

Capital City: Local Businesses and Global Development Institutions in Calcutta's Economic Decline

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Introduction

When the Ford Foundation entered India in 1951, its focus was overwhelmingly rural. As its presence expanded over time, it branched out to other areas such as education and culture, small-scale industrial development, manpower and management, population control and family planning, and technical training. Historians of development and U.S. foreign relations have over the past decade explored various facets of the foundation's activities in India.¹ However, thus far, its role in the urban sphere in India and perhaps even globally has not received much scholarly attention. I began my research at the Rockefeller Archive Center in September 2017, with the intention of studying a very specific urban project in India: the Ford Foundation's planning assistance to Calcutta (now Kolkata) from 1961 to 1974, then India's largest and industrially most important city. Given the lack of secondary references on this topic, I came in with some basic questions. 1) Why did the Ford Foundation get involved in Calcutta's urban renewal project? 2) What was the nature of the Foundation's involvement? More specifically, was it a grant for training or simply a planning program? At that stage in my dissertation research, I had hoped to have a chapter on the Ford Foundation and use it as a contrast to study the response of locally-based Indian and British businesses to Calcutta's civic and infrastructural problems, which had started to make international headlines by the late 1950s. In fact, my main focus was on Calcutta's businesses. However, as I will chart out in this report, the archival materials at the RAC persuaded me to reorient and broaden my core research questions and framework.

I was pleasantly surprised, even stunned, by the depth of materials on the Ford Foundation's program in Calcutta. The archival materials include three full microfilm reels containing program-related correspondence beginning from 1960 till 1970-71; catalogued reports on program assessment and other important program meetings and developments; and reports produced by the Ford Foundation team of experts in collaboration with their Indian counterparts.² Not only do the materials give a very detailed window into Ford's program in the city, they provide an invaluable vantage point from which scholars can study Calcutta's urban, West Bengal's regional, India's national politics. This is because the Foundation's program was not conducted in a vacuum. I realized that Calcutta was not a typical urban planning project where physical planners simply swooped down to a location with pre-conceived ideas, collected

or constructed maps and data, produced some reports and went away.³ In Calcutta, the Ford Foundation became inextricably involved in local, regional and national and even international affairs.

Research Findings

The reason why the Ford Foundation became so enmeshed in politics when assisting Calcutta, was because its motivation in joining the project was political to begin with. In the 1950s, Calcutta had emerged as the primary base of communism in India, where it was regularly defeating the liberal-nationalist Congress Party candidates in elections in local constituency. There was a genuine anxiety in the United States and among non-left sections in India, that if the country's most populous and industrially most-important city fell to the Communist Party of India, the rest of India might follow. The Ford Foundation, even though it was trying to reach out to Eastern European countries, was staunchly anti-communist in its approach in India. Underdevelopment or failure of satiate what was often called the "revolution of rising expectations" in decolonizing Asia and Africa, was thought to provide fertile ground for the extension of communism's influence. ⁴ Therefore in Calcutta, the Ford Foundation came to believe that communism's popularity was a direct result of the city's urban problems.

West Bengal's Chief Minister B.C Roy also arrived at the same conclusion about communism and Calcutta's urban-civic issues. He did so after he won his election constituency in the city by a wafer-thin margin in the 1957 elections while other Congress candidates performed poorly. It is in this context that Roy, after consulting with Prime Minister Nehru, requested assistance from the Ford Foundation to formulate a plan for Calcutta's development. According to Douglas Ensminger— the Foundation's powerful, charismatic and, at times, controversial field representative since 1952 (and until 1972)— what really convinced him to accept Chief Minister Roy's proposal was his insistence that "unless something is done about Calcutta it will be lost to the Communists."⁵ In a sense, it is not really surprising to find that the specter of communism played a crucial role in getting the Ford Foundation involved in a project in India. However, what was really surprising is the seriousness with which the Foundation viewed the communist challenge in India, which made it willing to enter into areas that

were not traditionally its strengths. I was also surprised to find the extent to which Calcutta's politics *mattered*.

The rich history of the Ford Foundation's involvement in Calcutta made me think why the Indian government would allow an American organization to get so enmeshed in local politics when it clearly was wary of American organizations and maintained a non-aligned foreign position. In fact, India had a history of major foreign policy disagreements with the United States in the 1950s and 60s.⁶ My curiosity was piqued even further by the general perception that the Ford Foundation often worked in tandem with the United States State Department.⁷ These questions led to me to two extremely productive detours which I will briefly mention below.

1) Ford Foundation's early history in India: I spent some time focusing on those materials, which could give me a sense of the early history of the Ford Foundation's entry into India and the dynamics of its relationship with the Indian government.⁸ Soon I realized that the Ford Foundation shared a complex relationship with the United States government, and the government of India. It was an independent entity of its own, with its own agenda and motivations, which sometimes overlapped with American foreign policy interests, and sometimes did not. At times, its interests aligned more closely with that of the government of India. The fruitful result of this detour, among many others, was that it made me realize that the Ford Foundation's motivation for joining programs such as the Calcutta program, or more generally any program in India, cannot be reduced to a simple story of the "red scare." Nor could, as it is often alleged, the foundation be simply dismissed as being a front for the CIA or the US government.

2. Ford Foundation in American cities and in its international urban programs: The foundation began its involvement in American cities from about the mid-1950s, with such initiatives as the Gray Areas Program. Although I could not go much in detail about this and there are some secondary works on the subject, I realized that perhaps from the foundation's perspective, the Calcutta program had more in common with contemporaneous urban renewal programs in the United States. The significance of this finding is that it helps locate Calcutta, a Third World city, in the larger history of global urban developmentalist thinking. I realized that not only were there significant exchanges among experts in American cities such Pittsburgh and Calcutta, but that the experience from the "Calcutta experiment" had a profound impact on how the Ford

Foundation began thinking about urban development more generally. This meant that perhaps I could pinpoint in my research specific ways in which the experience of working in a city like Calcutta actually impacted development thought and practice globally. Potentially this can help in reducing the analytical gap between cities in the developing world and cities in advanced capitalist economies that continues to inform urban studies and urban histories.

In this connection, I would like to point out three important documents which the staff at the RAC kindly alerted me to. 1) An abridged transcript on urban planning and development organized by the foundation in the 1956 2) Louis Winnick's 11 volume report titled "Philanthropy's Adaptation to Urban Crisis" 3) The [18 volume] International Urbanization Survey Reports prepared by John P. Robin, Colin Rosser and Frederick C. Terzo.⁹

After these two productive detours, I returned to the specific project I was working on, with a fresh perspective. And the documents available give a great sense of "development in practice," the nuts and bolts involved in collecting data, making plans, coordinating with various levels of governments, the local business community and with other development agencies. I will here briefly lay- out what I believe, are two interesting and related cases.

Case 1: Ford Foundation in India Meets the Communists:

As I have already mentioned, one of the reasons why the Ford Foundation entered Calcutta was because it wanted to thwart the rise of communism. However, as it turned out, the communists did come to power in 1967 as the most dominant part of a coalition in the State of West Bengal, which gave them significant control over the city's urban governance and spending. This meant that the Ford Foundation, as an institution, would have to finally interact and engage with Indian communists, if it were to continue its program in Calcutta. By then, despite suffering a series of setbacks due to inter- and intra-institutional disagreements, the program had helped publish widely-appreciated studies on a Calcutta development plan.¹⁰ Although the Ford Foundation did not see itself as an implementing agency, it was extremely keen on seeing this plan implemented on the ground. However at the same time, the radical left-wing U.S. magazine, *Ramparts*, had carried out a series of articles in which it had accused several American

non-profit organizations for being a front of the CIA.¹¹ Although the Ford Foundation was not mentioned and the government of India also did not suspect it of any malpractice, the Indian communists were quick to pick on these allegations. A leading communist member of the West Bengal Legislative Assembly directly accused the Ford Foundation's Calcutta team of comprising of CIA agents— the first time such an accusation was actually raised on the floor of any state legislative assembly in the country. This meant that Ensminger would have to meet West Bengal's new communist leadership with the intention of clarifying Ford Foundation's independence from the U.S. government and the CIA, and asking whether they would like the foundation to continue its work or not. Much to his surprise (and my own), however, Ensminger's report on the meeting tells us that the communist leadership had other concerns. It seemed more interested in asking the foundation to get them directly in touch with the World Bank to secure funds for Calcutta, as they felt that the Congress Party-ruled central government might cut down assistance to a communist-led state.¹²

This was completely new insight into the working of the communist parties in India and their relationship with private American philanthropic organizations, and I am very much interested in exploring this relationship further. This episode also led me to think seriously about the World Bank and I found out that in 1972 Calcutta became the first city in World Bank's history to receive multi-sectoral development assistance. Since then, I have decided to pursue another track in my research— the direct role of Calcutta and the Ford Foundation in persuading the World Bank to start a separate urban division in 1972.

Case 2: Ford Foundation, Urban Development and Indian Businesses:

In South Asian scholarship, very little is known about the history and nature of business involvement in India's development efforts, in general, and in urban development, in particular. I find this odd because, in countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, there is a well-documented history of business civic activism and involvement in the urban sphere. We know that today in Indian cities like Bangalore (now Bengaluru), "the key movers and shakers of urban transformation" are all part of a coalition constituted by international financial institutions, ambitious politicians, bureaucrats, NGOs, multilateral and bilateral philanthropic/development organizations, and local business elites and chambers of commerce.¹³ However, in the

absence of any historical study on the subject, scholars have located such efforts at coalition building in the urban sphere in neoliberal transformations in Indian economy, beginning with structural reforms in 1991. My research at the RAC, led me to documents that can substantially add to our knowledge about urban coalition building and business participation in Indian cities.

Covering the entire period from 1961 to 1974, the Ford Foundation spent close to US\$ 5 million on assisting Calcutta in preparing an urban revival plan and tried to persuade donors to take over and fund implementation of plans. The city became the foundation's longest running, and most expensive urban program outside of the United States; it was also the most transformative. Coming as it did in the early 1960s, during the high noon of modernization, American organizations, politicians and experts believed that the U.S. had important development lessons to offer to the entire world. But which American city should Calcutta learn from? Inner city decline, urban blight, racial strife and the flight to suburbs had turned American cities into a major source of embarrassment for those who were at the forefront of non-military aspects of the Cold War. American cities were a major weakness in their quest to show that the United States had better developmental models to that of the Eastern bloc in every sphere.¹⁴ There was, however, one city in the Ford Foundation's assessment, which Calcutta could learn from. This city was Pittsburgh— like Calcutta, an industrial city with a strong capitalist class— which had apparently pulled itself out of a morass through a civic-business partnership, known as the Allegheny Conference.¹⁵ Right from the very beginning then, mobilizing and involving the business community became an intrinsic part of Ford's Calcutta urban revival plan. A successful business-government alliance would not only increase the probability of the plan's success and implementation, but it could also keep, according to the foundation, the communists in Bengal away from achieving political power.

In 1962, Douglas Enslinger invited Bernard Loshbough, who was the Executive Director of the Pittsburgh based 'Allegheny Council to Improve our Neighborhood Housing Inc. (ACTION-INC), to visit Calcutta in order to figure out feasible ways of involving the business community in the city's urban planning process. Loshbough identified a prominent industrialist and "the wealthiest man in Calcutta," B.M. Birla as the "single most important person in the development of a successful regional plan for Greater Calcutta." He could be to Calcutta, Loshbough believed, what Richard Mellon had been for Pittsburgh. After all, much like the Mellons, the Birlas had "deep financial

roots" in Calcutta, and therefore an "enlightened interest" in its urban-economic future.

If we go by Loshbough's account of his meeting with Birla, the industrialist was "disheartened" by the slow rate of progress in Calcutta and showed little faith in the quality of political leadership that Bengal politics presented, despite being a 'trusted' advisor of Chief Minister Roy. But he still seemed interested when informed about the Allegheny model. Following this meeting and at Loshbough's request, Birla invited Ford representatives, Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organization officials (the institution which Ford assisted), and the city's leading businessmen for a luncheon, so that they could be acquainted with the state of urban planning and improvement in the city. Later, he also took foundation officials for a tour of a town site he wanted to build near Calcutta, ostensibly to demonstrate his abiding interest in Calcutta's future. Both Ensminger and Loshbough concurred that B.M. Birla was a suitable leader for the kind of role they wanted businesses to play in Calcutta, and felt that Birla himself was "intrigued" by the possibility of playing such a role, whether directly or in a behind-the-scenes- capacity. The Ford Foundation organized two additional lunch meetings with Birla and other Calcutta industrialists in quick succession, in early 1962. At these meetings, it presented a clear organizational plan— a committee consisting of 10-12 businessmen along with government officials and important citizens to promote the development and implementation of a metropolitan plan, and to establish a strong effective vice-presidency to run this organization. The foundation was ready to fund this organization and suggested that Mr. Birla take a tour to the United States, especially to Pittsburgh, along with other industrialists and officials, to see how business-civic partnership could potentially work.¹⁶

At this time, both Loshbough and Ensminger were convinced that they had set the stage for a successful business-civic partnership in Calcutta. It is not known whether B.M. Birla actually made that trip to Pittsburgh. But it is clear that as a result of these meeting, the Government of West Bengal did set up a formal organization to oversee and coordinate development activities in Calcutta, called "The Council for Coordination of the Calcutta Metropolitan Area." The council was composed of some of the most powerful provincial politicians in the state including communist leaders, government officials and important big businessmen including the B.M. Birla, Sir Biren Mookherjee, S.P. Jain, and McKay Tallack. However, the council was a non-starter from the beginning.

One reason behind the failure of this council could be Bengal politics. Chief Minister Roy was not in favor of striking formal institutional links with Calcutta businessmen. This was probably motivated by his desire to personally coordinate all the various actors involved in the city's revival and keep himself in the center of things. The Congress Party government that followed Roy's death in 1962 had a primarily rural electoral base and was not as committed to the city as Roy was. But that said, Calcutta's businesses also remained, "civically inert" through much of the 1960s, and "gave little indication that they were prepared to give much leadership to the revival effort." Ensminger summed up what the Ford Foundation thought of businesses community's approach to the crisis: "So far as the Indian business community was concerned...I found they were not behaving responsibly in that they were always blaming the Government for its failures, and never themselves recognized that strong leadership and concern on their part might have an effect in terms of how the Government responded to [Calcutta's] problems."¹⁷

Having failed in their initial effort to get businesses involved, the Ford Foundation gave another push for it in 1968. The favorable reviews of the *Basic Development Plan* for Calcutta that it helped prepare heightened the foundation's resolve that the plan get implemented. But an industrial recession and other economic difficulties struck India in 1965-66 due to war along with successive years of crop failures. These factors led to the suspension of India's Fourth Plan, which struck a severe blow to hopes of securing the necessary development funds from the central government. The 1967 elections installed non-Congress governments for the first time in many states. West Bengal, where the Congress Party had been in decline through the 1960s, was won by United Front alliance composed of as many as 11 parties in which the communists were the largest and most decisive component. There was a general anxiety at the time about how India's quasi-federal constitution would hold up to the combined strains of severe economic problems and emergence of a genuine multi-party democratic system. Communist success in West Bengal only made matters more complicated. In times of such political turbulence, including a Naxal (Maoist) revolt in the Bengal countryside which also spread to the city, the Ford Foundation believed that the local business-industrial community was the only coherent and stable force left in Calcutta.

The Government of West Bengal, too, was concerned about its fiscal situation and felt that none of the promises of developmental assistance from the central government would materialize. Despite being pro-labor, it wanted to maintain an amicable working

relationship with Calcutta's businesses. Therefore, both the government and the Ford Foundation turned to Calcutta's businessmen once more to try and involve them in Calcutta's urban project and persuade them to commit funds. "In thinking about how to get the business community to be more positive about planning in Calcutta," Ensminger reminisced, "I found a golden opportunity when I showed up in Calcutta one evening...and found there was an urgent phone call from the President of the Indian Chamber of Commerce wanting me to be their chief speaker the following day at a luncheon meeting of the Chamber." This last-second invite had come through because the scheduled speaker, B.M. Birla, had suffered a heart attack and therefore had to withdraw. Ensminger's objective "in making the speech was to challenge the business community to stop blaming others for the rot in Calcutta and start contributing themselves to Calcutta's improvement."¹⁸ In his speech, Ensminger threw down the gauntlet to the business community in the strongest possible terms:

Let me again address my remarks in the frankest and most direct manner to you, business Leaders, by saying...[o]n a man-to man basis, the crisis of Calcutta is one the Business Leaders of Calcutta must now accept. You must now assume the responsibility for assuring Calcutta's future and restoring it to its rightful place, as a significant city of India.... This you may say, isn't being fair, isn't being realistic, and that you cannot afford the investment required not only to save Calcutta but to make it a vital city again...you cannot afford to continue to be indifferent about Calcutta's future. You now have investments which run into thousands of crores in your businesses. The manufacturing sector of Calcutta makes an annual profit of Rs 380 crores. Unless and until you are prepared to invest, and invest until it hurts, in the restoration of Calcutta, you must accept as a fact that you are no longer interested in the future of your business and that you do not feel it in your hearts to accept the forgotten and downtrodden people of Calcutta...It is not incredible, given an annual added additional value of Rs 380 crores within the Calcutta Metropolitan District, that the current annual expenditure on Calcutta's development is only 3.5 crores? Just think of it. This is one percent of the annual value added by the manufacturing section of Calcutta...¹⁹

The governor of West Bengal, then the acting head of the executive, since the United Front government had been dismissed, chimed in, as well. "I will suggest that though the advocacy role of business and industrial community is no doubt important, the Government will appreciate a more specific and positive involvement by the business

and industrial community in the mobilization [sic] of resources for Calcutta's development in the immediate future." Expressing the government's desire to work more closely with the business community, he proposed the formation of an Urban Development Bank with Rs 20 crores (approx. US\$ 3 million) as seed fund in which international agencies could also contribute eventually. Calcutta's "newly awakened business community" pledged to match funds in order to kick-start this bank. The Indian Chamber of Commerce established a new sub-committee on urban affairs in the same year and its records clearly show a change in its attitude towards urban issues from 1968 onwards. Meetings were held in early 1969 which included the Government of West Bengal, the Ford Foundation, and Calcutta's business community. This was an unprecedented (and till now unstudied) experiment in urban governance and financing in India's urban history, one that prefigures one of the signal features of urban governance in neoliberal India today.²⁰

The negotiations for funding the Urban Development Bank, however, fell through because the government and businesses could not decide on who would own the controlling stake in this venture— the government or businesses. While the government wanted to own at least 51 per cent of the stakes in the bank, the capitalists themselves were looking for holding at least 50 percent. Businesses were also reluctant, if not opposed to the idea of using any profit beyond 2.5 per cent of their investment in seed fund, on building parks and recreation facilities in the city.²¹ Businessmen like Sir Michael Parsons, the President of the Bengal Chambers of Commerce, felt that the proposal ultimately failed because of the “mistrust of the private sector by the state government.” As a result of which, Calcutta missed an opportunity of benefitting from “a joint venture” which “could harness the skills and the executive abilities of the private sector and could avoid the delay and the bureaucratic methods which appear to be inseparable from State-run institutions.” Parsons may have been right. But Bengal's politicians and bureaucrats can also not be faulted for thinking something they would often mention in private— that “Calcutta's businessmen are only interested in making money.”²² This shows that making business and governments work together, even when they clearly have mutually overlapping interests is harder than is often believed. Ultimately, Calcutta experienced a flight of capital to other Indian cities, starting in 1969, which precipitated an economic decline from which the city is yet to recover.

Concluding Thoughts

My research at the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) has helped both broaden and deepen my dissertation research project. Historians have only just started to write histories of development through detailed case studies of specific development projects. My assessment is that the materials at the Rockefeller Archive Center, especially those of the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation, will become an invaluable store of primary sources to conduct such studies. The RAC is a very rich and indispensable archive for studying the history of early post-independence India more generally, too. The materials I have collected here will constitute the bulk of my research. I have been using them as a “control” to direct my forays into other archives. My dissertation would have been much poorer and thinner without having access to such detailed primary sources. My archival work at the RAC would have remained much narrower in focus without the help, advice, and encouragement of the fellows and archivists there, especially Patricia Rosenfield, Rachel Wimpee, Tom Rosenbaum, Michele Beckerman and Renee Pappous. To them, I am immensely grateful. I would also like to thank the RAC for giving me a research stipend and for the Tuesday lunches which turned out to be a great session for exchanging and brainstorming new ideas, and collecting new archival leads.

¹ This Report is on the research I conducted at the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) in September and October 2017 for my dissertation research project which is titled “Capital City: Local Businesses and Global Development Institutions in Calcutta’s Economic Decline.” For a more general survey of India-Ford Foundation relations see, Nicole Sackley, “Foundation in the Field: The Ford Foundation New Delhi Office and the Construction of Development Knowledge, 1951-1970,” in *American Foundations and the Coproduction of World Order in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Ulriche Herbert and Leonhard John (Gottingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012), 232–60. Kathleen D. McCarthy, “From Government to Grass-Roots Reform: The Ford Foundation’s Population Programmes in South Asia, 1959–1981,” *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 6, no. 3 (1995): 292–316. Leonard A. Gordon, “Wealth Equals Wisdom? The Rockefeller and Ford Foundation in India,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 554, no. The Role of NGOs: Charity and Empowerment (November 1997): 104–16. For more specific interventions some important works are, Daniel Immerwarh, *Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015). Matthew Connelly, *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).

² The relevant microfilm includes: Government of West Bengal (006100217), Reel 3312 (FA732C), June 12, 1961- Aug 31 1970, Ford Foundation, Ford Foundation Grants E-G, Rockefeller Archive

Center; Government of West Bengal (006100217), Reel 2641 (FA732C), June 12, 1961- Aug 31 1970, Ford Foundation, Ford Foundation Grants E-G, Rockefeller Archive Center; Government of West Bengal (006100217), Reel 2640 (FA732C), June 12, 1961- Aug 31 1970, Ford Foundation, Ford Foundation Grants E-G, Rockefeller Archive Center; Government of West Bengal (006100217), Reel 2639 (FA732C), June 12, 1961- Aug 31 1970, Ford Foundation, Ford Foundation Grants E-G, Rockefeller Archive Center.

³ Arthur Row, Ford Foundation's Chief Advisor to the Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organization (CMPO) between 1968-1971 elaborates this point very clearly. See Arthur Row, "Calcutta: The Great Experiment (Reports 013484)," Box 709, 1998, Ford Foundation, Ford Foundation records, Catalogued Reports, Reports 11775-13948, Rockefeller Archive Center.

⁴ Speeches by Paul Hoffman, Ford Foundation's first president, which are in the RAC. For a sample see, Paul Hoffman, "Quest for Peace (Report 019048), Dec 11 1951, Ford Foundation, Ford Foundation records, Catalogued Reports, Reports 17727-19980, Rockefeller Archive Center.

⁵ Douglas Ensminger, "Why did the Ford Foundation accept and respond to Dr. B.C. Roy's invitation to assist in the development of a long range plan for the Greater Calcutta Area?" Feb 7 1972, Series B: Topics to Specific Projects, Ford Foundation, Ford Foundation Records, Douglas Ensminger Oral History Series, Rockefeller Archive Center.

⁶ For one of the most important works on India-United States diplomatic, aid and development relations, see H.W. Brands, *India and the United States: The Cold Peace* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990).

⁷ A recent example of this argument is by Inderjeet Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power* (Columbia University Press, 2015).

⁸ For this in addition to the Douglas Ensminger's accounts and correspondence, I found John Howard's correspondence files to be particularly useful. Howard was the executive assistant to the Foundation's first president, Paul Hoffman. See, John Howard Correspondence, Reel C-1141, Series 1951: General Correspondence, Ford Foundation, Ford Foundation Records, General Correspondence, Rockefeller Archive Center.

⁹ Abridged Transcript of Conference on Urban Planning and Development Held at the Ford Foundation, October 10-11," Conference on Urbanism, Ford Foundation, October 10-11, 1956, 1956, Ford Foundation records, Catalogued Reports, Reports 3255-6261 (FA739B), Box 154, Abridged transcript of conference on urban planning and development held at the Ford Foundation, October 10-11 (Reports 003477), Rockefeller Archive Center; Louis Winnick, "Philanthropy's Adaptation to the Urban Crisis, Vol. 3," May 1989, 2, Ford Foundation records, Reports 11775-13948 (FA739E), Box 575, Reports 012158: Philanthropy's adaptation to the urban crisis vol. 3, Rockefeller Archive Center; John P. Robin, Colin Rosser, and Frederick C. Terzo, "The Ford Foundation International Urbanization Survey, Discussion Paper III," 1971, Ford Foundation records, Catalogued Reports, Reports 3255-6261 (FA739B), Box 262, The Ford Foundation International Urbanization Survey (Reports 005838), Rockefeller Archive Center.

¹⁰ "Basic Development Plan," Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organization, 1976, Government of West Bengal Publication.

¹¹ P. M. McGarr, "'Quiet Americans in India': The CIA and the Politics of Intelligence in Cold War South Asia," *Diplomatic History* 38, no. 5 (November 1, 2014): 1046-82.

¹² Douglas Ensminger, "Report of discussions held with members of the West Bengal United Front Government in Calcutta, April 1967, and ensuing developments (Reports 003145)," April 1967, Box 139, Ford Foundation, Ford Foundation records, Catalogued Reports, Reports 1-3254, Rockefeller Archive Center.

¹³ Michael Goldman, "Speculative Urbanism and the Making of the Next World City: Speculative Urbanism in Bangalore," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 35, no. 3 (May 2011): 555-81.

¹⁴ Nicholas Dagen Bloom, *Merchant of Illusion: James Rouse, America's Salesman of the Businessman's Utopia* (Ohio State University Press, 2004). Samuel Zipp, *Manhattan Projects: The Rise and Fall of Urban Renewal in Cold War New York* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

¹⁵ On Pittsburgh, see Tracy Neumann, *Remaking the Rust Belt: The Post Industrial Transformation of North America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).

¹⁶ Bernard Loshbough, “Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organization: Report and Recommendation (Reports 000687),” May 1962, Box 35, Ford Foundation, Ford Foundation records, Catalogued Reports, Reports 1-3254, Rockefeller Archive Center.

¹⁷ See citation no. 5.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Douglas Ensminger, “The challenge of Calcutta, address given in Calcutta at a luncheon sponsored by the Indian Chamber of Commerce (Reports 018825),” Dec 1968, Box 890, Ford Foundation, Ford Foundation records, Catalogued Reports, Reports 17727-19980, Rockefeller Archive Center.

²⁰ See citation no. 2.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Arthur Row, “Programme proposals for Ford Foundation assistance to the government of West Bengal in the development of Calcutta (Reports 009239),” 1969, Box 383, Ford Foundation, Ford Foundation records, Catalogued Reports, Reports 6262-9286, Rockefeller Archive Center.