

No Dead Languages, Only Dormant Minds: U.S.- Spanish Educational Exchanges through the Ford Foundation

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Abstract

My dissertation examines the role of smart power in U.S.-Spain relations during the Spanish transition to democracy. The archives of the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) held several collections that enriched my analysis of the development of soft power by the United States in Spain. At the archives, I found records on the movement of Pablo Picasso's *Guernica* from the Museum of Modern Art to the Prado in Madrid, Nelson Rockefeller's impact on the Spanish transition, how the Ford Foundation and Peter Fraenkel helped administer Spanish educational reforms and exchanges of the 1970s, and how human rights played a vital role in the Spanish transition.

No Dead Languages, Only Dormant Minds: U.S.-Spanish Educational Exchanges through the Ford Foundation

The Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) provided my dissertation with pivotal archival resources. These documents enhanced my research in many ways. My dissertation examines the role of smart power in U.S.-Spain relations during the Spanish transition to democracy in the 1970s and 1980s. Specifically, I examine how the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations utilized hard power tactics in their diplomacy with Spain. The United States accomplished this through military base negotiations and hard power inducements, such as entry into NATO and the European Community. While the bilateral relationship relied on hard power, the U.S. government's attempt at soft power often found itself either working with or against nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Spain. I look at three distinct areas of soft power—educational exchanges, television, and human rights—to examine how U.S. governmental organizations (GOs) and NGOs interacted in Spain. For educational exchanges, I argue that the Fulbright program and the Ford Foundation worked together to build soft power through educational exchanges and facilitating Spanish educational reform laws. For television, I argue that the United States Information Agency (USIA) focused on documentaries about the current political landscape in the United States, but the Children's Television Workshop provided educational programming for children. This shows that the GOs and NGOs had a similar goal to project an American image abroad, but used different methods to achieve this goal. For human rights, I argue that the presidential administrations and USIA promoted human rights in the latter parts of the Spanish transition to democracy, but human rights NGOs pointed to flaws in the rhetoric and continued human rights violations in Spain.

My research at the RAC delivered several important documents for five chapters of my dissertation. These include the introduction and chapters on educational exchanges, the Gerald Ford administration, the USIA, and human rights. In the introduction of my dissertation, I discuss the movement of Pablo Picasso's

Guernica from the Museum of Modern Art to the Prado in Madrid. I argue that this fight over the control of Picasso's Spanish Civil War painting is representative of U.S.-Spain relations during the transition to democracy. The United States wanted to continue control of the bilateral relationship, but Spain wanted a new national identity for the post-Franco era. Having Picasso's masterpiece back in the Prado would symbolize this new epoch. Further, rumors abounded that Picasso left it in a will that *Guernica* would not be allowed in Spain until the return of democracy.

One of the documents that I located at the RAC was Cyrus Vance's opinion on the case of the moving of the *Guernica*. This document, found in the Blanchette H. Rockefeller Papers, helped to illustrate the final decision-making process of the *Guernica* movement, as Vance was secretary of state in the Carter administration. By November 1979, MoMA and the United States began the process to move the *Guernica* to the Prado. John B. Koegel, who took over the position of general counsel for MoMA after Richard Koch had left, explained the museum's position to Rubin. Their position, along with Dumas', was that *Guernica* was to be delivered to Spain, but the claim of Claude Picasso, the son of Pablo Picasso, may halt the move. Vance, at that time back in private law practice, was brought as an intermediary between the United States and Spain. His conclusion is as follows:

Based upon our review of the facts provided to us by the Museum, which are summarized below, we are of the opinion that the Museum holds Guernica and the related works as a trustee under an inter vivos trust created by Picasso. Pursuant to the terms of the trust, the Museum has an obligation to deliver Guernica and the related works to the Spanish Government when it has been determined, in accordance with Picasso's instructions, that democracy has been restored to Spain. [] The only person consistently mentioned by Picasso in connection with the question as to who would make that determination, and the only one named in a document signed by Picasso, is Maitre Roland Dumas, Picasso's attorney, or his designee. Accordingly, we believe the Museum is obligated to deliver these works to Spain with reasonable promptness upon the determination by Maitre Dumas that Picasso's condition has been satisfied.¹

In March 1980, the leadership of MoMA wrote a letter to the Spanish government explaining it was ready to deliver the painting to Madrid after September 1980.

The Ford Foundation Records provided the greatest contribution to my research. The Ford Foundation (FF) plays a pivotal role in my chapter on educational exchanges. As an NGO, I argue that the FF worked with the Fulbright program to find methods to help reorganize education in Spain and further educational exchanges. There are four distinct approaches the FF used including: exploration of education and arts prior to the reform law, the role of Peter Fraenkel and the 1970 Spanish Educational Reform law, educational exchanges, and approved academic projects involving Spain.

One of the early explorations of education during the Spanish transition to democracy was a report by William C. Frederick and Chadwick J. Haberstroh on management education in Spain. Frederick and Haberstroh described prior business schools in Spain as focused on lower-level commercial training, but a recent impetus on formal management education had begun in the late 1960s. The authors show that there were similarities and differences between Spain and the United States, but this should not be a rating criterion for the success of the programs. Instead, a “more important test of adequacy of Spanish management education institutions is whether they are workable for Spaniards, in Spain.”² Frederick and Haberstroh applauded the emerging management education movement due to mistrust and hostility toward upper professional management classes. Another example is the International Survey on the Promotion of the Arts with reports written by Ruby D’Arschot. These four reports on Spain focus on the role of music, theater, plastic arts, and cinematography. With music, D’Arschot argued that the regionalism in Spain was best seen in music, and it would be a “serious mistake to limit one’s idea of Spanish cultural life to that of Madrid.”³ However, theater in Spain struggled due to a lack of professionalism and Spanish censorship. D’Arschot believed the plastic arts in Spain were in a renaissance mostly due to fine arts schools, despite little support from the Franco regime. Regarding cinematography, the Spanish government funded the school of cinematography to “stimulate technical and artistic progress” among films in Spain.⁴

The role of Peter Fraenkel and the Spanish Educational Reform law in 1970 cannot be underestimated in its importance to the transition to democracy. Through the FF, Fraenkel helped Spain integrate a new educational system just as the country transitioned from authoritarianism to constitutional monarchy. In 1968, Fraenkel visited Spain for a month to observe the Spanish educational system in Madrid, Barcelona, San Sebastian, Pamplona, and Bilbao. One major problem he pointed to were the barriers to access to education. He explained that for secondary education only 24 percent of men and 18 percent of women were enrolled, and in higher education, the percentage was 5 percent of men and 1 percent of women.⁵ Fraenkel used a specific example of Bilbao—what he referred to as the “Pittsburgh of Spain”—which only had two public high schools with enrollments of approximately 3,000 each for a city of roughly 370,000 and more than 500,000 in the greater metropolitan area.⁶ One of the purposes of the trip was to explain the FF to Spaniards and look for possible Spain-FF collaborations. Some of the suggestions included collaboration in planning new universities, fellowship programs for young Spaniards, short-term study abroad funds, and a special program for applied social sciences. Fraenkel was adamant that the FF should work in Spain,

Spain is at the end of an era. This era began thirty years ago. No one knows how long the end of the old era may last -- nor what the nature of the new era will be when it begins. But the period of transition from the old era into the new one is underway. Thus the present is for Spain a time of introspection and analysis, of planning and preparation for the future. It is a most uncertain time for all Spaniards -- but it is a time also of restlessness and great expectations, particularly for youth. It is an unusually propitious time for the Foundation to systematically study Spain — and perhaps also cautiously to begin to expand our hitherto so modest investments in that country.⁷

Fraenkel concluded that though Spain was about to undergo a difficult transition, the FF should be as involved in the country as possible.

Fraenkel continued to monitor the educational reform in Spain and be a liaison with the Ford Foundation. He detailed how the reform was set forth in the *Libro*

Blanco (White Book), which was sent and approved by the Cortes, Spain's legislature. Yet, Fraenkel worried that Spain might end up pushing a full reform effort without assistance from anyone, including the United States. He met with members of the State Department who voiced concern that "they can see no way of special U.S. Government assistance to Spanish education except by tying such assistance in some way as a form of 'payment' for the right to use the bases."⁸ There was discussion of sending some of the appropriations of the Fulbright program in Spain to the reform effort. Fraenkel stressed the importance of the FF helping Spain in the reform effort through staff development or three specific projects. He proposed a collaboration with the Institutes of Educational Science, a FF collaboration with the Faculty of Economics at the new Autonomous University of Madrid, or providing the service of Professor Severo Ochoa.⁹

The Spanish Ministry of Education stressed the urgent need to create an Institute of Educational Sciences in all universities. Education Minister José Luis Villar Palasí wrote to Fraenkel that these institutes would improve teaching methods and "meet the needs of training teachers and readapting them to the present requirements."¹⁰ Further, they would carry out the necessary research to promote continuous modernization in teaching methods. Fraenkel worked with Lawrence A. Cremin, a historian of education at the Teachers College, Columbia University, to identify nine American universities to send Spaniards to learn educational theory and practice. These included Columbia, Harvard, Chicago, Cornell, Stanford, Johns Hopkins, Cal-Berkeley, and Princeton.¹¹ In April 1970, the FF approved a \$400,000 grant for the Institute of International Education and for support of educational modernization and reform in Spain. A large portion of this funding was used in support of fellowships for Spanish educators to study abroad, but other funding included a small number of short-term consultants for specific assignments in Spain.¹²

One year after the General Education Law passed, Fraenkel returned to Spain to evaluate progress. Some of the achievements that Fraenkel highlights include the decentralization of the public school system, citizen participation, and creation of new Basic General Education agenda.¹³ Yet, he pointed to immediate practical problems with the reform. These difficulties include who teaches what and apportioning financing. Other problems include a reshuffling of the Ministry of

Education, infighting on educational plans, and poor conditions in classrooms and old, outdated textbooks. Fraenkel continued to monitor the educational reform efforts in Spain, and the Ministry of Education continued to request his presence. In June 1974, the FF gave the Indiana University Foundation \$149,000 for Fraenkel to leave his position at the university to be a consultant for the Ministry. He explained that the Ministry and the U.S. Embassy were dissatisfied with how education funding had been used and hoped for the consultancy of the FF. Fraenkel worked carefully with the minister to lay the groundwork for a “national training program for young university teaching personnel in business administration.”¹⁴

The Ford Foundation played a pivotal role in educational exchanges between the United States and Spain. Early in the transition, Ruben E. Reina, Associate Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, worked with the FF to create a triangular trade of cultural anthropology students between the United States, Spain, and South America. Reina used funds from the FF to travel to Spain, Argentina, Colombia, and Guatemala. In his work in these areas, Reina noticed that few anthropologists in Spain received their training abroad, and the *catedráticos* (professors) in Spain were quite uninformed in the social sciences. He argued that this lack of emphasis on social sciences made Spain “culturally very different” from Latin America, and the Spanish students “cannot be handled with the same policies and techniques.”¹⁵ As the transition to democracy began, Fraenkel tried to build up the scholarship of Spain. In October and November 1976, Fraenkel visited Madrid, Barcelona, Salamanca, and Sevilla to distribute announcements of the Southern European Fellowship programs. He bragged that he made great use of the social science departments at the universities.

In the 1980s, the Ford Foundation played a pivotal role in supporting academic conferences and research works in Spain. Freedom House received a grant to hold a conference in Madrid on “Freedom, Dissent and the Western Alliance.” The conference explored the future of the Helsinki Accords and discuss the emerging dissent figures.¹⁶ In addition, the Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales (INCI) received two separate grants. The first was partial support for a conference on Spanish security options, and the second was a matching grant for possible work on Spain’s defensive relationship with Latin America. The FF staff wrote that the

INCI tried to do in a short time what was never done under the Franco regime: “to establish a center of independence discussion on Spain’s foreign policy, international relations, and security problems.”¹⁷ In 1983, Georgetown University received funding for partial support of a symposium on political security in Spain, which discussed Spain’s integration into the European Community, NATO, and diplomacy with Central America.¹⁸ In 1986, Procedural Aspects of International Law Institute received support for a research project on autonomy, sovereignty, and self-determination. The project, which turned into an 850-page manuscript, used Spain as a representation of a Western developed country, and the Basque country as a case study for separatist movements.¹⁹

Another crucial series at the RAC that helped enrich my dissertation was the Nelson Rockefeller Vice Presidential Records. I was able to find important documents in them that detail how the Ford administration planned to move forward after the death of Franco. The briefing book for Nelson Rockefeller’s trip to Franco’s funeral make clear three essential points. Prepared by the State Department, there were three sections of talking points for the vice president to understand the importance of the Spanish transition. Under the U.S.-Spanish relations talking points, the State Department emphasized the “200th anniversary of our democracy” as a path for Rockefeller to convey “our understanding and support” as Spain meets the challenge ahead.²⁰ The State Department also prepared Rockefeller for meeting other European dignitaries at the funeral. The State Department officials implored Rockefeller to emphasize that Europeans should show realism and responsiveness for the transition to democracy. Realistic expectations meant to avoid pressing a fast transition, and responsiveness included encouraging democratic evolution “without arousing Spanish resentment about foreign intervention.”²¹ Finally, the State Department detailed that a successful transition hinged on the leadership of King Juan Carlos. Triumph in Spain came down to “the extent to which it can attract the participation of the reform-minded, including the presently illegal opposition parties while not sparking direct conflict with the hard-line rightists.”²²

In separate correspondence with Rockefeller, Henry Kissinger and Wells Stabler, Ambassador to Spain, underscored the fears of domestic unrest in Spain during the transition. Kissinger explained that Juan Carlos had to steer the ship of

transition through the middle ground of the far right—“the stand-fast mentality of the old Falangists”—and the far left—“terrorists and ... a large, hostile communist party.”²³ In addition, Kissinger revealed that he was “a little more optimistic” about the king’s ability to lead, but still a bit shocked at the prince’s uncertainty over key positions in his government.²⁴ Stabler believed that Juan Carlos was not in any immediate danger or trouble, but did believe that the venom from the right or left could cause problems. Stabler clarified,

Juan Carlos has a difficult road ahead, in which he will seek to move without pause but without haste. In this he has considerable support, first of all from the mood of the Spanish people, but also from the Church, the establishment aperturistas, and, in a tacit sense at least, from the military. Since our earlier analysis one problem has become sharper, the threat from the right. There is entrenched opposition to apertura from the ‘bunker’ and from violence-prone rightist groups who will have to be brought under control, and their links with certain police elements severed, if the transition is to prosper. The threat to evolution, in the initial stages, is stronger on the far right than the far left (the Communist Party and the violence-prone groups such as the FRAP) whose real turn would come later on, once popular reaction to continued right wing intimidation set in. But of course the extreme left and extreme right, united in their opposition to democratic reforms, feed upon each other.²⁵

The fear that domestic threats would derail Juan Carlos and the transition to democracy caused some stress within the Ford administration. Yet, this was not as concerning as being able to guide Juan Carlos through a nonviolent transition.

The Nelson Rockefeller Vice Presidential Records also provided me with a copy of King Juan Carlos’s speech to the U.S. Congress on his first official visit in June 1976. The USIA used this speech as significant public diplomacy and soft power. Upon their arrival on June 1, 1976, King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia attended several Washington galas and bicentennial events in Washington and New York City. On their first night in Washington, the Ford administration invited the Spanish monarchs to a white tie dinner at the White House where Juan Carlos and Sofia requested the attendance of such guests as Mario Andretti, Jack Nicklaus, Charles Bronson, Raquel Welch, and Neil Armstrong. President Ford delivered a toast to the monarch at the Spanish embassy that summed up the

importance of Juan Carlos's visit. In his speech, Ford emphasized the relevance of Spain to American history, but he stressed the importance of Spain now to Western and trans-Atlantic defense. Ford observed how Juan Carlos hoped they would reinforce the bonds of friendship between the United States and Spain.

King Juan Carlos addressed a joint session of Congress where he spoke in perfect English and emphasized the importance of the United States to Spain. He began by discussing the Bicentennial, and the Spanish history of the United States. He discussed how "the Spanish pioneers of the 16th century, who in less than 50 years explored in their fragile primitive ships all the Rio Grande to Cape Breton."²⁶ Juan Carlos then turned to the importance of democracy, not just in the United States but in Spain as well. He explained that the Spanish monarchy "will insure, under the principles of democracy, that social peace and political stability are maintained in Spain," and that the Crown "protects the whole people and each and every one of its citizens, guaranteeing through the laws and by the exercise of civil liberties the rule of justice."²⁷ In addition, Juan Carlos even hinted that Spain intended to integrate into Europe. With the discussions in the White House and the speech to Congress, Juan Carlos showed his diplomatic abilities and embodied the transition in Spanish policies.

Finally, the Rockefeller Vice Presidential Records presented documents on the role of human rights in the Spanish transition to democracy. Franco became ill and died shortly after the ETA separatists and FRAP revolutionaries were executed, which plunged Spain and the United States into questions of how the post-Franco era would play out. The Ford administration appreciated the restoration of the monarchy in Spain with Juan Carlos. There were hopes that Juan Carlos would be a champion of democracy and, by proxy, human rights. This optimism heightened following a pardon decree for certain prisoners. According to the pronouncement, most criminals received a minimum reduction of their sentence by no less than three years, and those with sentences under three years were voided.²⁸ However, the requisites for a pardon contained quite a few caveats. For example, those crimes "that come within the purview of the Anti-Terrorism Law including propaganda or membership in proscribed groups" did not receive a pardon.²⁹ This included ETA and FRAP members as well as other separatist groups such as communists and anarchists. Juan Carlos bestowed patents of

nobility to Franco's wife and daughter alongside the pardon decree. Even when making strides, the Franco legacy handicapped the progress that the Spanish king made in human rights.

¹ "Re: Guernica" by Cyrus Vance, August 12, 1981; Painting and Sculpture, Guernica 1981; box 64; Blanchette H. Rockefeller Papers; Series 4; Museum of Modern Art; RAC.

² "Management Education in Spain," William C. Fredrick and Chadwick J. Haberstroh, 1968; Report 005180; Catalogued Reports, Ford Foundation Records; RAC.

³ "The Situation of Music in Spain," Ruby D'Arschot, August 22, 1969; Report 019964; Catalogued Reports, Ford Foundation Records; RAC.

⁴ "The Official School of Cinematography," Ruby D'Arschot, 1969; Report 019963; Catalogued Reports, Ford Foundation Records; RAC.

⁵ "Spain Trip Report, October 23-November 19, 1968," Peter Fraenkel; Report 004574; Catalogued Reports, Ford Foundation Records; RAC.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Peter Fraenkel to Marshall Robinson and Howard Swearer, September 30, 1969; Spain-General-Memoranda re: fellowships, university development, trip 1968-1971; box 16; Higher Education and Research Division, Program Staff Files, 1954-1975, Peter E. de Janosi; Ford Foundation Records; RAC.

⁹ Fraenkel to F. Champion Ward, November 10, 1969; Program of Support to Educational Modernization and Reform in Spain, General Correspondence, 1969-1970; box 6; International Division, Latin America and the Caribbean, Office Files of Peter A. Fraenkel; Series II: Educational Modernization Grant, Madrid Field Office Files; Ford Foundation Records; RAC.

¹⁰ Villar Palasí to Fraenkel, January 27, 1970; Program of Support to Educational Modernization and Reform in Spain, General Correspondence, 1969-1970; box 6; International Division, Latin America and the Caribbean, Office Files of Peter A. Fraenkel; Series II: Educational Modernization Grant, Madrid Field Office Files; Ford Foundation Records; RAC.

¹¹ Philip H. Phenix to Fraenkel, March 14, 1970; Program of Support to Educational Modernization and Reform in Spain, General Correspondence, 1969-1970; box 6; International Division, Latin America and the Caribbean, Office Files of Peter A. Fraenkel; Series II: Educational Modernization Grant, Madrid Field Office Files; Ford Foundation Records; RAC.

¹² "Ford Foundation Collaboration with the Educational Reform in Spain," September 25, 1970; Program of Support to Educational Modernization and Reform in Spain, General Correspondence, 1969-1970; box 6; International Division, Latin America and the Caribbean, Office Files of Peter A. Fraenkel; Series II: Educational Modernization Grant, Madrid Field Office Files; Ford Foundation Records; RAC.

¹³ "Comments on the Current Status of the Spanish Educational Reform – Major Achievements, Problems, and Prospects," Fraenkel, July 29, 1971; Report 007993; Catalogued Reports, Ford Foundation Records; RAC.

¹⁴ Providing Services of Consultant to Spanish Ministry of Education, July 11, 1974; Reel 2467, 74-447; Grants H-K; Ford Foundation Records; RAC.

¹⁵ Ruben E. Reina to Harry Wilhelm, October 11, 1967; Report 001922; Catalogued Reports, Ford Foundation Records; RAC.

¹⁶ Freedom House support for "Freedom, Dissent, and the Western Alliance," December 2, 1980; 815-0096; Ford Foundation Records; RAC.

¹⁷ Matching Grant for General Support, Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales, March 5, 1982; Reel 3704, 81-877; Grants H-K; Ford Foundation Records; RAC.

¹⁸ Georgetown University Partial Support for "Spain: Studies in Political Security," November 30, 1983; Reel 4698; 835-1026; Grants E-G; Ford Foundation Records; RAC.

¹⁹ Procedural Aspects of International Law Institute support, February 7, 1986; Reel 5697, 86-173; Grants Them-Tw; Ford Foundation Records; RAC.

²⁰ “Rockefeller Briefing Book – The Vice President’s Mission to Spain,” November 1975; Vice President’s Mission to Spain, 1975; box 3; Nelson Rockefeller Vice Presidential Records; Series 19: Foreign Affairs and National Security; RAC.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ “Your Conversation in Spain,” November 21, 1975; Spain Substance File, 1975; box 1; Nelson Rockefeller Vice Presidential Records; Series 19: Foreign Affairs and National Security; RAC.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ “Spain at the Time of Transition,” November 21, 1975; Spain Trip Message File, 1975; box 3; Nelson Rockefeller Vice Presidential Records; Series 19: Foreign Affairs and National Security; RAC.

²⁶ “Address by King Juan Carlos II of Spain Before Joint Meeting of the House and Senate,” June 2, 1976; Spain, 1975-76; box 9; Series 19: Foreign Affairs and National Security, Nelson Rockefeller Vice Presidential Records; RAC.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ “King Decrees General Pardon (Indulto) and Bestows Titles on Franco’s Wife and Daughter,” November 26, 1975; Spain Trip Message File, 1975; box 3; Nelson Rockefeller Vice Presidential Records; Series 19: Foreign Affairs and National Security; RAC.

²⁹ Ibid.