depend indefinitely on the courses provided by AAI’s Special Education Centre or Project Tanganyika’s volunteers. The path taken deviated from the initial boarding school structure and focused on post-primary education, and a fully operational Portuguese-speaking staff was achieved by 1966.\textsuperscript{34}

Before this achievement was possible, however, news of the shortage of Portuguese-speaking personnel far extended beyond the boundaries of FF-MI correspondence during the international scandal that unfolded after the connections between the FF and FRELIMO through the MI came to public knowledge in September 1964. According to the FF’s documents, the scandal seemed to have erupted after Janet Mondlane was interviewed by the \textit{Syracuse Herald Journal} on August 24, 1964. Published the following day with the headline “Party-in-Exile Sees Liberated Mozambique,” the news article explicitly cited the FF as responsible for funding the Mozambique Institute and mentioned Janet Mondlane’s direction over “the education of the youth who she hopes will become the leaders of the new independent nation when and if it emerges.”\textsuperscript{35} After this connection was picked up by Portuguese journalists, the scandal raged on for months involving the international press, Portuguese authorities and the Ford Motor Company.\textsuperscript{36}

Reel 0765 contains correspondence exchanged in October/November 1964 between FF President Henry T. Heald and Alberto Franco Nogueira, Portugal’s Minister of Foreign Relations. Heald tried to placate and convince Nogueira not to involve the Ford Motor Company in the incident – as Portugal threatened to have its assembly factory in Lisbon shut down in retaliation. Heald cabled and sent him a letter emphasizing FF’s apolitical stance, that only educational criteria had been considered and that he was “told at the moment that there is some lack of Portuguese-speaking teachers”\textsuperscript{37} in the project. Nogueira’s replied on the topic:
May I ask whether the language training project is meant to train students in the Portuguese language and whether the lack of Portuguese speaking teachers is being filled with teachers of other nationalities who however also speak and teach Portuguese? Or is it intended to replace the Portuguese language in Mozambique by some other language?\(^{38}\)

The implications of Nogueira’s comment, as well as the scandal itself, are too far-reaching to be adequately analyzed in this report. For the moment, it may be assured that that some Portuguese high-officials considered the possibility that Portuguese language in Mozambique could be threatened by Mozambican nationalists.\(^{39}\)

**Concluding Remarks: Prospects for Future Research**

A first aspect that needs further investigation is the extent to which Portuguese authorities, particularly PIDE,\(^{40}\) were (un)informed about the case. It may be argued that Janet Mondlane’s indiscretion triggered the incident, as it was only several days after her interview by the *Syracuse Herald Journal* that the Lisbon-based newspaper *Diário de Notícias* published its version of the story on September 12.

When the news made it to *The New York Times* the next day, it stirred up criticism of the FF, coming from various sectors of the American public. Particular mention is made to a letter written on September 16, 1964, by a self-identified Iroquois man named Barry Defreitag, who was outraged that “the Ford Foundation could squander such a large sum of money on this black, foreign organization masquerading as an educational institution” and added that “the poverty-ridden and oppressed ‘original owners’ of this vast continent comprising America” were “more deserving of help from the whites than African natives bent on destruction.”\(^{41}\) This letter, which is the only of its kind in the files, is ripe with implications and makes for a tempting research topic, but it does not fit into the
scope of my analysis and is quoted here with the exclusive purpose of drawing scholarly attention.

In a letter written to a newspaper editor from Minneapolis, Henry T. Heald described the aforementioned crisis as “our adventures with Salazar & Co.,” and regretted the political activities of the Mondlanes. He conceded retrospectively that “the original grant was a mistake and that permitting ourselves to become involved even indirectly in a political refugee operation was almost bound to be unfortunate.” The correspondence between the main philanthropic institutions compiled in the files of the MI grant indicates that the aftermath of the crisis, on the American side, meant the closing of several funding opportunities to FRELIMO. As a consequence of the scandal, the FF did not extend the grant to the AAI to run the “Mozambique Institute Project.” An inter-office memo written on February 17, 1965 noted that similar discretion was taken by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund when approached by the Mozambique Institute for aid, It refused “because of its political nature and because of the general political instability of the area.” This sentence contrasts sharply with the racial and political stability praised by Project Tanganyika’s proponents five years earlier.

It may be too soon to argue that there is a causal relation between the Mozambique Institute scandal and a reorganization of Ford Foundation’s policies, but there is strong evidence that indicates so. Upon the suspension of “any consideration of renewal” of Grant no. 63-425, for instance, Francis X. Sutton was informed by a superior officer that there had been “general policy discussions regarding the appropriateness of making grants specifically designed to deal with refugee problems” and “the upshot has been a decision that in the future the Foundation will stay out of the refugee business.”

However, if the diplomatic backlash from Portuguese authorities, the polemics hailing from American newspapers, the criticism from Ford Motor Company, and the overall embarrassment caused as the Mondlanes’ agenda reached broader audiences constituted historical events significant enough to shift future Ford Foundation grant policies, there are other factors that were deliberately not considered in this report. Namely, it is important to evaluate the influence of the “Africanists” within Kennedy’s administration who had helped arrange political
negotiations between Eduardo Mondlane and favorably-inclined individuals in the White House, such as Robert Kennedy, who, in turn, interceded in his favor whenever feasible. All things considered, further research is still advised on the topic especially in relation to Ford Foundation’s grant policies. A quantitative history of grantees, for instance, would help in assessing whether Grant no. 63-425 would have been formally acceptable without covert political interference from Washington.

The documentation preserved in RAC’s collections has allowed me to gain a deeper understanding of the formation of an institution which played a central role in the formation of Mozambican nationalism and the liberation struggle waged against Portuguese colonialism. It also gives substance to the linguistic complexities in the context upon which FRELIMO was built. The records contain precious information as to how the choice for the Portuguese language was implemented in the movement’s first educational facility. The documents analyzed in this report are fundamental to situate historically FRELIMO’s language policy in exile and further improvements in my understanding of correlated historical phenomena are expected as my research progresses.

\[1^{\text{The research was conducted between June 19-23, 2017. Special thanks are due to RAC’s staff in general, Bethany J. Antos in particular; Hector H. Guerra and Omar R. Thomaz for their support; and the São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP) for granting me permission to accept the stipend.}}\]
The Master thesis (in Portuguese) which resulted from this research may be digitally consulted at: http://repositorio.unicamp.br/handle/REPOSIP/331888.

A major topic on the historiography of Mozambique is the Luta de Libertação Nacional, or National Liberation War, as proclaimed by FRELIMO against Portuguese rule in Mozambique on September 25, 1964.


FRELIMO’s official narrative and historiography often reduced the conflicts that occurred within FRELIMO during its first years to grievances between “two lines”: a progressive one, described as representing the interests of the Mozambican people in a protracted struggle against colonialism and capitalist exploitation; and a reactionary one, supposedly comprised by imperialist lackeys and obscurantist/tribalist leaders opposed to the revolutionary war. While criticism against such oversimplification dates back to the 1980s, few studies have been dedicated to elucidate on social and political aspects of Mozambican nationalism in exile. Cf. Bragança & Depelchin, 1988; Tembe, 2013; Liesegang, 2005.


Ford Foundation Grants, Reel 0765, Africa-America Institute, 006300425, Education Project for African Students in Tanganyika. Grant File PA no. 63-425. 1, Section 1, Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC).

Ford Foundation Grants, op. cit. Section 2, RAC.


Ibidem.

Ibidem.

Ford Foundation Grants, op. cit. Section 4. “Memorandum to Files (L62-1404),” p. 1, RAC.


Ford Foundation Grants, op. cit. Section 1. “Request No. OD-1252G,” RAC.

Ibidem.

24 Ibidem, p. 5.
26 Ibidem.
28 Letter from Janet R. Mondlane to Frank X. Sutton, October 14, 1963. Ford Foundation Grants, op. cit. Section 4, RAC.
31 Memorandum from Francis X. Sutton, March 27, 1963. Ford Foundation Grants, op. cit. Section 4, RAC.
32 Letter from Reynold E. Carlson to James T. Harris, March 20, 1964. Ford Foundation Grants, op. cit. Section 4, RAC.
33 Letter from James T. Harris to Reynold E. Carlson, April 27, 1964. Ford Foundation Grants, op. cit. Section 4, RAC.
36 Cf. Ford Foundation Grants, op. cit. Section 4, RAC.
39 Ibidem.
40 PIDE, Portuguese acronym for Policia Internacional de Defesa do Estado, was the political police of the Salazar authoritarian state. Extended to the colonies in late 1950s, PIDE’s staff in Mozambique were chiefly responsible for assembling the concealed bomb that killed Eduardo Mondlane in February 1969, and were also widely accredited for having fueled and implanted dissent among the ranks of FRELIMO and other nationalist movements.
43 Letter from Harvey P. Hall to Francis X. Sutton, November 11, 1964. In: Ford Foundation Grants, op. cit. Section 4, RAC.
44 Inter-Office Memorandum from John Spencer, February 17, 1965. Ford Foundation Grants, op. cit. Section 4, RAC.
45 Letter from Harvey P. Hall to Francis X. Sutton, November 11, 1964. Ford Foundation Grants, op. cit. Section 4, RAC.
46 Witney Schneidman describes the “Africanists” as members of the Kennedy establishment, mainly concentrated around the “Africa Bureau” that had been created by Eisenhower in
1957, “who shared the President’s perception of Africa” and ultimately aimed to “recast Africa policy” towards the changing political setting of the continent. Among those members sympathetic to change the United States’ pro-European stances towards newly independent Africa were the Michigan Governor G. Mennen Williams; the Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles; the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Adlai Stevenson and the Attorney General of the United States Robert Kennedy. Cf. Schneidman, 1987, pp. 67 – 80.