

**Enrique Sanchez de Lozada, the Andean Indian Program, and the
Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC):
A Report on Research at the Archives**

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From the ashes of the First World War, the International Labor Organization (ILO) emerged to address the plight of industrial workers. Yet, by 1952, the ILO had embarked upon an ambitious multilateral enterprise aimed at peasants in the Andes Mountains, known as the Andean Indian Program or AIP. Confronting the paradox of the ILO's postwar turn toward rural and community development, my dissertation traces the formation of a global network of reformers and experts who became the principal foot soldiers of the AIP (1952-1972) and propelled it toward the center of postwar discussions of social and economic modernization. In short, my project reconstructs the networks of people, ideas, and institutions that merged to carry out the ILO's broader development agenda and examines the encounters that resulted from the implementation of the Andean Indian Program.

In January of 2009, I spent time working in two of the Rockefeller Archive Center's collections: the Papers of Nelson Aldrich Rockefeller (especially Record Group 4, containing

Nelson Rockefeller's Washington, D.C. Files) and the Rockefeller Foundation Records. My interest stemmed not only from the importance of these collections to the broader history of social and economic change in Latin America, but also from what I suspected was the indirect influence of the Foundation and the United States Office of Inter-American Affairs or OIAA (headed by Nelson Rockefeller during the Second World War) on the design of the Andean Program. I have uncovered no evidence that either the Rockefeller Foundation or the OIAA were ever directly associated with the ILO's projects in Latin America, yet in different ways each contributed to the increased focus on "underdevelopment" and modernization that characterized the activities of international reform networks in the post-World War II era. In general, the RAC's holdings support my conclusions about how the experiences and social networks established in the context of fighting the Second World War informed and shaped the "war" against "underdevelopment" waged during the Cold War.

My research suggests that the OIAA in particular was an important predecessor of the Andean Indian Program. Like the AIP, many OIAA programs reflected a similar emphasis on "self-help" and the application of technical "know-how." This was particularly true of the Institute for Inter-American Affairs, which began as a branch of the OIAA focused on rural development and technical assistance projects, but which outlived the OIAA itself to become an early pillar of the US government's foreign assistance programs. Some individuals who worked for the OIAA went on to careers in the international civil service and/or went to work for projects such as the AIP. Thus, I would argue that the OIAA served as a training ground for the technocrats that constructed the postwar "development" programs of the ILO and other international organizations. Regarding the ILO's Andean Program in particular, perhaps the most important of these individuals was Enrique Sanchez de Lozada, a Bolivian diplomat who fled

into exile in the United States during the 1930s, where he became an outspoken proponent of the Roosevelt administration's Good Neighbor Policy and an associate of Nelson Rockefeller.

Lozada's story suggests some of the ways in which World War II, and the expansion of international institutions to which it contributed, helped define the problem of "underdevelopment" and the disparate strategies adopted to address it.

A professor of international law who taught at the University of La Paz in Bolivia's capital city and at Harvard University in the United States, when he joined the OIAA Lozada was already a vocal advocate of a new approach to diplomacy on the part of the United States in Latin America, one that would help forge "the good will of the masses" and counteract Nazi efforts to infiltrate the region. Born into privilege and possessing all the advantages of education and social connection that it implied, Lozada's political instincts nevertheless convinced him of the need for significant social and economic changes in his native Bolivia and elsewhere in Latin America. In order to address long-standing class, ethnic, and racial conflicts, he predicted the growing influence of an incipient middle class in many Latin American countries that would wrest control of the masses from the ruling oligarchy. Essential to the recipe of reforms he proscribed were (public and private) investments from the United States in sanitation and public works, or "the kind of practical work you do in your own country," as he told a US audience in November 1940. As a means of gradually improving the level of common understanding that existed between the United States and its southern neighbors, he advocated an exchange program that prefigured the design of the US Peace Corps created in the 1960s. Both of these measures were seen by Lozada as ways of "crystallizing the identity of interest" between the new middle class and the United States. Lozada's ideas paralleled the rhetoric of the Roosevelt administration's Good Neighbor Policy, which he claimed "injected the human element into the

policies of the United States” for the first time. With the onset of World War II, Lozada attracted the attention of the new United States Coordinator of the Office of Inter-American Affairs (COIAA or CIAA, later renamed OIAA), Nelson Rockefeller. Rockefeller, in turn, appointed Lozada as a special advisor and speechwriter.

The RAC’s records demonstrate that, during the war, Lozada completed special reports on Pan-Americanism, rural education, and other subjects pertaining to Latin America. He also worked on training and literacy films contracted out by the OIAA to Walt Disney Films. His reports to and conversations with Nelson Rockefeller indicate that Lozada advocated what he called “regional internationalism,” which he suggested could be achieved “by endeavoring to influence, through example, other sections of the world in the ways of peaceful international living” and “by actively eradicating totalitarian theories within the [Western] Hemisphere itself.” According to Lozada, regional internationalism was part of a “dynamic conception of the world of tomorrow...which will be universal in scope but which will tend to solve the problems of everyday life.” Indeed, it was the absence of a “regional unifying policy” that led Lozada to advocate changes in the way the US State Department dealt with the region, ideas that found their way into a letter he drafted to then Secretary Cordell Hull for Nelson Rockefeller in September of 1944.

Perhaps more important than his influence as an advisor and occasional speechwriter for Nelson Rockefeller was the impression that Lozada’s service in the OIAA had on him personally. During the war, the OIAA performed a number of functions in support of the Allied war effort. It was primarily an organ of US government propaganda designed to combat Nazi fifth column activities in South America through press releases and radio broadcasts, as well as through more substantive technical and financial aid and development projects. Toward the end

of the war, the OIAA's focus shifted toward regional cooperation and collective security. For example, a special labor service feature printed by the OIAA, and available in the RAC's collections, championed the benefits of labor-management cooperation focused on raising production levels, which it claimed would produce a higher standard of living and full employment for all after the war. This perspective was hardly unique to the OIAA. Indeed, it was consistent with a nascent Fordist-Keynesian consensus promoted around the globe by economists, the actions of individual governments, and the arrangement of various international institutions.

For Lozada, his wartime experience at the OIAA proved highly instructive. The RAC's archives reveal that he came to see the office as a model for how to bring less economically developed regions of the world into the international fold, to fight the spread of totalitarian ideologies and to promote global economic growth. In an August 1945 memo, for example, he wrote that all hope of influencing the masses and middle classes of the American republics "for constructive international purposes" must be abandoned "unless there is simultaneous action to uplift their present living conditions." According to Lozada, the OIAA was a "small but very significant" precedent for "this type of policy," whether in the form of bilateral aid programs operated by the US government or multilateral technical assistance projects conducted under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) and other international bodies.

In the early 1950s, Lozada used the experience, skills, and contacts he acquired at the OIAA to gain a position with the UN that led to his work on the ILO's Andean Indian Program. With the help of several letters of introduction written by Nelson Rockefeller on his behalf, Lozada joined the staff of the United Nations Technical Assistance Program in 1951. The following year he was selected to serve on the survey mission, which examined the need for and

outlined the basic framework of what became the Andean Indian Program. In 1954, Lozada was selected as the first regional director of the AIP.

Lozada believed that the UN and ILO had an interest in the issue of indigenous integration “from [a] purely technological point of view,” as well as a matter of “human relations.” Consistent with the ILO’s general embrace of Fordist-Keynesian growth models, this meant that the success of the program would be measured by its contribution to steadily increasing productivity, especially improvements in agricultural yields. Increasing production (which could be quantified with relative ease) became a gauge of progress in the area of indigenous integration (which was much more difficult to translate into easily quantifiable terms). One example of how this pro-growth orientation affected Lozada’s management of the Andean Program and his relationship with government officials was the friction generated by the Bolivian government’s attempts at land reform. Although he was generally supportive of the regime that came to power after the 1952 Bolivian revolution, Lozada deemed its program to break up the old hacienda system a failure because large units of land were “completely pulverized by land reform without taking account of the production unit which it represented.” Instead, he favored land policies that first served “an economic function of national importance.” The goal of redistributing individual land titles was, according to Lozada, an infinitely less urgent priority. To this end, he attempted to stimulate interest in the AIP on the part of Nelson Rockefeller’s International Basic Economy Corporation, which was already involved in several “development” projects of its own in Venezuela and elsewhere in the region. Letters in the possession of the RAC suggest that Lozada’s overtures to IBEC officials such as Lawrence Levy received a polite, but lukewarm response.

The RAC’s holdings have enabled me to fill in the gaps of Lozada’s story and develop a

more comprehensive chronology of his attitudes and activities before and during his time as the Regional Director of the Andean Indian Program. Furthermore, the RAC records illustrate how important his relationship with Nelson Rockefeller remained years after he left the service of the OIAA.

The relative significance of the Rockefeller Foundation Records for my project is more problematic. After the Second World War, as before, the Foundation obviously continued its work supporting programs and individual studies in the areas of health, sanitation, and agriculture around the globe. Some of these projects were located in the countries affected by the Andean Indian Program, i.e. Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia. The Rockefeller Foundation archives indicate that Bolivian universities and individual scientists such as the plant geneticist Dr. Martín Cárdenas, for example, received numerous grants for agricultural research from the Foundation during the 1950s and 1960s. Some of these same institutions sometimes lent personnel and expertise to the AIP. Yet, as already noted, there is no evidence that the Foundation was in any way actively involved with the work of the AIP.

Two circumstances provide some basis for understanding the lack of collaboration between the AIP and the Foundation, despite their many areas of overlapping interest. As a matter of general policy, the Rockefeller Foundation possessed a fair amount of skepticism about the effectiveness of international associations. In the early 1950s, the director of the Foundation's Social Science Program, Joseph Willits, confided that, "international associations are as a rule poor mechanism for research." The "most productive investments," Willits concluded, "are those made in the best individuals or centers." Willits concluded that the Foundation "should never lose sight of the fact that [its] target is the *person* with insight, competence, drive, and integrity" [*italics mine*]. On the other side, the perspective of

international organizations and the technocratic reformers who directed their operations was often critical of the earlier efforts by private institutions such as the Foundation. As UNESCO deputy-director Malcolm Adiseshiah explained at an international conference in 1952, “previous efforts like those of the RF [Rockefeller Foundation] . . . seemed destined to be „piecemeal.”” Projects undertaken by the UN or its specialized organizations were meant to be “first attempt[s] at over-all planning . . . to see the problems of each nation in their entirety.” If widespread and systematic, such attitudes represented a significant obstacle to cooperation between private foundations and non-governmental organizations such as the Rockefeller Foundation and international bodies such as UNESCO and the ILO.