Introduction

In 1968 the Ford Foundation (FF) approved a grant of $180,000 to Wayne State University (WSU) over a two-year period to support the American-Yugoslav Project (AYP). The grant proposal was made by Jack C. Fischer, Vladimir Mušič and Lojze Rojec to Stanley T. Gordon of the FF in order to assist the American-Yugoslav Project (AYP) for Regional and Urban Planning Studies and thus to complete experimental plans for the city and region of Ljubljana. At the same time the FF grant would also continue to support interdisciplinary training in urban-regional planning methods for Yugoslav specialists.¹

It was expected that at the end of the grant period there would be greater international participation in the project and that it would be under predominantly Yugoslav leadership. In addition, the letter anticipated financial assistance beyond the period of the grant under the condition of the availability of a responsible Yugoslav institution to “provide adequate leadership and substantial financial support for a program emphasizing cooperative activities with institutions in other European countries.”²

What was meant by this was revealed much later, in Louis Winnick’s reflections on the project in 1989. Winnick, the FF officer in charge of the AYP, was involved in related activities that ran directly or indirectly parallel to AYP’s course up until the late 1970s. He described the rationale for the project primarily as a technology transfer, focused on exporting innovative concepts to Yugoslavia’s urban officials and implanting new ways of thinking and doing into the post-graduate curricula of Yugoslav universities. They believed that this would ensure that the transferred knowledge would be anchored on a lasting institutional base. The FF’s interests, in terms of cooperation with the AYP, were the institutions involved in planning and education.
Interestingly, the AYP evolved between people and institutions that “belonged to” two different ideologies. Consequently, there were discrepancies in their use of technical language related to planning procedures. Even though the project was expected to export knowledge mainly in one direction, from the US to Yugoslavia, it in fact had effects and consequences for regional planning strategies on both sides. It had to in order to succeed. Planners and other participants needed to find a mode of collaboration if the project was to take place.

Even though Winnick described this part of FF history as a time of conflicting ideologies, they were apparently able to find a common denominator in regional planning methodologies in order to continue. As such, the language developed with the AYP offers us a glimpse into the evolution of Cold War planning strategies, which have persisted to the present day. The dilemmas and cracks the project reveals offers an opportunity to consider questions about regional development. The intention of this paper is to show how a single project, the AYP, was developed as a testing ground for planning, which in the long run overlapped with the interests of the Yugoslav government, the FF, and finally, the United Nations (UN). The analysis reveals how the interested parties borrowed know-how from each other and, in doing so, indisputably convoluted planning procedures.

**Framing the AYP**

The FF’s interest in Yugoslavia became evident even before the AYP started, and the interest was connected to the questions of urban development in the US. For example, Winnick documents at the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) related to challenges in American society are kept in the same boxes as his itineraries for his overseas travels. They speak of questions of poverty, race, and health issues, and are connected to questions about non-profit housing.³

Winnick was appointed the Public Affairs Program’s Associate Director at the FF in 1946. Focusing on urban development was a way for him to deal with the needs
of middle income families and construct balanced new communities that were seen as the solution to urban and metropolitan problems generally. In 1967 Winnick became a Program Officer in charge of the Urban and Metropolitan Development unit of the National Affairs Division, and in June 1968 he was promoted to Deputy Vice President of the Division.

Winnick visited Yugoslavia in 1964 to meet with Zdenko Kolačić, chief architect of the city of Zagreb and Branka Savić from the Institute for Housing and Town Planning of the Central Government Office Building in New Belgrade. The stops on his Yugoslav itinerary were Dubrovnik, Belgrade and Zagreb. He also traveled to Tel Aviv, Athens, Amsterdam, London, Beirut and Jerusalem.

Winnick described the AYP as “the second venture into international urbanism,” when writing about FF’s involvement in international urban planning projects. The two others were Calcutta and Athens. Even though his notes indicate that the project extended over a period of 14 years, the grant documents show that the project developed under this particular name in the course of two years only: 1968 to 1970.

The proceedings began in 1966 with the Eastern Europe Fellowship Program (EEFP), two years after the Winnick’s previously-mentioned travels. This program offered Vladimir Braco Mušič, an architect and planner working at the Urban Planning Institute (UPI) from Slovenia, Yugoslavia and later one of the key figures of the AYP, the opportunity to establish a wide network of professional and personal relations, which finally made the AYP possible. Although the name AYP appears only in 1968 as the official name of the project, all of the reports and evaluations talk about the project starting in 1966; it is clear that the EEFP grant, even thought it had a different name, was envisaged to result in a collaborative project between Yugoslavia and the US.

In this first phase (1966-68), the project sought to perform three main functions: introducing American know-how to problems of urban and regional planning in Yugoslavia; developing a multidisciplinary and regional planning research and
training facility in Ljubljana; and preparing a comprehensive development plan for the Ljubljana region as a case study. Despite the relatively small progress achieved in the first two years, there were positive outcomes of the project: it established an infrastructure for research and training, assured American and Yugoslav participation and support, and legitimized the discipline of urban and regional planning.⁸

These were the main objectives for which the FF funded the project in its second stage, from 1968 to 1970, this time under the name AYP. The project sought to complete the comprehensive plan for the city and region of Ljubljana—the so-called Demonstration Study—and continue to serve as a platform for the multidisciplinary training of Yugoslav specialists in urban and regional planning. Over these two years, the involvement and leadership of Americans in the project was supposed to be reduced in favor of the Yugoslav team and develop internationally, and it did. Yugoslav involvement grew as well as international contacts with Western and Eastern Europe, which gave rise to discussions of, and preparations for, the establishment of an International Urban Studies Center at Ljubljana, based partly on the AYP.⁹

Consequently, in March 1970, the FF received a new proposal: a request from Yugoslavia for the establishment of a Yugoslav Center of Regional and Urban Studies; and a parallel (double) request from WSU for the continuation of the AYP. The Foundation, however, was not eager to fund the proposals. Rather, it saw this as an opportunity for professional evaluation of both the accomplishments of the AYP and of the new request that predicted further activities and mobility of the AYP staff.

The Report

The evaluation was done by Raymond Vernon and David L. Brich of the Harvard Business School. In April 1970, they submitted their report on the “Urban and
Regional Planning Project in Yugoslavia,” which was key for the future funding of the activities that evolved from the AYP. The report defined the project’s objectives somewhat differently than in the reports made to the FF by the personnel working on the project. They stated four main objectives for the project: upgrading Yugoslav skills (focusing mainly on the effect on attitudes, direct technical contributions and educational efforts), creating an internal communication grid, creating a Pan-European Center, and finally, providing feedback to Americans. This is how they understood the project in 1970. Their report served as the basis for the evaluation of the proposals the FF received and in the end rejected.  

The recommendations commented on the three related proposals that the FF received at the time: one from the Yugoslav side requesting the sum of $110,000 annually for two years; a second from WSU requesting over $200,000 annually for two years; and a third from WSU requesting $196,000 over a three-year period for fellowships in Detroit that would serve as a vehicle for training the Yugoslavs. Vernon and Brich, aside from finding that the fellowship proposal was outside of their mandate, had strong reservations about WSU’s proposal to use “Detroit ghetto” as a training ground. They found this to be “a less than optimal training experience.” In their opinion the funds would be more effectively spent if they provided Yugoslav students and professionals an opportunity to study in a large number of different planning schools in the US.

The turn that the project was trying to make was made clear. If the FF had funded the three proposals, the project would no longer have served to merely export American planning techniques. Rather, it would have provided a platform for the exchange of knowledge in both directions. The first such planned activity was a Conference on Historic Preservation in Urban Centers in Detroit. Vernon and Brich saw no reason for the FF to support a project evolving in this direction. The aim of AYP was to train specialists to plan the American way. Exporting American technical knowledge meant learning to use complicated planning techniques. Amongst them the Lowry model proved to be the most effective, and was also used as one of the AYP’s methodologies.
The Lowry model, a quantitative method to predict future changes in land use, socioeconomic and demographic data based on economic theories and social behaviors, was according to Vernon and Brich from a technical standpoint sufficiently complicated “to impress the more unsophisticated of the Yugoslavs.” However, it disturbed them that Yugoslavs in influential positions, who had not been affiliated with the project, were interested in whether or not they could trust the output of the model as a basis for making decisions. The danger in their view was not that the model would be acted upon, but rather that the Yugoslavs would discover its weaknesses and begin to question it. This could in their opinion wipe out the gains in general attitude that the AYP accomplished. They saw this as a risk inherent in the design and implementation of the project.¹²

The Vernon-Brich report served as the basis for the evaluation of the AYP for the FF written by Andrzej Korbonski, program officer of the European and International Affairs in the International Division. Korbonski was, likewise, not supportive of the continuation of the grant. His estimation was that the project failed to serve as the basis for an all-Yugoslav urban and regional planning effort even though the regional network among planners had grown stronger. AYP as the nucleus of a future European urban and regional planning center, in his opinion, turned out to be merely a dream. Likewise, he continued, “the implicit idea behind the AYP that would permit the American participant to use it as a laboratory to test their ideas and apply them into practice did not work out.”¹³ The report did not recommend further support and recommended that the FF terminate the project.

The evaluators never clearly stated the implicit idea behind the project. But what were the ideas the AYP was testing, and how would they be applied in practice through planning strategies? Why did the plan not succeed?
Testing Ground

The Ljubljana proposal crossed the FF’s threshold at the instant it was reexamining its East-West programs. It was an on-site program with the explicit goal of engaging substantial numbers of professionals, as an alternative to one-by-one awards. To the FF, the AYP had one more allure. Urban and regional planning was a field over which the FF’s domestic staff had roved for more than a decade. It had acquired substantial in-house experience and a prodigious network of connections to leading academics and institutions. AYP was in fact the FF’s first Eastern European project.\textsuperscript{14}

In this context, Yugoslavia was presumably an interesting “testing ground”; it was a developing socialist country expelled from the Comintern after the 1948 Tito-Stalin break. The Iron Curtain ran along the eastern border of Yugoslavia, giving the state the unique position of being a socialist country looking west for investments and models of development. Winnick described it as “a half-open window on the Iron Curtain”\textsuperscript{15} and the AYP as an exceptional opportunity “to open doors and open minds” within Marxist Europe.\textsuperscript{16}

The fact that Yugoslavia was interested in the American planning methodologies was puzzling even for Winnick, who later recognized a certain irony in the notion that “a Communist country was willing to concede a deficit in spatial arrangements at the regional level.” Namely, it was in Yugoslavia where systemized planning, according to Winnick, “approached almost a secular religion.” With the AYP Yugoslavia sought assistance “not from the socialist labor party regimes of West Europe, Scandinavia, or France, but from the US, arguably the Western world’s most free-wheeling and least planned society.”\textsuperscript{17} In this un-planned society the FF played a central role and was, after WWII, involved with questions of development and planning on a global scale.
The AYP’s difficulties reflected these dilemmas and the overarching theme that connected them was the normative substance of urban planning. The incompatibility of capitalist and socialist philosophies and mindsets was, amongst others, noticeable in the language used by American and Yugoslav planners. Winnick gave the example of the “free-market principle.” According to the American planners, urban land, which derives its site value from the incremental gains of its location, was envisioned to be allocated to the most productive users according to the principle of “highest and best use.” This was dismissed as irrelevant in Yugoslavia, where urban land was publicly owned and administratively distributed. In such circumstances the attribution of any value and price to land was an alien idea and caused a significant problem when starting the AYP, since both parties were unable to communicate the basic starting point for planning.\(^{18}\)

This was not the only predicament. To the Americans, un-priced land provided no clues to the rational spatial arrangement of economic activities. Likewise, housing, which in a market system is an economic good rationed by price and rent, was treated by socialist planners as a public good provided at a nominal charge, slated in the future to be a free commodity. Rent-income rations of 25% typical for the US context seemed like exploitation of renters by landlords to the Yugoslavs. Conversely, to the Americans, Yugoslavia’s closely packed three-generation households and the 10-year queue for a dwelling was evidence of underinvestment in housing, which, in a capital-short nation, could be remedied by higher consumer outlays.\(^{19}\)

**Infrastructure**

The logic of return on investment was a foreign concept in a socialist country. Regardless of the initial deadlock of the AYP, however, Yugoslavia wanted to industrialize and needed infrastructure to do so. Given the fact that state socialism was a new phenomenon, theories of development were scarce with spatial and
societal planning in its initial stages. Vernon and Brich gave a vivid description of the situation: “It was common for a Yugoslav planner to think of transportation as an isolated problem area having little to do with the location of future housing or manufacturing plants, of the economic status of the population.”

Under these circumstances, how could they find a common denominator for planning and thus a way, as Winnick put it, to open minds in Marxist (meaning socialist) Europe? How could the AYP make the Communist party “see” that socialism and the logic of return of investment could go hand in hand?

Since the principle of “highest and best use” could not be the starting point for planning, the process was adapted and started instead with the infrastructure needed in an industrializing socialist context. Planning infrastructure made it possible to predict the development of spatial arrangements and consequently to adapt American methodologies of investment. The location of future housing or manufacturing plants could be predicted, which at the same time gave way to thinking of planning as being founded in economy. Unlike in the US, where the distribution of profit was regulated through taxation policies, in Yugoslavia the logic of return of investment worked on the level of the state, which controlled the process and consequently used the revenue for centralized societal planning.

However, during the 1960s there was a shift toward self-sufficiency in the national republics of Yugoslavia’s socialist federation. The principles of regional planning overlapped with planning on the level of the Communist party-controlled republic, through its national branches. Vernon and Brich noted that in this process of local [meaning national] planning, groups bolstered their capabilities. They reported evidence that they would have headed in the multi-discipline direction in the absence of the AYP, which helped accelerate the trend. They saw this as one of the biggest assets of the project.

The AYP was a planning study project, but it was dealing with the question of not how to define a plan, but how to how to develop a particular way of planning. The idea was to produce an evolution of better planning processes, for which physical,
social, and economic factors were presented as maps. The statistics were given graphic representation while the Ljubljana metropolitan region was a case-study upon which procedures were discussed. It was about creating foundations for a regional planning institution that would cooperate internationally and connect the region’s urban planners with their American counterparts.

“Marxist Spheres”

For Winnick reflecting back on the project in 1989, the FF journey to Ljubljana was stimulated by a controversial urge to deliver a package of technocratic skills to Yugoslavia. Specific international grant programs were typically attached to some strategic keystones of their foreign policy. For example, the Calcutta development scheme aimed to alleviate the poverty of a vast metropolitan conglomeration, an urban parallel to the FF’s engagement with India’s rural development. But below the surface was a compulsion “to enhance India’s status as Asia’s showcase of democracy and to prevent a poverty-raced metropolis inside an unstable, radicalized region from lurching into the Marxist sphere.”

The concern about spreading Marxism connected the AYP to the India situation; in both cases, the FF saw spatial planning as a way to address it. In Winnick’s words: “If in the West economics was being transformed into the ‘science’ that Karl Marx had known all along it to be, why not spatial planning? In that dubious belief, Marxist dogma and Western Enlightenment were as one.” Looking closely at how the grants evolved through the stories of particular individuals related to the project reveals that the scope of the project was much broader than sketched in the justifications of the grant file. Stories of the protagonists of the AYP testify to that.

In June 1968, with the official beginning of the AYP, Winnick was promoted to Deputy Vice President of the National Affairs Division. He held this position through several Foundation-wide reorganizations and for the remainder of his career. He helped establish the Foundation’s focus on urban renewal grants as a
result of the urban turmoil of the 1960s and was also credited with persuading Foundation President George McBundy to begin funding “program related investments” in the form of equity investments and low-interest loans to schools, hospitals, housing organizations and small businesses in low-income urban areas.25

On the side of the AYP there are at least two other names worth mentioning: Jack Fischer and Vladimir Mušič. The rationale behind the AYP was determined in the summer of 1966 as a result of a discussion between Jack Fisher, at that time Assistant Professor at Cornell, and a group of Yugoslav planners centered around the Urban Planning Institute of Slovenia, Ljubljana. The institutional arrangements of the AYP were crystallized between 1966-68 in the form of two co-directors, Jack Fisher and Vladimir Mušič, Research Director of the UPI in Ljubljana, and the two National Advisory Committees, one American and one Yugoslav. The former, headed by John W. Dyckman of the University of California, Berkley, who was to review the work program, suggested potential participants and generally advised the directors of the project.

Jack Fischer had previously worked on the question of planning in Eastern Europe. By 1966, when he began working on the AYP, he was the author of City and Regional Planning in Poland, published by Cornell University Press in 1965. In 1968, before the second phase of the AYP started, however, he was involved in the question of planning in India. The Ford records include his Notes on the need for regional (spatial) planning at the state level in India, an unpublished report from 1968. In this report, Fischer opens the question of the division of developmental responsibilities between the Center and the states, which he believed required some readjustment to order to increase planning initiatives in the states.26

Why was the Yugoslav context relevant for Fisher when he was confronted with this situation in India? His perception of Yugoslavia was of “a state that had swung from a Soviet-style industrial fundamentalism, in which heavy industry was essential for the economic and political development of each region to a market
version of efficiency in which investment funds were to be freed to seek opportunities for profitability.”  

Fischer described his two months in India as a FF Consultant on urban and regional planning as his most important professional experience. It provided him with a better perspective against which to evaluate the AYP and to develop his new comparative planning program at WSU. He recognized that the introduction and review of Indian urban and regional planning was for him of the greatest professional importance. Because of his work in Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe with the Foundation, he was provided with a comparative framework, which suggested guidelines to understand and evaluate the work of the FF in India.  

For Fisher the AYP was informed by his Indian experience. In this perspective the AYP was a testing ground for global development issues that overlapped issues facing capitalist and socialist countries. The fact that the Non-Aligned movement was established in 1956 with Yugoslavia and India as two of three founding countries of the organization was surely an additional impulse worth taking into account by the FF.

**From New Delhi to Los Angeles**

The AYP as such was related to the themes the FF had been approaching since 1950s both in the US and internationally. The FF organized a Conference on Urban Planning & Development in October 1956 to explore the major problems of urban development in the US and in the economically less-developed countries. It was prompted by the increasing problems of unplanned development in the US. Rapid growth of urban population both in the US and abroad was at that point a fact. So were the problems resulting from this growth, which the FF saw as equally critical whether they affected New Delhi or Los Angeles. The conference considered whether these problems were the same, whether research and action programs to solve them could be designed on common principles, and whether the experts
needed to handle them could be recruited and trained with the present resources and in similar ways.²⁹

Ernest Weissmann, at the time Assistant Director of the Bureau of Social Affairs in charge of Housing, Building & Planning at the United Nations in New York, was one of the key speakers at the conference. He presented his paper *The Problems of Urbanism in the Less Industrialized Countries*. For Weissmann urbanization meant not just cities and metropolitan areas, but a way of life, which reaches from the city into the village, and vice versa. To deal with it, he suggested urbanization must be placed within the framework of regional development.³⁰

What seems to be lacking in “general resource development” or “national planning” in many countries is that they fail to try to develop the resources of a region based on a geographic and economic entity, or to enlist the resources of the people of a region, so as to contribute to the development of the nation as a whole. Some countries with central planning – among them Yugoslavia – encountered difficulties and switched over to planning on the local level and, finding still greater difficulties, evolved the regional approach as the appropriate framework for general economic development.³¹

Weissmann cooperated with the FF on several occasions. In 1958 he wrote the Notes on a FF project: *Planning and Rehabilitation of the Villages of India* and in fact it was Weissmann, who recommended that Winnick visit Yugoslavia in 1964 to meet with Zdenko Kolačić and Branka Savić.³² The interests of the FF and UN apparently overlapped when it came to spatial and regional planning. This was made clear yet again when Fisher was offered the position as Director of the UN Program for Regional Development while working on the AYP.³³

When the FF terminated its support for the AYP, Fisher’s involvement with the foundation ended. Mušič, on the other hand, continued his collaboration on a different project, which extended Ford’s involvement with Yugoslavia in a new framework. In 1972 UPI received funding to cooperate with the University of Ljubljana’s Faculty of Architecture, Engineering and Geodesy. The FF’s goal was
to create a program that paired an architectural graduate school with a research and training center, but it did not succeed as initially envisioned. Instead, the Foundation granted the UPI $50,000 for two years for a series of four workshops. As they progressed, its educational material was quietly absorbed by Ljubljana’s Faculty of Architecture, Engineering and Geodesy. Given the promising results, the FF funded a fifth workshop entitled “Integrated Planning: Tasks, Approaches and Problems.”

Regional Development and the UN

In 1972, a Regional Development Center was established in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. The initiative developed directly out of the AYP proceedings. A letter from Marjan Tepina, the then director of the UPI to Weissman, in 1971 the Senior Regional Adviser at the UN, testifies to that. Tepina informed Weissmann about the development regarding the “Center for Research and Training in Regional Development and Planning.” It was Weissmann’s initiative as well as preparations carried out by Kosta Mihailović, Marko Śljajmer and Vladimir Mušič that “brought Yugoslavia’s State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs to express to the Social Council of the UN in written form the willingness for Yugoslavia to be the host for a center of the developing Regional Program.” The institutions involved were the Institute of Economics in Belgrade and the UPI in Ljubljana.

The center was developed through the Office des Nations Unites a Geneve in 1971 and in 1972. In February, Weissman reported from Belgrade to the UN in NY: “Yugoslav government decided to establish a Regional Development Center RESIO86 associating academic research and planning institutions mainly in Belgrade, Ljubljana and Zagreb with fieldwork extending also to other republics and serving particularly Africa and Near East. Pending long term financing possibly as joint United Nations Yugoslav project entities concerned prepared organize soonest experimental training program using Yugoslav bilateral and other resources for fellowships etc.”
What kind of role, if any, the center played in the context of global development, is yet to be determined. Likewise, another question remains: how and to what extent did the interests of the FF and the UN overlap? What is evident with the AYP is that the “technology transfer” could not unfold merely in terms of exporting a package of technocratic planning skills to Yugoslavia without adjustments. The socialist country experimenting with market socialism could obviously not base its idea of progress in land speculation for private profit. It did, however, seek investment to establish the basic infrastructure and industrial production.

One of the key results of the AYP were the computer programs developed for the work of the Demonstration Study of the Ljubljana region. Their purposes were to record the basis for the quantitative analysis done in Ljubljana and to provide a point of departure for continuing planning in the Ljubljana region, as well as for planning elsewhere. The program represented a “package which could be used as a basis for methodologically strong transportation planning effort. However, it was sufficiently adjusted so that land use and market criteria were included as facets of operation.” Each of the package segments was sufficiently independent to enable detailed examination of particular aspects of regional planning and development.38

Concluding Remarks

Despite different conceptions of space, such planning enabled the US and Yugoslavia to cooperate economically, which confirmed that collaboration between capitalist and socialist countries could bring progress to the developing world through investments. The implicit idea with such regional planning procedures was that predictability of spatial arrangements gave way to land speculation, while complicated computer programs were presented as the oracle of future progress.

What was not envisioned at the time was how such planning procedures would work in the absence of the socialist project. Namely, the socialist state under the described circumstances potentially served as a shield from exploitation and aimed
at creating a socialist society. After 1989 this shield started to disappear; the absence of laws to deal with common property, including land, in the post-socialist context gave way to theft on a vast societal scale resulting in inequalities on a global scale.

While technologically advanced planning strategies were embraced by all and promoted by the UN, the question of development was depoliticized. Using regional planning strategies in today’s conflicting world, whether in terms of environmental changes or disappearing human rights, therefore calls for a rethinking of basic principles of spatial planning. How this could be achieved, given the fact that the FF’s scholarships (in addition to several others) have successfully institutionalized their way of understanding space across educational and planning platforms on the highest multidisciplinary international level, remains an open question.

1 Secretary to Keast, June 13, 1968, Reel 2871, Grants U-Z o6800493, FA 7321, Ford Foundation records, Rockefeller Archive Center.
2 Ibid.
3 Dr. Winnick’s conference files document his continued interest and activity in the field of housing and urban studies both before and after he joined the Foundation. The files contain meeting books with agenda or programs, Dr. Winnick’s handwritten notes, reports or transcripts from the conferences, and pre-conference background information. Louis Winnick, Conferences, 1957-1969, Box 1–5, United States International Affairs Program, Ford Foundation records, Rockefeller Archive Center.
4 See for example Fredenrick Gutheim to Neal Hardy, June 3 1964, Folder 4, Box 2, Conferences, 1957-69, FA 601, United States International Affairs Program, Ford Foundation records.
6 “Louis Winnick’s travel notes, itineraries and correspondence,” Conferences, 1957-1969, Folder 4, Box 2, FA 601, United States International Affairs Program, Ford Foundation records.
8 The final evaluation of the AYP to WSU was written in 1972. Andrzej Korbonski, “Evaluation of the grant to Wayne State University,” Inter-Office Memorandum, April 24 1972, Reel 2871, Section 3 – Reports, Grants U-Z o6800493, FA 7321, Ford Foundation records, Rockefeller Archive Center.
9 Ibid.
10 Raymond Vernon and David L. Brich, “Report to the Ford Foundation on Urban and Regional Planning Project in Yugoslavia,” April 16 1970, p.21, Reel 2871, Section 4 –
Genera Correspondence, Grants U-Z 06800493, FA 7321, Ford Foundation records, Rockefeller Archive Center.

11 Ibid.
12 Ibid, 9-10.
13 Korbonski, “Evaluation of the grant.”
16 Ibid, p.7.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid, p.23.
19 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 “Team meeting summary,” Material AYP-JAP, Folder 09, Box VBM-1, Archive of Vladimir B. Mušič, Museum of Architecture and Design, Ljubljana, Slovenia.
25 “Ford Foundation records, United States International Affairs Program (USIAP), Deputy Vice President, Office Files of Louis Winnick.”
26 Jack Fisher, “Notes on the need for regional (spatial) planning at the state level in India,” 1968, Folder 009242, Box 383, FA739C, Catalogued Reports, Ford Foundation records, Rockefeller Archive Center.
28 Ibid.
29 “Abridged transcript of conference on urban planning and development held at the Ford Foundation,” October 10-11 1956, Folder 003477, Box 154, FA739B, Catalogued Reports, Ford Foundation records, Rockefeller Archive Center.
31 Ibid.
32 Winnick to Zdenko Kolačić, June 10 1964, Conferences, 1957-1969, Folder 4, Box 2, FA 601, United States International Affairs Program, Ford Foundation records.
34 Like comprehensive planning replaced master planning because it added to its physical dimensions a socioeconomic dimension, Integrated Planning replaced comprehensive planning by adding a political dimension.