

Whither the Rural? The Debate over Rural America's Future, 1945-1980

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Project Overview

Following World War II, rural America experienced a number of interconnected transformations that raised the question of what its future might look like, or whether or not it even had one. My project examines the response of policymakers, rural people, and social scientists to the problems these changes created, which I am calling the “rural crisis.” More specifically, my dissertation examines how rural problems were understood by these groups, and the various ways they sought to build a new, more prosperous rural America and redefine the meaning of rural in the process. My research tracks the debates and implementation of public policies across distinct rural settings in California, Missouri, and Georgia.

What exactly constituted the rural crisis following World War II? Foremost in the minds of many were major changes in American agriculture. Between 1900 and 1940, the size and number of farms in the United States remained relatively stable. Following the 1940s, however, the number of farms dropped from 5.9 million in 1945 to only 2.3 million in 1974. The average size of farms also doubled during this same period from just under 200 acres to over 400 acres. These larger farms became increasingly mechanized and captured a high proportion of the total farm product sales in the U.S.¹ In part, scientific advances in seeds, fertilizers, and machines throughout the twentieth century allowed farmers to expand the size of their operations.

The role of the state, however, cannot be discounted in driving changes in American farming. The U.S. Department of Agriculture funded scientific studies that produced newer, stronger seed varieties, and supported so-called demonstration farmers who spread the virtues of high-tech farming. In the 1930s, federal policymakers also passed

critical legislation that paid farmers to take land out of production in an attempt to raise the prices they could fetch for their goods. This policy primarily benefited farmers whose landholdings were substantial. Smaller farmers found it more difficult to compete with subsidized large farmers and often got out of farming altogether. At the same time, the tenants who rented land from large farmers found themselves kicked off the land as the latter reduced acreage in order to receive federal benefits. These depression-era government policies therefore instigated a critical shift in American agriculture that saw the number of farmers decline, while the farmers who remained saw their operations get larger and mechanized.²

Agriculture was not the only sector of the rural economy that saw major changes after the 1940s. The timber and mining industries also experienced a reduction in the number of workers as a result of declines in demand for these products as well as the mechanization of many jobs within these industries. Following World War II, for example, demand for Appalachian coal dropped precipitously, and by 1970 roughly a quarter of the miners in that region could not find work. Zinc and lead mining, a major employer of people in the Missouri Ozarks, experienced a similar decline. By 1960, most zinc and lead extraction ended, and the major mining company, St. Joe Minerals, shuttered its doors in 1972.³

These shifts in the structure of the economy reverberated throughout rural society and laid the groundwork for the rural crisis. In response to these changes, many rural people migrated to the nation's cities and suburbs in search for better work. While just over half the population of the U.S. lived in rural places in 1910, by 1960 only thirty-seven percent did, and by 1980 only twenty-six percent of the population inhabited rural places. Population and community decline therefore became major problems facing

rural America. For those people who did not migrate, poverty and joblessness became endemic features of rural life. By the time the War on Poverty was launched in 1964, forty-three percent of the poor lived in rural areas. If one includes “nonmetropolitan” counties, or those counties without a city of more than 50,000 people, over sixty percent of the poor lived in rural areas or small towns.⁴

In examining the response to these interlocking problems, scholars have argued that public policymakers either ignored the issue or sought to encourage more people to migrate from failing rural areas. In this view, then, rural America was facing a nearly insurmountable decline, and the best thing one could do is to help rural people leave their failing communities.⁵ While policymakers and other Americans were supposedly ignoring rural problems at home, the United States government invested heavily in rural development programs in Latin America, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.⁶

My project argues against the notion that the domestic rural crisis provoked a generally anemic response. At the same time the U.S. intervened in foreign rural communities, it, along with social scientists and ordinary rural people, took seriously the problems confronting American rural communities and sought to revive and develop them. Essentially two different rural development tracks existed in the postwar period: one sought to renew rural areas through nonfarm development, and the other aimed to reform the farm economy to make it more democratic and equitable. Nonfarm development attracted the attention of policymakers in Washington D.C. beginning in the mid-1950s, and they crafted a set of policies that worked through state and local governments that aimed to create new private sector jobs in non-agricultural industries. Infrastructure projects, industrial attraction, and rural tourism emerged as the central ways to redefine the basis upon which rural society rested. To achieve this

nonfarm development goal, the U.S. Department of Agriculture created a variety of rural development initiatives, and Congress passed the Area Development Act in 1961 and the Public Works and Economic Development Act in 1965. In the process, a rural development network composed of the federal, state, and local governments, as well as the private sector, was established.

While federal policymakers, local business elites, and a contingent of rural sociologists and agricultural economists embraced nonfarm rural development, a counter-tendency emerged in the 1960s that attempted to reform the way the farm economy functioned, and to make it work better for small farmers, renters, and waged farm labor. No uniform farm-based rural development program dominated postwar America. Instead, the shape of farm reform reflected the concerns of local marginal farmers and the structure of the farm economy in that particular place. In California, for example, the largely Mexican-American farmworker population fought for improved wages and working conditions on the state's gigantic farms. In Georgia, black farmers formed cooperatives in order to bolster and expand the number of black southerners owning farms and working the land. Like nonfarm rural development, these farm reformers intended to revive rural places. Unlike nonfarm development, however, farm reform generally did not have the support of the federal government. For a brief period in the mid to late 1960s, the War on Poverty supported grassroots farm reformers, but, by the 1970s, these forces were increasingly on their own.

My dissertation begins by examining the ways social scientists, and in particular rural sociologists and agricultural economists, thought about the shifting economic and social structures of rural America. This section of my research not only shows how understandings of rurality came into question following World War II, but also provides

critical insight into the exact nature of those changes. My project then moves on to examine the implementation of nonfarm rural development policy, first by looking at the Congressional debates and legislation that produced nonfarm development programs. Then, my project examines the implementation of nonfarm development policies through infrastructure projects and industrial attraction, and by analyzing projects that aimed to create a rural tourist economy. Another chapter examines the efforts of grassroots farm activists in reforming the way the agriculture economy operated. My project concludes with a discussion of the Reagan administration's deconstruction of the rural development network in the 1980s. Reagan dramatically reduced federal spending on rural development, and, in doing so, forced ailing rural communities to look increasingly toward state funding and, more importantly, the private sector. As I argue, though, the distinctions between the heyday of rural development policy and the post-1980 landscape are not exceedingly sharp. The development apparatus created in the 1950s had always been decentralized and reliant upon the private sector, and the turn toward more market-oriented solutions to social problems in the 1980s merely made those features more prominent.

The Rockefeller Archive Center

The records contained at the Rockefeller Archive Center provide critical insight into domestic rural development programs. While the role of foundations in non-U.S. rural development projects has been examined in great depth by many scholars, their role in the funding and operation of stateside programs remains rather murky, and therefore reflects our general lack of knowledge about postwar U.S. rural development initiatives.

To be sure, my research at the Rockefeller Archive Center probably suggests that the involvement of foundations, particularly the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund (RBF), in domestic rural development programs does not match their interest in non-U.S. efforts.

Nonetheless, at least in the realm of postwar, grassroots-driven farm reform projects, the foundations played an important role. This fact is perhaps best illustrated by the relationship of the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund with the Federation of Southern Cooperatives (FSC), for which the Rockefeller Archive Center contains rich documentation. The FSC formed in 1967 and was led by Charles Prejean for much of the 1960s and 1970s. The overriding goal of the FSC was to support small black farmers in the South by helping them form cooperatives in order to improve their market power, improve their farming techniques through education and training programs, and stop the outmigration of rural black farmers to northern cities. The aim was to revive declining black rural communities. By the early 1970s, the FSC had 110-member cooperatives that covered a wide array of activities including farming cooperatives, credit unions, retail co-ops, and handicraft collectives. The total membership at the organization's peak totaled over 30,000 families, including 10,000 farm families.⁷

In part, the FSC organized in response to the dramatic reductions in black landownership and farming during the postwar period. In 1954, for example, there were 175,386 black landowners in the South who owned 10,619,367 acres of farmland. By 1969, the number of black landowners dropped to 66,815, and the total acreage declined to 5,648,960.⁸ Further, Prejean and others in the FSC envisioned their work as an extension of the civil rights movement. Prejean argued that the next frontier of civil

rights activism would be located in the economic sphere, and he believed that cooperatives serving small black farmers could be a significant way of securing economic justice.⁹ In general, then, my research argues that the FSC should be seen as a critical component of postwar rural development efforts. Its work in supporting black farmer cooperatives throughout the South attempted to reform a farm economy that had overwhelmingly discriminated against black farmers. Moreover, like other proponents of rural development, the FSC wanted to revive, not abandon, rural communities.¹⁰

The records of the Rockefeller Archive Center are particularly rich in the areas of foundation funding to the FSC. The Rockefeller Brothers Fund, for example, provided extensive support to the FSC throughout the 1970s, and the FSC's program fit within the larger funding and program goals of the RBF. The Rockefeller Brothers Fund created a special initiative in May 1970 known as the Southern Program. Like the FSC, the purpose and goals of the Southern Program aligned nicely with the larger rural development impulse of the postwar period. The goal of the program was not to help small, ailing farmers leave their rural communities and find work and livelihoods elsewhere, but to help them stay in rural places and become economically successful.¹¹ The Rockefeller Brothers Fund provided \$750,000 per year for the Southern Program, supporting organizations involved in, among other things, economic development and land retention and acquisition with a focus on low-income communities.

Between 1970 and 1974, the Southern Program provided, in turn, around \$70,000 per year for the support of the FSC's Rural Training and Research Center, located on over 1,000 acres of land in Epes, Alabama. The FSC's outpost in Epes served as the central hub of the organization, where its leadership met to discuss programs and plans. More

importantly, the Epes center contained a demonstration farm that provided FSC members with the opportunity to observe and learn from the latest farming techniques. This proved to be an important service because black southern farmers had long been discriminated against by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and small farmers in general had not been beneficiaries of the bureaucracy's research and demonstration activities.¹²

The Rockefeller Brothers Fund provided support to the FSC in other ways, as well. One of the FSC's major goal was to maximize the income of southern black farmers and to help them be more competitive in the agricultural marketplace. Prejean and others within the FSC leadership believed that black farmers should maximize the use of their existing resources in order to wrench as much profit from the land as possible.¹³ To assist farmers in achieving this goal, the FSC developed the "winter crop program" in August 1970. The goal of this program was to put the land owned or operated by black farmers to use year-round. In a proposal to the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the FSC maintained that larger, wealthier farmers frequently adopted such a practice, but marginal black farmers could not, because they lacked the funds, markets, and knowledge necessary to successfully plant and harvest a winter crop.¹⁴ The FSC intended to provide farmers with seeds, starter plants, fertilizers, and pesticides in order to get the crop planted, and then assist them in securing marketing contracts for the produce. The program would operate in several southern states, but, for the purposes of my research, I concentrated on the program's efforts that aided black farmers in Missouri's bootheel region, as well as in low-income Harris County in west Georgia. With over \$26,000 from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the FSC was ultimately able to help farmers make winter farming a critical part of their operations.¹⁵

While the Rockefeller Brothers Fund provided critical support to the FSC, in terms of dollar amounts, the Ford Foundation supplied the FSC with the most money. Indeed, for a few years in the late 1960s and early 1970s, ninety percent of the FSC's budget came from the Ford Foundation and the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO).¹⁶ The OEO was the institutional arm of the War on Poverty launched by the Lyndon Johnson administration in 1964. Although the records pertaining to the FSC at the Rockefeller Archive Center contain some information about its relationship with the OEO, more extensive documentation about their interactions can be found at the Amistad Research Center at Tulane University.¹⁷ In any event, the Ford Foundation's substantial support for the FSC suggests that it, too, believed that a sound domestic rural development program involved some element of farm reform and, more generally, stopping the flow of rural outmigration and reviving rural communities.

Records from the papers of Mitchell Sviridoff, who worked in the Social Development division at Ford, and the records of the Ford Foundation more broadly, show that Ford and the FSC expressed interest in learning from the experiences of non-U.S. cooperatives. A prominent theme in the literature on postwar rural development initiatives has been the circulation of ideas and people around the globe, and the FSC's work suggests that such flows may also have been characteristic of domestic programs. Over the course of 1971 and 1972, leadership from the FSC travelled to Israel with some representatives from the Ford Foundation. This group was particularly interested in learning about the moshav form of farm cooperative, which aimed to bring together small, individually owned plots of land into a larger economic bargaining unit.¹⁸ It will ultimately take more research to determine whether or not these trips to Israel actually shaped the FSC's program or the way the Ford Foundation viewed U.S. cooperative enterprises. Nevertheless, the suggestion of travel and the exchange of ideas remains

significant because it places the actions of the FSC within a broader, global network of rural development ideas and practice.

Perhaps the most interesting elements of the records pertaining to the Ford Foundation and the FSC relate to fights over funding and, by 1972, the Ford Foundation's de-funding of the FSC. The archival material held by the Rockefeller Archive Center provides ample documentation over these struggles. By the end of 1971, the Ford Foundation became increasingly concerned that the FSC was spreading its resources too thin and pushed Prejean and the FSC to focus on supporting a smaller number of cooperatives with its foundation grants. The records provide significant insights into the back-and-forth between Prejean, the Ford Foundation, and in particular Bryant George. The records reveal that the conflict was about what kind of organization the FSC should be. Prejean wanted a large umbrella organization that acted not just as a stimulator of rural development, but as a broader social movement that fought for economic and social justice in rural America. The Ford Foundation, increasingly concerned that its funding dollars produce demonstrable results, pushed Prejean and the FSC to focus on creating exportable "models" of rural development and cooperative building by narrowing its support to a smaller number of member cooperatives. Ultimately, by 1972 the Ford Foundation pulled its support from the FSC. Making the blow even worse, the OEO de-funded the FSC at about the same time for refusing to participate in an OEO-supported study of the cooperative movement.¹⁹

Following the end of the Federation of Southern Cooperatives' relationship with Ford and the OEO, the FSC cast about for new sources of funding. Records from the Rockefeller Archive Center make clear that the relationship between the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the FSC continued, although the former never provided the

institutional support characteristic of Ford and the OEO. Nonetheless, with assistance from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the FSC began devising ways to develop programs that made money in order to turn the institution into a self-supporting enterprise. One of the more interesting examples revealed by the archival record revolves around a business relationship developed between the FSC and Taiyo Americas, Inc., a Japanese import/export firm. In exchange for certain agricultural products, particularly soybeans, Taiyo would provide FSC member co-ops with frozen fish they could sell for profit. Prejean and the FSC leadership believed, correctly, that the American agricultural industry was becoming increasingly internationalized, and that the key to the success of black farming would require those farmers to embed themselves in international markets. The contracts developed between the FSC and Taiyo first worked through farmers in Georgia and the Japanese firm in 1974. However, the relationship quickly soured and the promise of reaping profits from the international agricultural marketplace was never realized.²⁰ Nonetheless, the story is instructive for a number of reasons. First of all, it shows the impact of reduced state and foundation funding on groups such as the FSC. Moreover, it also further illustrates the point that domestic rural development efforts did not occur solely within the borders of the U.S.

A final point of interest concerns the FBI's investigation of the FSC's use of federal funds beginning in 1980. The papers of Bernard McDonald and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund contain ample documentation of this critical part of the FSC's history. The records from these collections clearly demonstrate that the FBI's investigation was sparked by southern white elites in Alabama who had long been opposed to the FSC's program of black empowerment. Through their connections to powerful southern Congressmen, they helped to orchestrate an attack upon the group. Ultimately, the FSC was cleared of all charges of wrongdoing. However, the legal costs associated with the investigation

severely strained the FSC's ability to operate. The attack signaled a transition in the federal government's attitude toward the FSC: one of erstwhile ally to opponent. Following the investigation, the FSC would continue to provide support to its member co-ops, but its position would be increasingly embattled and marginalized.²¹

While the Sviridoff, McDonald, Ford Foundation, and Rockefeller Brothers Fund records contain significant documentation of postwar U.S. farm reform initiatives, the Archive Center also contains information related to nonfarm rural development programs. A major component of my dissertation examines the efforts of the federal policymakers, state governments, and rural people to provide a new economic base for their ailing rural communities by investing in new infrastructure, industrial attraction, and rural tourism. In the 1960s, the federal government passed the Area Redevelopment Act, followed by the Public Works and Economic Development Act. These pieces of legislation, alongside a number of programs initiated within the USDA, provided loans, grants, and technical assistance to rural communities to help them stimulate an economic recovery. The assumption behind these programs was that the small farm economy was more or less a part of the past, but that rural areas should not be abandoned. Instead, they could be modernized or developed through a program of nonfarm investments.

The papers of Winthrop Rockefeller, who served as governor of Arkansas during this period, provide some important insight into how this nonfarm rural development network operated.²² The Public Works and Economic Development Act in particular established a host of "regional commissions" throughout the U.S. These commissions were responsible, in part, for the disbursement of funds for rural development projects and the establishment of development goals within the region. The governors whose

states were included in each region served as the commission's leaders. In this way, these commissions constituted an important element of the planning apparatus constructed by the postwar development legislation. Their structure also reflected the ways this legislation was meant to be implemented through various levels of government, and not directed solely by the federal government.

Winthrop Rockefeller's papers contain some information on development projects occurring in Arkansas, but their primary value might be for the insights they contain into the operation of the Ozarks Regional Commission. This commission covered Missouri and Arkansas, as well as smaller parts of Oklahoma and Kansas. Winthrop Rockefeller's records for the Ozark Regional Commission reveal debates about economic development goals and strategies, but with an overall agreement that the best way to revive rural areas is through nonfarm development, and not the reform of the farm economy. Thus, these papers provide not just a way to get better insight into the operation of postwar rural development programs, but they also illustrate that a variety of reform possibilities existed in the postwar period. These strategies, nonfarm development versus farm reform, each had their own set of assumptions about how rural America could be revitalized.

The records at the Rockefeller Archive Center contain significant insights into the broader debate that occurred in postwar America about how rural areas might be revitalized. The records of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Ford Foundation, Mitchell Sviridoff, Bernard McDonald, and Winthrop Rockefeller clearly demonstrate that many postwar Americans did not want to abandon rural places or encourage rural people to migrate. Instead, a variety of groups, from low-income black farmers in the South to foundation officials in New York grappled with the best way to revive declining

rural communities. While some wanted to transform rural communities into something akin to miniature cities or tourist destinations for affluent suburbanites and city dwellers, the Archive Center records illustrate that a vision of rural farm reform rooted in economic and racial justice commanded significant attention in the postwar period.

¹ United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, *The Changing Concentration of U.S. Agricultural Production During the 20th Century*, 1993, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office.

² Carey McWilliams, *Factories in the Field: The Story of Migratory Farm Labor in California* (University of California Press, 1939); Linda and Theo Majka, *Farm Workers, Agribusiness, and the State* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982); Steven Stoll, *The Fruits of Natural Advantage: Making the Industrial Countryside in California* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Christopher Henke, *Cultivating Science, Harvesting Power: Science and Industrial Agriculture in Industrial California* (MIT Press, 2008); Richard Kirkendall, *Social Scientists and Farm Politics in the Age of Roosevelt* (University of Missouri Press, 1966); Gary Gerstle, *Liberty and Coercion: The Paradox of American Government from the Founding to the Present* (Princeton University Press, 2016).

³ Kathleen Blee and Dwight Billings, *The Road to Poverty: The Making of Wealth and Hardship in Appalachia* (Cambridge University Press, 2000); Ronald Eller, *Uneven Ground: Appalachia Since 1945* (University of Kentucky Press, 2008); “Missouri Lead Mining History by County,” Missouri Department of Natural Resources, accessed 26 January 2017, <https://dnr.mo.gov/env/hwp/sfund/lead-mo-history-more.htm#tristate>.

⁴ David Torstensson, “Beyond the City: Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty in Rural America,” *Journal of Policy History* 25, no. 4 (2013), 593.

⁵ Jess Gilbert, *Planning Democracy: Agrarian Intellectuals and the Intended New Deal* (Yale University Press, 2016); Thomas Kiffmeyer, “We are Ordered to do Everything”: The National Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty, American Social Thought, and the War on Poverty,” *Register of the Kentucky Historical Society* 107, no. 3 (Summer 2009); Eller, *Uneven Ground*; Mark Lapping, “American Rural Planning, Development Policy and the Centrality of the Federal State: An Interpretative History.” *Rural History* 3, no. 2 (October 1992): 219-242; William Browne, *The Failure of National Rural Policy: Institutions and Interests*. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2001.

⁶ For a small sampling of this large literature, see Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Harvard University Press, 2003); Michael Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era* (University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Odd Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our Times* (Cambridge University Press, 2005); Daniel Immerwahr, *Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development* (Harvard University Press, 2015); David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton University Press, 2009); Nick Cullather, *The Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia* (Harvard University Press, 2013).

⁷ “Statement to the National Advisory Committee on Economic Opportunity,” 22 February 1973, Folder 2089, Box 338, Series 1 Grants, Rockefeller Brothers Fund (hereafter RBF), Rockefeller Archive Center (hereafter RAC).

⁸ “Proposal for Agricultural Development in the Rural Southeast,” 12 February 1975, Folder 2091, Box 338, Series 1 Grants, RBF, RAC.

⁹ “Statement on Improving Federal Services for Minority Rural Community Development and Rural Development in General,” 28 April 1976, Folder 2093, Box 339, Series 1 Grants, RBF, RAC.

¹⁰ “Grassroots Cooperatives and Credit” July 1968, Folder 2083, Box 337, Series 1 Grants, RBF, RAC.

¹¹ “Rockefeller Brothers Fund Southern Program,” 29 January 1974, Folder 2090, Box 338, Series 1 Grants, RBF, RAC.

¹² Pete Daniel, *Dispossession: Discrimination against African American Farmers in the Age of Civil Rights* (University of North Carolina Press, 2013).

¹³ “Proposal for Agricultural Development in the Rural Southeast,” 12 February 1975, Folder 2091, Box 338, Series 1 Grants, RBF, RAC; “Federation of Southern Cooperatives Proposal,” 8 December 1971, Folder 2087, Box 337, Series 1 Grants, RBF, RAC.

¹⁴ “A Proposal for the Support of a Winter Crop Program and the General Program of the Federation of Southern Cooperatives,” 4 August 1970, Folder 2084, Box 337, Series 1 Grants, RBF, RAC.

¹⁵ “Memorandum to Dana S. Creel from Thomas A. Waman,” 1 October 1970, Folder 2085, Box 337, Series 1 Grants, RBF, RAC.

¹⁶ “Memorandum to Dana S. Creel from Thomas A. Waman,” 1 October 1970, Folder 2085, Box 337, Series 1 Grants, RBF, RAC.

¹⁷ For insights into the relationship between the OEO and the FSC contained at the Rockefeller Archive Center, see Boxes 337-340, Series 1 Grants, RBF, RAC; Reel 1690, Grants E-F, Ford Foundation Records (hereafter FF), RAC.

¹⁸ To Mitchell Sviridoff from Bryant George, 24 January 1972, Folder 3, Box 8, Series I Administrative Subject Files, Office Files of Mitchell Sviridoff, RAC; See also, “A Proposal for the Support of a Winter Crop Program and the General Program of the Federation of Southern Cooperatives,” 4 August 1970, Folder 2084, Box 337, Series 1 Grants, RBF, RAC; “Southern Rural Cooperative Economic Development,” ca. October 1971, Reel 1690, Grants E-F, FF, RAC; To Bryant George from Frank Hartmann, 1 June 1971, Reel 1690, Grants E-F, FF, RAC.

¹⁹ The documentation for this particular battle is extensive, and ranges across Boxes 337-340, Series 1, RBF, RAC. See also Reel 1690, Grants E-F, FF, RAC.

²⁰ The material on this particular episode is rather extensive, and is contained primarily in Boxes 337-339, Series 1, RBF, RAC. Additional materials can be found in the FSC’s collection at the Amistad Research Center at Tulane University.

²¹ For information on this chapter of the FSC's story, see Folders 7-8, Box 11, Series III Program Related Investments, Office Files of Bernard McDonald, RAC; Folders 2098-9, Box 340, Series 1 Grants, RBF, RAC.

²² See in particular Reel 189, Series III Marilyn Bledsoe Files, Winthrop Rockefeller Gubernatorial Papers, RAC; Reel 222, Series III State Agency County Files, Winthrop Rockefeller Gubernatorial Papers, RAC; Reel 265, Series III State Agency Files and Reports, Winthrop Rockefeller Gubernatorial Papers, RAC.